The role of legislative, executive and judicial mechanisms in ensuring a fair and effective asylum process, PhD thesis, Australian National University by Francis, Angus
 THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE 
AND JUDICIAL MECHANISMS IN 
ENSURING A FAIR AND EFFECTIVE 
ASYLUM PROCESS 
Angus James Francis 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of 




I, Angus James Francis, declare that except where acknowledged in the text, this 
thesis is my original work, undertaken under the supervision of Professor Penelope 
Mathew and Professor Kim Rubenstein.  It has not been submitted for a higher degree 
at any other university or institution. 
 
Angus James Francis 




I am very grateful to my supervisory panel, Professor Kim Rubenstein, Professor 
Penelope Mathew, Professor Peter Bailey, and J P Fonteyne.  I am especially thankful 
for the encouragement and guidance of Professor Mathew during the early stages of 
this thesis.  I also owe special thanks to Professor Rubenstein who agreed to act as my 
supervisor half-way through the writing process.  She has expertly, diligently and 
patiently guided me to completion, as well as fostered my engagement with other 
experts in the field. 
I am also heavily indebted to the assistance of other members of the academy over the 
course of this research.  The general direction of the thesis benefited from the 
comments of participants at a seminar I gave while a Visiting Fellow at the Refugee 
Studies Centre, Oxford University, in 2003.  Toward the other end of the process, I 
owe thanks to Professor James Hathaway for critical feedback on my central thesis at 
a seminar convened by Professor Rubenstein at the ANU College of Law in 2007.   
Individual chapters have also benefited from the guidance of members of the 
academy.  In relation to chapter 2, I owe special thanks to Professor Ian Hunter, my 
father-in-law, for unparalleled guidance on the material on state sovereignty and early 
modern European history.  Our discussions, which have ranged from Pufendorf to the 
modern era and back again, have always entertained and enlightened!  I would also 
like to thank Professor David Saunders who kindly provided similarly expert advice 
on an earlier version of chapter 2. 
Chapter 5 is based on a paper that I delivered at the workshop, Untangling the 
national from the international and the public from the private: the complexities of 
 iv
accountability and governance in a globalised world, at the Centre for International 
and Public Law, ANU College of Law, in July 2007.  I am grateful to the convenors, 
Professor Rubenstein and Dr Jeremy Farrall, for their invitation to take part in such a 
stimulating and thought-provoking workshop.  I also would like to thank the 
participants at the workshop for their feedback on my paper, especially Stephen Tully 
who refereed the revised paper that I submitted for publication.*    
Chapter 6 appears in article form in the International Journal of Refugee Law.**  I owe 
my appreciation to Dr Jane McAdam and Professor Hathaway and the journal’s two 
referees for detailed feedback on the draft article.  I was also lucky to have recourse to 
the editing skills of a retired English master, my father Dr Russell Francis.  The 
discussion in chapter 6 also relies heavily on my submissions invited by the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee as part of its inquiries into 
Australia’s offshore processing regime.  I thank the Committee members for their 
thoughtful engagement with those submissions as reflected in the inquiry reports.***   
The themes in chapter 7 are explored in two articles.  The first article, entitled 
‘Examining the role of legislators in the protection of refugee rights: toward a better 
understanding of Australia’s interaction with international law,’ is found in the 
Australian Journal of International Law.****  I express my thanks to the journal’s 
                                                          
* A revised version of the paper is due to appear as a chapter in Jeremy Farrall and Kim Rubenstein 
(eds) Sanctions Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World (CUP 2009 in press). 
** A Francis, ‘Bringing Protection Home: Healing the Schism Between International Obligations and 
National Safeguards created by Extraterritorial Processing’ (2008) 20(2) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 273-313. 
*** A Francis, Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Inquiry into 
the Migration Legislation Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006, June 2006; A 
Francis, submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Inquiry into the 
Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002, October 2002.  
**** A Francis, ‘Examining the Role of Legislators in the Protection of Refugee Rights: Toward a Better 
Understanding of Australia’s Interaction with International Law’ (2006) 13 Australian International 
Law Journal 147-163. 
 v
anonymous referee for his or her comments.  The second article appears in the 
Melbourne University Law Review.*  This article is based on a paper I delivered at 
the Legislatures and the Protection of Human Rights conference, hosted by the Centre 
for Comparative Constitutional Studies, University of Melbourne, in July 2006.  I am 
grateful to participants at the conference, as well as Professor Bryan Horrigan, for 
comments on my paper.  I also thank the Melbourne University Law Review’s 
referees for their critical feedback on the revised article, as well as Claire Agius of the 
Editorial Board for excellent editorial assistance.   
I would also like to thank those people who have made this thesis possible in other 
ways.  I owe deep gratitude, in particular, to the workers, volunteers and clients of the 
Refugee and Immigration Legal Service, the Refugee Council of Australia, WA Legal 
Aid, and the Refugee Advice and Casework Service for facilitating my engagement  
with Australia’s asylum process: Rob Lachowicz, Clyde Cosentino, Nitra Kidson, 
Ricardo Viana, Emma Robinson, Nick Poynder, Marg Le Seuer, Madhukar Naiker, 
Sonia Caton and Anthony Reilly.   
I am especially grateful to Marianne van Galen Dickie for allowing me to see inside 
the political process and for assistance in tracking down hard to get information on 
government policy.   
I also owe my thanks to staff from the UNHCR for their input, particularly Susan 
Harris-Rimmer, and members of head office in Geneva during my research period at 
the UNHCR library.   
                                                          
* A Francis, ‘The Review of Australia’s Asylum Laws and Policies: A Case for Strengthening 
Parliament’s Role in Protecting Rights through Post-Enactment Scrutiny’ (2008) 32 (1) Melbourne 
University Law Review 83-114. 
 vi
I owe special thanks to the support of fellow academics and staff at the University of 
Canberra and Griffith Law School, especially Professor Bryan Horrigan, Dr Alan 
Berman, and Darren Mullaly.   
A further debt is owed to the undergraduate and postgraduate students undertaking my 
course and clinic in refugee law at the Griffith Law School who have been unwitting 
foils for many of the ideas expressed in this thesis.   
I also express my gratitude to the staff, guest lecturers, and fellow visitors at the 
Refugee Studies Centre during my periods there. 
My sincere thanks to the unfailing moral and professional support of Professor Ross 
Buckley.  His faith in my abilities is more unshakable than my own! 
I would like to express my special thanks to my family.  My parents-in-law, Ian and 
Alison, have provided much appreciated mentorship and practical relief.  My siblings, 
Jo, Kate, Pete, and Jono, have kept me on the path.  My mother, Judy, has been a 
constant source of encouragement and understanding.   My father, Russell, 
exemplifies integrity and commitment.   
Finally, my deepest gratitude to my wife, Jane, and my children, Clare and Robert, for 




A good faith reading of core international protection obligations requires that states 
employ appropriate legislative, administrative and judicial mechanisms to ensure the 
enjoyment of a fair and effective asylum process.  Restrictive asylum policies 
instead seek to ‘denationalize’ the asylum process by eroding access to national 
statutory, judicial and executive safeguards that ensure a full and fair hearing of an 
asylum claim.  From a broader perspective, the argument in this thesis recognizes 
that international human rights depend on domestic institutions for their effective 
implementation, and that a rights-based international legal order requires that power 
is limited, whether that power is expressed as an instance of the sovereign right of 
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1   INTRODUCTION: CHALLENGES TO THE UNFETTERED 




States experiment with an array of restrictive asylum policies designed to prevent 
individuals from accessing protection.1  Visa requirements enforced by private 
carriers, expedited processes for ‘manifestly unfounded’ claims, interdiction and 
extraterritorial processing, expansive safe third country categories, restrictions on 
judicial review – all are examples of policies and practices that have made serious 
inroads into the opportunity of finding protection from persecution in today’s world. 
A common feature of many of those policies - as will become clearer as this thesis 
progresses - is the circumvention or erosion of national legislative, judicial and 
administrative mechanisms that provide the framework for asylum adjudication.  
There is a growing propensity to use unfettered administrative discretion for 
                                                          
1 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (EXCOM), Note on International 
Protection, Report by the High Commissioner, A/AC.96/1038, 29 June 2007, [39]; EXCOM 
Conclusion No. 29 (XXXIV) – 1983, (e); EXCOM Conclusion No. 33 (XXXV) – 1984, (d);  M 
Gibney, ‘The State of Asylum: Democratisation, Judicialisation and Evolution of Refugee Policy’ in S 
Kneebone (ed), The Refugees Convention 50 Years On (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003) 19-45, 19-21, 28; A 
Helton, ‘The Future of Refugee Protection’ in A Bayefski and J Fitzpatrick (eds), Human Rights and 
Forced Displacement (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2000) 213; J Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) 998; G Loescher, 
Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1993) 7-8; J Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Europe’s response to the arrival of asylum seekers: refugee 
protection and immigration control’, Working Paper No. 6, New Issues in Refugee Research, Centre 




determining the grant of protection, or for determining who can access asylum 
procedures set out in legislation and subject to statutory and constitutional avenues of 
independent review.  At the core of this trend, is a ‘denationalization’2 or 
‘deformalization’3 of the asylum process.  By this I mean the process whereby states 
(governments) avoid the formal institutional constraints placed on immigration 
control that arise in the national framework by denying asylum seekers access to the 
breadth of domestic judicial, statutory and administrative mechanisms ensuring a fair 
and effective asylum hearing.   
This thesis contests this trend toward arbitrary decision-making in the asylum arena.  
The central contention in this thesis is that a good faith reading of key international 
protection obligations requires that states implement appropriate national legislative, 
executive and judicial safeguards to ensure fair and effective asylum adjudication.  
This thesis identifies a range of progressive and effective measures that states should 
employ to ensure that the expertise of judicial, administrative and parliamentary 
bodies is properly brought to bear on the asylum process.  In light of this discussion, 
this thesis critically examines prominent restrictive asylum policies including visa 
requirements and carrier sanctions, interdiction and extraterritorial processing, and 
restrictions on the effective judicial scrutiny of asylum decision-making.  
Calling for improved asylum procedures, as this thesis does, takes us into the heart of 
a polemic that ‘generates hard questions about our … recognition of human rights and 
                                                          
2 A term coined by Guiraudon in the European context to describe the trend whereby political actors 
responsible for immigration control increasingly engage policies and policy-making venues in order to 
avoid the judicial, parliamentary and intra-executive constraints that arise in the national framework: V 
Guiraudon, ‘European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue shopping’ 
(2000) 38 Journal of Common Market Studies 251, 252. 
3 Harvey uses this term to describe what he sees as the steady rise of policies designed to undermine 
legality and the rule of law in the asylum arena:  C Harvey, Seeking Asylum in the UK: Problems and 
Prospects (Butterworths, London, 2000) 191. 
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our willingness to give them practical effect … the roles of state sovereignty and 
borders …’4  Today, asylum procedures are increasingly buffeted by real or perceived 
economic, social and political forces that lead policy-makers to prioritise immigration 
control over humanitarianism.5  This thesis enters this discussion with some 
trepidation, yet with a firm belief that the clear and concise enunciation of the legal 
obligations of states has its own normative force; one that ought sustain the rights of 
refugees above social unrest, economic cost, or short-term electoral gain.  Ultimately, 
this thesis expresses a commitment to an international refugee rights regime – and 
more broadly, an international legal order - where the enshrinement of rights in 
international law is matched by their enjoyment at the national level.     
I THE GRANT OF ASYLUM AND THE ‘ASYLUM PROCESS’ 
At the outset, it is necessary to define what is meant by ‘asylum’ and the ‘asylum 
process’.  Historically, asylum referred in simple terms to the state’s grant of entry 
and residence to foreigners seeking protection from political or religious persecution.  
The traditional view in international law is that states enjoy the right to grant asylum;6 
                                                          
4 S Legomsky, ‘Learning to live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency’ (2007) 
Stanford Law Review 413, 414. 
5 See generally, Gibney above n 1; Vedsted-Hansen, above n 1.  
6 L Bolesta-Koziebrodzki, Le Droit D’Asile (Leyde, AW Sythoff, 1962) 80; O Kimminich, Asylrecht 
(Berlin, Luchterhand, 1968), 46.  Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 
December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) UN Doc A/C 3/SR. 121) declares that every individual shall 
have the right to seek and enjoy asylum.  However, these words are traditionally regarded as not giving 
the individual a right to seek and be granted asylum.  In discussions concerning the proposed draft of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the words ‘to seek and to be granted’ asylum were rejected 
in favour of ‘to seek and to enjoy’.  Representatives considered that this change of wording 
safeguarded the right of states to grant asylum in their territory.  Efforts at the 1977 UN Conference on 
Territorial Asylum to extend the institution of asylum as a binding obligation in international law 
failed.  See generally, A Grahl-Madsen, Territorial asylum (Stockholm, Almquist & Wiksell 
International, 1980) 10.  
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thus, while a person may request asylum, a state decides whether to grant it.7  In other 
words, the traditional position in international law is that individuals have no right to 
asylum.8     
Today, however, the state has relinquished its discretion over central aspects of the 
traditional grant of asylum.  Most importantly, the non-return of a person to a territory 
where they fear persecution, which historically was implicit in the grant of asylum, is 
now a ‘specific and fundamental’ international obligation.9  The non-refoulement 
obligation, as it is known, requires that states protect individuals against expulsion or 
return (refoulement)10 to territories in which they face (or are at risk of removal to) 
persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
membership of a particular social group, or torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.11  The non-refoulement obligation is not subject to 
                                                          
7 G Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Its Standing and Scope in International Law’, 
A Study prepared for the Division of International Protection Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, July 1993, 3. 
8 A proposition accepted by the courts in Australia and the UK: Applicant A v Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 272-275 (Gummow J); T v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [1996] AC 742, 754 (Lord Mustill); R (On the Application of European Roma Rights 
Centre) v Immigration Officer, Prague Airport [2005] 2 AC 1, [12] (Lord Bingham).  See generally, 
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, ‘The Rights of Refugees: Report of the Committee and 
Background Materials’ (New Delhi, The Secretariat of the Committee, 1967) 44; F Morgenstern, ‘The 
Right of Asylum’ (1949) 26 The British Year Book of International Law 327, 327; P Weiss, ‘Legal 
Aspects of the Convention of 25 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees’ (1953) 30 The British 
Year Book of International Law 478, 481. Contra, M Garcia-Mora, International Law and Asylum as a 
Human Right (Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1956) 14, 23 (arguing that the right to be granted 
asylum exists as a right of the individual in international law).    
9 Goodwin-Gill, above n 7, 3. 
10 Professor Atle Grahl-Madsen observes that ‘the word “refoulement” is used in Belgium and France 
to describe a more informal way of removing a person from the territory and also to describe non-
admittance at the frontier’: A Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951, Articles 2-
11, 13-37, Published by the Division of International Protection of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 1997, commentary on art 33(1), [2].  He also notes that the practice 
corresponds with the Anglo-American concepts of exclusion and refusal of leave to land: Ibid.  See 
also, N Robinson, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Its History, Contents and 
Interpretation, A Commentary (Institute of Jewish Affairs, World Jewish Congress, New York, 1953) 
161.  
11 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
(entered into force 22 April 1954) (Refugee Convention), art 33, read together with the Protocol 
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reservation and applies irrespective of a person arriving without authorization at the 
frontiers of the state.12   
The degree to which the non-refoulement obligation has constrained the state’s 
traditional right to grant asylum is subject to ongoing debate.  While the non-
refoulement obligation is recognized as prohibiting states from returning a person by 
way of ejection from the jurisdiction to a frontier where he or she fears persecution, 
more controversial is the issue of whether the non-refoulement obligation also 
precludes the state from refusing admission to a person outside, or arriving at, the 
border.13  A further controversy is emerging with respect to the degree to which the 
state retains its traditional discretion to grant permanent residency as a component of 
asylum in circumstances where a person entitled to protection against refoulement 
cannot be sent to a third country.14  Thus, while it is common to talk about the ‘grant 
of asylum’ and the grant of protection against non-refoulement in the same breath, it 
                                                                                                                                                                      
relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into 
force 4 October 1967); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 
1987), art 3 (CAT); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 172 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (ICCPR).  The ICCPR contains an 
implied prohibition against the expulsion or return of a person to a territory where they face a real risk 
of a violation of their rights, such as a threat to the right to life (art 6) or torture or other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment (art 7): UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 20: 
Article 7 (Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 10 
March 1992, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, 10 March 1992, [9]; UN Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, [12]; ARJ v Australia, Communication No 692/1996, 11 
August 1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996, [6.8]-[6.9]; R (on the application of Ullah) v Special 
Adjudicator [2004] All ER 153, [21]-[24] (Lord Bingham).   
12 Minister for Immigration v Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1, [136] (Gummow J) (‘The provisions of the 
Convention “assume a situation in which refugees, possibly by irregular means, have somehow 
managed to arrive at or in the territory of the contracting State”’, citing to J Fitzpatrick, ‘Revitalizing 
the 1951 Refugee Convention,’ (1996) 9 Harvard Human Rights Journal 229, 245).  See also, G 
Goodwin-Gill, International Law and the Movement of Persons Between States (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1978) 140-141.   
13 P Weiss, ‘The International Protection of Refugees’ (1954) 48 The American Journal of 
International Law 193, 199; Hathaway, above n 1, 284, 301, 315-17.  
14 See generally, G Gilbert, ‘Is Europe Living Up to its Obligations to Refugees?’ (2004) 15 European 
Journal of International Law 963-987, 965. 
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is important to bear in mind that the extent to which the two are synonymous is hotly 
debated.15 
While acknowledging this debate, this thesis uses the phrase ‘asylum process’ to refer 
to the procedures adopted by states for identifying persons who are entitled to 
protection from refoulement under various international rights instruments.16  This 
follows the current vogue.17  The use of the phrase ‘asylum process’ in this thesis is, 
however, not intended to obscure the fact that the asylum procedures of certain states 
fall short in identifying persons entitled to protection against refoulement under all 
relevant international instruments.  It also must be remembered that in identifying an 
individual as a refugee for the purposes of the Refugee Convention, the individual 
becomes entitled to a range of rights designed to ensure their protection in light of 
their unique characteristics and circumstances – in addition to protection against 
refoulement.18   
Taking into account these caveats, probably a less loaded expression – and one used 
interchangably with ‘asylum process’ in this thesis - is to refer to the ‘eligibility 
process’.  Put simply then, an asylum or eligibility process refers to the procedures 
employed to determine an individual’s entitlement to protection under international 
rights instruments.    
                                                          
15 Harvey, above n 3, 44-46. 
16 See the collection of treaty articles, cases and commentary cited above n 11.   
17 See, eg, UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 
2001; Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in 
one of the Member States of the European Communities, Dublin, 15 June 1990, OJ (1997) C254/1 
(Article 1: ‘'Application for asylum` means: a request whereby an alien seeks from a Member State 
protection under the Geneva Convention by claiming refugee status within the meaning of Article 1 of 
the Geneva Convention, as amended by the New York Protocol’); Council of the European Union, 
Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member 
States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status, 2 January 2006. 2005/85/EC, [3] (setting out ‘the 
common standards for fair and efficient asylum procedures in the Member States’).   
18 J Hathaway and A Cusick, ‘Refugee Rights are Not Negotiable’ (2000) 14 Georgetown Immigration 
Law Journal 481, 493. 
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II THE STATE’S UNFETTERED DISCRETION OVER ITS ASYLUM 
PROCESS – THE ORTHODOX VIEW 
This thesis makes a case for a particular method of incorporation of states’ 
international obligations toward refugees in terms of the institutions and mechanisms 
they employ to determine an individual’s eligibility for protection.  In making this 
argument, this thesis must confront the fact that international and regional rights 
instruments do not expressly set out any obligation requiring states to adopt a formal 
asylum or eligibility process, nor do they expressly prescribe the procedures that 
states should adopt.   
The threshold requirement that states should instigate a process to determine who is 
entitled to protection is well-accepted.  It is acknowledged that a state’s protection 
obligations engage irrespective of a formal determination of protection entitlement.19  
This means that states are unable to disclaim their protection responsibilities by 
refusing to process asylum claims.  Thus, states should put in place procedures that 
determine whether a person who is subject to the state’s exclusion or expulsion 
machinery is eligible for protection.  The obligation to put in place procedures to 
determine eligibility in these circumstances cannot be seriously disputed.20   
A much more challenging issue is the extent to which states are bound in the way they 
design and deliver their asylum procedures.  The orthodox view is that states retain 
                                                          
19 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, [28] (1979) (‘A 
person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils the criteria 
contained in the definition.  This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee status is 
formally determined.  Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee but 
declares him to be one.  He does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized 
because he is a refugee’).  See also, J Hathaway and J Dent, Refugee Rights: Report on a Comparative 
Survey (York Lanes Press, Toronto 1995) 7.  
20 EXCOM Conclusion No 28 (XXXIII) – 1982, (c); EXCOM Conclusion No 71 (XLIV) – 1993, (i); 
EXCOM Conclusion No 74 (XLV) – 1994, (i); EXCOM Conclusion No 81 (XLVIII) – 1997; EXCOM 
Conclusion No 82 (XLVIII) – 1997, (d)(ii); EXCOM Conclusion No 87 (L) – 1999, (j); EXCOM 
Conclusion No 105 (LVII) – 2006, (n). 
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the discretion to determine the nature of their eligibility processes.21  As part of this 
general discretion, the traditional view in international law is that states enjoy the 
freedom to determine the nature of the involvement of their national institutions in the 
development, implementation and scrutiny of the asylum process.  The following 
discussion highlights evidence of the orthodox view in state practice, the work of 
international agencies, and in refugee law scholarship with a view to querying its 
continuing relevance in section III of this chapter. 
A The orthodox view in state practice 
The extent to which the orthodox view is reflected in state practice over time is open 
to debate.  On the one hand, the orthodox view would appear to be reflected in the 
variety of asylum processing systems that states have historically employed.  This has 
seen states experiment with a range of different legislative and administrative 
frameworks.  For example, after entrenching a right of asylum in its constitution,22 the 
Federal Republic of Germany introduced a Ausländergesetz (law on immigrants) in 
1965 that regulated in detail the procedures for determining eligibility for asylum.23  
In contrast, common law countries, such as the UK, Australia and the US, relied 
largely on administrative policy to decide asylum claims up to the 1970s and 1980s at 
which time they incorporated determination criteria into national legislation or 
binding rules.24   
                                                          
21 UNHCR Handbook, above n 19, [189]; P Hyndman, ‘The 1951 Convention and Its Implications for 
Procedural Questions’ 6 IJRL 245 (1994), 246; J Hathaway, ‘A Reconsideration of the Underlying 
Premise of Refugee Law’ (1990) 31 Harvard International Law Journal 129, 166-167; Simsek v 
MacPhee (1982) 148 CLR 636, 643 (Stephen J); Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Mayer 
(1985) 157 CLR 290, 294 (Gibbs CJ), 305 (Brennan J); NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v MIMIA (2005) 
222 CLR 161, 170 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
22 A Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, vol. 1 (AW Sijthoff, Leyden, 1966) 
23. 
23 Ibid 24. 
24 See, below n 247 -  and accompanying text. 
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The involvement of the courts in the asylum process has also varied across 
jurisdictions and across time.  The courts in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
France enjoyed a role in reviewing asylum decisions from as early as the 1960s.25  
This can be compared to the fact that the broad nature of administrative control over 
the eligibility process in the UK and Australia effectively excluded judicial review for 
much of the twentieth century.26  The courts in those jurisdictions seriously emerged 
as key players in the eligibility process only after the incorporation of eligibility 
criteria and procedures referred to above.27 
The well-documented trend in recent times toward restrictive asylum policies 
provides further evidence of the orthodox view in state practice.28  This has seen the 
steady instigation of practices designed to circumvent the financial and social costs 
associated with sophisticated asylum adjudication.29  Today, restrictive asylum 
policies rely on the understanding that states have the discretion to implement an 
abbreviated asylum adjudication system that limits access to the full range of judicial, 
legislative and administration protection safeguards that would otherwise be available 
within, or at the borders of, the state.30   
                                                          
25 Grahl-Madsen, above n 22, 23. 
26 See, below n 247 -  and accompanying text. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See, below n 566 -  and accompanying text. 
29 See, eg, Asylum Adjudication, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, below n 34, 4-11, Statement of Doris 
Meissner, Acting Commissioner, INS (referring to the range of measures proposed by the US 
administration to exclude access to the then recently introduced procedures found in the Refugee Act of 
1980). 
30 See, eg, Australia’s policy of processing asylum claims at processing centres in third countries under 
purely administrative procedures.  See, in particular, the comments of the then Minister for 
Immigration, Mr Ruddock, when introducing legislation to facilitate the processing of asylum claims 
for persons arriving in Australia in third countries: Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Representatives, Official Hansard, No. 14 2001, Tuesday 18 September 2001, 30846 
(justifying offshore processing – and the different standards applied therein – on the basis that asylum 
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On the other hand, the variety in the asylum procedures that states have utilized 
should not be overstated.  Despite the differences between jurisdictions, the post-war 
developments in France and Germany, and the later initiatives in common law 
jurisdictions in the 1970s and 1980s, can be viewed as part of a cross-jurisdictional 
trend in asylum procedures toward ‘legality’ or the rule of law.31  This saw an area 
traditionally dominated by administrative discretion gradually come under the 
supervision of legal regulation and judicial control.32  Furthermore, as later chapters 
of this thesis attest, statutory and curial safeguards continue to resurface despite 
efforts to remove or circumvent them through restrictive asylum practices.33 
Whether states have considered themselves bound as a matter of international law to 
subject the asylum process to the rule of law is open to debate.  It is possible to find 
statements by legislators emphasising that reforms to asylum procedures were 
necessary to meet states’ international protection responsibilities.34  Parliamentary 
committee reports and debates have also recognized the importance of rectifying the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
seekers arriving in Australia should not get a better ‘outcome’ than those processed by the UNHCR in 
third countries, such as Indonesia). 
31 See generally, Harvey, above n 3, 145. 
32 Harvey, above n 3, 145. 
33 See, eg, the unsuccessful attempts to oust judicial review of asylum decisions, below n 1064 – and 
accompanying text. 
34 See, eg, Asylum Adjudication, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First 
Session, How Do We Determine Who Is Entitled to Asylum in the United States and Who is Not?, 
October 14 and 16, 1981, Serial No J-97-66 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, US) 3 
(Senator Edward M Kennedy approving the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy’s 
recommendations (see below n 35) on the basis that ‘these are guidelines that we should pursue in 
establishing an asylum policy that accurately reflects our humanitarian tradition of welcoming 
refugees, and that meets out responsibilities under the U.N. Convention and Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees.’) 
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lack of statutory protections available to refugees historically in order to ensure that 
refugees are able to access and enjoy asylum.35   
But there are other statements in such reports and debates that preserve the state’s 
discretion to determine the composition of their asylum process, including the mix of 
administrative, legislative and judicial mechanisms, even while recommending greater 
regulatory and curial control.36  For instance, Osamu Arakaki observes that Japanese 
parliamentarians felt largely unconstrained by international or comparative precedents 
that might dictate the makeup of Japan’s asylum process when introducing new 
asylum legislation in the 1980s.37   
The formal espousal of the orthodox view, while following a cross-jurisdictional trend 
toward greater legal controls, is also apparent in national judicial decisions.  In two 
decisions in the 1980s, the High Court of Australia expressly endorsed the orthodox 
view.38  At around the same time, the courts in the UK and the US endorsed the 
orthodox view as represented in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
                                                          
35 See, eg, Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the 
National Interest, Committees on the Judiciary House of Representatives and United States Senate, 
Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, August 1981 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 
1981) 153, 154-155 (the Select Commission observed the importance of the Refugee Act of 1980 in 
rectifying the dire consequences of an historical lack of systematic procedures for refugees, eg the US’s 
denial of entry to Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany in the 1930s).    
36 See, eg, Refugee Status Determination Process, Report of the Task Force on Immigration Practices 
and Procedures, Office of the Minister Employment and Immigration, Government of Canada, Canada 
(1980), 1 (While acknowledging that fairness ‘in the area of refugee claims procedure’ is ‘crucial’, the 
Report referred to UNHCR requirements for the determination of refugee status as ‘general principles’ 
and reiterated that ‘the actual [refugee status determination] process is left for each country to establish 
on its own:’ Ibid 1).  See also, the US House Judiciary Committee Report explaining proposed 
provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980 which made mandatory the Attorney-General’s prior discretion 
to withhold deportation of a refugee: H.R.Rep. No. 96-608, 1-5 (1979) 17-18 (The Committee stressed 
the importance of codification of the mandatory requirement as a way of ‘clarifying’ the US’s 
obligations, while at the same time asserting that the existing scheme based on largely unfettered 
administrative discretion complied with art 33 of the Refugee Convention: Ibid).  See also, INS v Stevic 
467 US 407, 104 S Ct 2489, 2500 Fn 22 (1984).   
37 O Arakaki, Refugee Law and Practice in Japan (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008) 20-21. 
38 Simsek v MacPhee (1982) 148 CLR 636, 643 (Stephen J); Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v Mayer (1985) 157 CLR 290, 294 (Gibbs CJ), 305 (Brennan J).  
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Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.39  Recently, 
the orthodox view was restated by way of obiter dicta by a joint judgment of six 
members of the High Court of Australia.40  
Yet at the same time as the courts have formally espoused the state’s discretion to 
determine eligibility procedures they have also defended their own jurisdiction to 
review asylum decisions made by administrative officials.41  While these efforts bear 
the clear influence of international human rights,42 national courts have generally been 
unwilling to associate the right of asylum seekers to access judicial remedies with any 
limitations on the state’s discretion to determine the nature of its eligibility process in 
international law. 
This brief overview of state practice thus shows evidence of the orthodox view that 
states are free to engage in different modes of asylum processing.  On the other hand, 
                                                          
39 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Bugdaycay [1986] 1 WLR 155, 163 (Neill 
LJ) (refusing to interfere to protect suspensive appeal rights – a procedural requirement in the UNHCR 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status – on the basis that the appellant 
overstated the role of the Handbook, which ‘recognises that the practice to be adopted in various states 
will vary and the recommendations are clearly drafted in broad terms to cover many different situations 
and many different legal systems’); Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] 
AC 514, 524 (Lord Bridge of Harwich) (considered the procedural requirements set out in the UNHCR 
Handbook of no binding force either in municipal or international law); INS v Cardoza Fonseca 480 
US 421, 107 S.Ct 1207, 1217 Fn 22 (1987) (‘We do not suggest, of course, that the explanation in the 
U.N. Handbook has the force of law or in any way binds the INS … Indeed, the Handbook itself 
disclaims such force, explaining that “the determination of refugee status under the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol ... is incumbent upon the Contracting State in whose territory the refugee finds 
himself.”’)  For the position in the Handbook see below n 48 – and accompanying text.   
40 NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v MIMIA (2005) 222 CLR 161, 170 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, 
Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).  See also, Yogathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2003] 1 AC 920, [22] (Lord Hope) (‘nor did [the Refugee Convention] attempt to set out the 
procedures to be adopted by the contracting states for granting and withdrawing refugee status.’) 
41 See, eg, Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 (the High Court of Australia 
‘reading down’ a privative clause designed, in large part, to prevent asylum claimants from accessing 
the courts).  See generally, M Crock, ‘Judging Refugees: The Clash of Power and Institutions in the 
Development of Australian Refugee Law’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 51; C Dauvergne, 
‘Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times’ (2004) 67(4) Modern Law Review 588-
615.  See also, R Rawlings, ‘Review, Revenge and Retreat’ (2005) 68(3) Modern Law Review 378-410 
(discussing the extra-curial resistance of the UK judicial and legal establishment to an ouster clause 
proposed by the government as a means of limiting asylum appeals).   
42 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, [30], [37] (Gleeson CJ); Rawlings, 
above n 41, 401-402.  
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it also shows a competing cross-jurisdictional trend in state practice toward legality 
and the rule of law.  How these examples of state practice should be used to interpret 
the nature and scope of states’ obligations with respect to asylum procedures is 
another matter.  This issue is discussed further in this introductory chapter in section 
IV, which summarizes the interpretative approach developed in later chapters of this 
thesis. 
B The orthodox view in the work of international agencies 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the international 
agency charged with the supervision of the Refugee Convention.43  The Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (EXCOM) is the states’ body 
that supervises and directs the activities of the UNHCR.44  As part of its role, 
EXCOM develops conclusions that set international protection standards (EXCOM 
Conclusions).   
The 1977 EXCOM Conclusion on Determination of Refugee Status recommended 
that states should satisfy certain basic procedural requirements in their asylum 
procedures.45  The 1977 Conclusion also requested UNHCR to consider issuing a 
handbook relating to procedures and criteria for determining refugee status for the 
                                                          
43 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res 428(v), 
Annex, UN Doc A/1775 (1950), s 8; Refugee Convention, art 35. 
44 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res 428(v), 
Annex, UN Doc A/1775 (1950), s 4; International assistance to refugees within the mandate of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res 1166 (1953), [5]; Establishment of the 
Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(E/RES/672 (XXV)), 1959. 
45 EXCOM Conclusion No 8 (XXVIII)-1977, (e). 
  
14
‘guidance’ of states.46  Pursuant to this directive, the UNHCR issued its Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status in 1979.47  
These initiatives, while espousing basic procedural standards, did little to displace the 
orthodox view that states retained discretion in relation to the composition of their 
refugee determination systems.  First and foremost, the UNHCR Handbook expressly 
provides in relation to this issue that ‘[i]t is … left to each Contracting State to 
establish the procedure that it considers most appropriate, having regard to its 
particular constitutional and administrative structure.’48  In addition, the general 
position is that EXCOM Conclusions49 and the UNHCR Handbook50 are not binding 
on states as a matter of international law, dictating that states retain the discretion to 
comply with the procedural requirements found therein.   
Moreover, the procedural requirements in the 1977 EXCOM Conclusion on 
Determination of Refugee Status provided states with only minimal guidance so that 
‘party states went on to develop different internal procedures in an effort to meet their 
                                                          
46 Ibid (g). 
47 UNHCR Handbook, above n 19. 
48 UNHCR Handbook, above n 19, [189] (‘It is obvious that, to enable States parties to the Convention 
and to the Protocol to implement their provisions, refugees have to be identified. Such identification, 
i.e. the determination of refugee status, although mentioned in the 1951 Convention (cf. Article 9), is 
not specifically regulated. In particular, the Convention does not indicate what type of procedures are 
to be adopted for the determination of refugee status. It is therefore left to each Contracting State to 
establish the procedure that it considers most appropriate, having regard to its particular constitutional 
and administrative structure’).   
49 A Corkery, ‘The Contribution of the UNHCR Executive Committee to the Development of 
International Refugee Law’ (2006) 13 Australian International Law Journal 97-127, 107; J Sztucki, 
‘The Conclusions on the International Protection of Refugees adopted by the Executive Committee of 
the UNHCR Programme,’ 1 IJRL 285 (1989), 306; Hathaway, above n 1, 113.  The use of EXCOM 
Conclusions is currently under review by the UNHCR: Review of the Use of UNHCR Executive 
Committee Conclusions on International Protection, Report of the Evaluation Team led by Bryan 
Deschamp, 9 June 2008. 
50 Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, 524 (Lord Bridge of 
Harwich); INS v Cardoza Fonseca 480 US 421, 107 S.Ct 1207, 1217 Fn 22 (1987). 
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obligations.’51  EXCOM continues to periodically remind states of the importance of 
providing access to a fair and effective asylum process, but without specifying 
procedural requirements in any greater detail.52   
EXCOM also has made repeated general appeals to states to ensure the effective 
implementation of the Refugee Convention through appropriate administrative and 
legislative measures, including national procedures for determining refugee status.53  
However, those general conclusions stop short of recommending what form those 
measures or procedures should take; nor is it clear from the text of the conclusions 
whether the call on states to adopt ‘appropriate administrative and legislative 
measures’ derives from any particular international obligation/s.   
EXCOM has provided greater guidance in relation to the minimum requirements of 
expedited proceedings where claims are ‘clearly abusive’ or ‘manifestly unfounded’.54  
Yet that effort has done little to erode the orthodox view in state practice; instead, it 
has simply assured that states have discretion to implement abbreviated asylum 
procedures. 55   
Greater focus on the specific make up of national asylum procedures has come about 
through the UNHCR’s follow up work on the Global Consultations on International 
Protection held in 2001. The Global Consultations were launched by UNHCR in an 
                                                          
51 W Gunther Plaut, Refugee determination in Canada, Proposals for a New System: A Report to the 
Honourable Flora MacDonald Minister of Employment and Immigration, 17 April 1985 (Minister of 
Supply and Services, Canada, 1985), 14. 
52 EXCOM Conclusion No 28 (XXXIII) – 1982, (c); EXCOM Conclusion No 71 (XLIV) – 1993, (i); 
EXCOM Conclusion No 74 (XLV) – 1994, (i); EXCOM Conclusion No 81 (XLVIII) – 1997; EXCOM 
Conclusion No 82 (XLVIII) – 1997, (d)(ii); EXCOM Conclusion No 87 (L) – 1999, (j); EXCOM 
Conclusion No 105 (LVII) – 2006, (n). 
53 EXCOM Conclusion No 2 (XXVII) – 1976, (c); EXCOM Conclusion No 11 (XXIX) -1978, (h); 
EXCOM Conclusion No 14 (XXX) – 1979; EXCOM Conclusion No 29 (XXXIV) – 1983, (g), (h); 
EXCOM Conclusion No 41 (XXXVII) – 1986, (g); EXCOM Conclusion No 49 (XXXVIII) – 1987, 
(d); EXCOM Conclusion No 57 (XL) – 1989, (a) – (d).  
54 EXCOM Conclusion No 30 (XXXIV) – 1983.   
55 See below n 597 – and accompanying text for criticisms of EXCOM Conclusion No 30. 
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attempt to engage states and other actors in a wide-ranging discussion on refugee 
protection.  The Consultations led to a renewed appreciation of the importance of ‘the 
adoption and implementation of national refugee legislation and procedures for the 
determination of refugee status’.56   
Since the Global Consultations, the UNHCR has been active in strengthening the 
institutional capacity of certain states to deliver fair and effective asylum processes – 
focusing on incorporating asylum procedures through national legislation, providing 
access to effective remedies, and ensuring the quality of administrative decision-
making.57  Furthermore, UNHCR has increased its calls for states that have not done 
so to accept responsibility for processing asylum claims within their jurisdiction – 
acknowledging that UNHCR ‘cannot substitute for national protection systems in any 
meaningful way.’58 
It is unclear to what extent these more recent endeavours make inroads into states’ 
traditional discretion in relation to asylum processing.  While delegates to the Global 
Consultations reached broad agreement on the need for ‘basic common standards for 
refugee status determination procedures derived from the framework of international 
refugee law’, they also acknowledged the need for ‘flexibility’ so as to ‘take account 
                                                          
56 Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status 
of Refugees, UN Doc HCR/MMSP/2001/09, 13 December 2001, incorporated in EXCOM, Agenda for 
Protection, UN Doc EC/2/SC/CRP.9/Rev.1, 26 June 2002, [6].  
57 UNHCR’s Strengthening Capacity Project commenced in 2006: UNHCR, Strengthening Protection 
Capacity Project, Protection Gaps Framework for Analysis Enhancing Protection of Refugees (2nd 
edition, 2008). 
58 See, most recently, UNHCR, Statement by Ms Erika Feller, Assistant High Commissioner - 
Protection, at the fifty-ninth session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's 
Programme: ‘Protection makes a difference. It can mean the difference’, 8 October 2008, 6.  See also, 
UNHCR, Note on International Protection, 30 June 2008, A/AC.96/1053, [25]; UNHCR, Note on 
International Protection, 29 June 2007, A/AC.96/1038, [18]. 
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of national and regional specificities and domestic legal and administrative 
systems.’59   
During the Consultations, the UNHCR identified a common set of procedural 
standards that could form the basis of a new EXCOM Conclusion on Asylum 
Procedures.60  Yet these standards were expressed as ‘best practice’ that were to be 
‘promoted’ as examples of evolutions in state processing.61  Use of the term ‘best 
practice’ suggests that it was thought that states retain ‘flexibility’ in the 
implementation of asylum procedures.  Resort to the notion of ‘best practice’ possibly 
reflects the expectation that states are likely to be resistant to a set of prescriptive (as 
opposed to aspirational) processing requirements.  The delay in the formulation of the 
proposed EXCOM Conclusion on Asylum Procedures perhaps bears this out. 
C The orthodox view in refugee law scholarship 
In the 1960s, the founding figure of modern refugee law scholarship, Professor Atle 
Grahl-Madsen, wrote that ‘each Contracting State [to the Refugee Convention] is in 
every respect free to make its own eligibility determination.’62  While he drew 
attention to the beneficial effects of legislation, administrative decrees, and judicial 
decisions in translating a state’s international protection obligations into binding 
municipal law,63 Grahl-Madsen did not imply that states were required as a matter of 
                                                          
59 EXCOM, Fifty-third session, Global Consultations on International Protection: Report of the 
Meetings within the Framework of the Standing Committee (Third Track), Report of the Second 
Meeting in the Third Track, 28-29 June 2001, [29]. 
60 UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001 
[50]; EXCOM, Fifty-third session, Global Consultations on International Protection: Report of the 
Meetings within the Framework of the Standing Committee (Third Track), Report of the Second 
Meeting in the Third Track, 28-29 June 2001, [29]. 
61 UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001, 
[3], [50]. 
62 Grahl-Madsen, above n 22, 339. 
63 Grahl-Madsen, above n 22, 24-27. 
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international law to employ any particular municipal measures (or combinations of 
such measures) when constructing their eligibility procedures.   
In keeping with his general view, Grahl-Madsen did not suggest that states were 
obliged to incorporate their eligibility procedures in binding statutory provisions.  He 
also did not suggest that states were required to engage any particular administrative 
measures in their asylum process.  Moreover, Grahl-Madsen nowhere suggests in his 
treatise on the status of refugees in international law64 or in his draft commentaries65 
on the Refugee Convention that states must ensure access to their courts for the 
purpose of allowing refugees to enforce the state’s international protection 
obligations, including the refugee’s entitlement to protection.  Although he assumes at 
various places in his work that refugees will have access to municipal remedies to 
enforce their international rights,66 there is no indication in his writings that states 
were obliged to grant access as part of the eligibility process.  Grahl-Madsen’s 
approach is characteristic of other early commentators on the Refugee Convention.67   
On this issue, refugee law scholarship over the years has largely followed the lead of 
early writers.68  Scholars who have addressed national asylum adjudication 
procedures have generally done so on the basis of salient principles of administrative 
law and constitutional due process69 or immigration control policy.70  Relatively few 
                                                          
64 Grahl-Madsen, above n 22. 
65 Grahl-Madsen, above n 10.   
66 Ibid 59. 
67 Robinson, above n 10, 50, 112-113. 
68 Hyndman, above n 21, 246; Hathaway, above n 21, 167; D Johnson, ‘Refugees, Departees and 
Illegal Migrants’ (1980) 9 Sydney Law Review 11, 46-47; R Schaffer, ‘South East Asian Refugees: The 
Australian Experience’ (1976-1977) 7 Australian Yearbook of International Law 200, 203-204; D 
Ayling and S Blay, ‘Australia and International Refugee Law: An Appraisal’ (1989) 9 University of 
Tasmania Law Review 245, 258.  
69 D Anker, ‘The Mischaracterized Asylum Crisis: Realities Behind Proposed Reforms,’ (1994) 9 
American University Journal of International Law and Policy 29, 37; Legomsky, 2000, below n 774, 
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scholars have rigorously analyzed the obligatory nature of asylum procedures under 
international law.71  
There is also a dearth of scholarship that systematically considers the issue of the 
obligatory role of national institutions in the asylum process.  The major exception to 
this statement is the work of modern scholars who – in an apparent departure from 
earlier scholarship – argue that the courts should review asylum decisions as part of 
the state’s express obligations to provide persons seeking protection with access to the 
courts.72  Yet the literature to date has not seriously countenanced the possibility that  
other national mechanisms essential to a fair and effective asylum process might also 
be mandated as a matter of international law.   
III CHALLENGES TO THE STATE’S UNFETTERED DISCRETION 
TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF ITS ASYLUM PROCESS 
Given that the orthodox view permeates state practice and refugee law scholarship, 
one might expect that its foundations are well-established and explained.  This is not 
the case.  Nevertheless, it is possible to point to certain basic propositions and notions 
that inform and underly it.  This section asserts that these are increasingly susceptible 
to challenge in light of the evolving understanding of international refugee and human 
                                                                                                                                                                      
622 (basing his analysis of US asylum adjudication on ‘fundamental goals of any adjudicative process 
… accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability’); J Ramji-Nogales, A Schoenholtz, and P Schrag, ‘Refugee 
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication’ (2007) 60 Stanford Law Review 295 (pleading the need 
to foster adherence to the principle of stare decisis in asylum adjudication in order to ensure accuracy, 
consistency, and public acceptance). 
70 Hailbronner, below n 620 (supporting the application of visa requirements and other measures 
designed to restrict access to asylum procedures on the belief that asylum in Europe is an avenue of 
illegal migration and should be subject to immigration controls). 
71 With some notable exceptions, see, eg, Hyndman, above n 21 (deriving core processing standards 
from the definition of refugee found in the Refugee Convention).  See also, Legomsky, 2003, below n 
855, 655 (arguing that unfair asylum procedures constitute a breach of art 33 of the Refugee 
Convention or, alternatively, a breach of the principle of fair process as a ‘general principle of law’ in 
international law). 
72 See, eg, Hathaway, above n 1, 647-650. 
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rights law.  As a consequence, this thesis seeks to re-examine the orthodox opinion 
that states are in no way bound in the way they compose their asylum procedures. 
A Obligations of result and means 
The basic proposition that informs the orthodox view is that there is no express 
requirement on states to implement an asylum process, nor is there any express 
obligation on states to employ particular processing mechanisms.  A key notion that 
underlies this basic proposition is that international protection obligations are 
‘obligations of result’.73  International rights instruments simply identify the ‘result’ 
expected of states, while leaving states to determine the means for their realization.  
By way of illustration, it might be argued that the ‘means’ employed by the state to 
safeguard against refoulement are irrelevant so long as the state achieves the ‘result’ 
of non-refoulement.   
This is the basis of the belief that states do not need to impose internal limitations on 
officials so long as they do not, in fact, refoule.  Employing this logic, Australia’s 
Attorney-General’s Department submitted in evidence to a Senate inquiry into 
Australia’s asylum process: 
The government does not need to legislate to regulate its own behaviour.  The 
government can simply undertake not to, and in fact not, refoule people … Where the 
obligation is only on the government, the government can simply undertake to fulfil 
that obligation without any law to compel it to do so.74 
                                                          
73 See, eg, J Hathaway, ‘A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law’ (1990) 31 
Harvard International Law Journal 129, 166, Fn 222 (‘State responsibilities under the Convention are 
in the nature of obligations of result, not obligations of conduct or means’). 
74 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Legal and Constitutional References 
Committee, A Sanctuary under Review: An Examination of Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian 
Determination Processes, June 2000 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000), 58. 
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The notion of ‘obligations of result’ furthermore feeds the false dichotomy between 
compliance with the Refugee Convention ‘in theory’ and ‘in practice’.  On the one 
hand, official state reports express satisfaction that processing arrangements meet the 
particular state’s international obligations ‘in theory’, while on the other proposing the 
reform of asylum procedures to ensure that they facilitate ‘in practice’ the proper 
identification of persons in need of protection.75  While there has been a growing 
awareness among states that certain arrangements better facilitate the proper 
determination of refugee status, there is a general failure by states to acknowledge that 
the satisfaction of their international obligations depends on the pursuit of practically 
effective asylum procedures (as opposed to some ‘theoretical’ or ‘in principle’ 
compliance).   
Whether the notion of ‘obligations of result’ that underlies the orthodox view ever 
accorded with the true object of international or regional human rights treaties is 
highly doubtful.76  In essence, the idea that protection obligations are ‘obligations of 
result’ reflects a traditional, but limited, understanding of civil and political rights.  
States, it is argued, are obligated to simply refrain from interfering to breach such a 
right.  They are under no obligation to put in place measures to protect against breach 
of the right by state officials or private individuals or to ensure that individuals 
practically enjoy the right in question.  Thus, for instance, the non-refoulement 
obligation is satisfied so long as the state does not actively seek out and exclude or 
expel refugees; the state is under no duty to adopt positive measures to ameliorate the 
effects of general immigration controls.   
                                                          
75 Ibid 51 (‘While the Committee is satisfied that the present arrangements meet Australia’s obligation 
under the Refugee Convention in theory, consideration should be given to whether the actual 
procedures that are in place to give effect to those arrangments, in practice, facilitate the proper 
determination of refugee status.’) 
76 See below n 267 – and accompanying text.   
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B The importance of positive measures to the effective enjoyment of rights 
This construction of civil and political rights is fundamentally at odds with the nature 
of the obligations imposed on states under human rights treaties.  Human rights 
treaties require states to ensure the effective operation of rights within their 
jurisdictions through positive measures - mechanisms that ensure the practical 
implementation of states’ international obligations.77  Rights embody both an 
obligation to refrain from direct action leading to an infringement, as well as an 
obligation to adopt mechanisms or means to ensure the practical enjoyment of the 
right.78  Thus, states are required to implement positive measures that ensure the 
practical enjoyment of a right even though the right contains no express mention of 
those measures.79 
The application of positive measures in the context of a state’s international protection 
obligations, such as the non-refoulement obligation in art 33 of the Refugee 
Convention, challenges the proposition that states have unlimited discretion in how 
                                                          
77 See, eg, United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31 [80] Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26/05/2004, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, [8]; Dzemajl v Yugoslavia, CAT Case No 161/2000, Decision adopted on 
21 November 2002, [9.6]: (‘The positive obligations that flow from the first sentence of article 16 of 
the Convention include an obligation to grant redress and compensate the victims of an act in breach of 
that provision. The Committee is therefore of the view that the State party has failed to observe its 
obligations under article 16 of the Convention by failing to enable the complainants to obtain redress 
and to provide them with fair and adequate compensation.’).  See also, the doctrine of positive 
obligations developed by the ECtHR, A v the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, Reports, 1998-VI, 
2699, § 22; Z and Others v the United Kingdom [GC], No 29392/95, §§ 73-75, ECHR 2001-V; 
(recognizing the positive obligations of Member States to put in place measures designed to ensure that 
individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment); Golder v UK (1975) Series A No 18, and Airey v. Ireland (1979) Series A No 32 (holding 
that art 6 of the ECHR imposed positive obligations on Member States to provide legal aid); Tysiac v. 
Poland, Application No. 5410/03, 20 March 2007, [112] (‘for the assessment of positive obligations of 
the State it must be borne in mind that the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a 
democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention’).  See generally, A Mowbray, The 
development of positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European 
Court of Human Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004); C Dröge, ‘Positive Verpflichtungen der 
Staaten in der Europaischen Menschenrechtskonvention’ [‘Positive Obligations of States in the 
European Convention on Human Rights’] (2003) 159 Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht 
und Völkerrecht 379-392. 
78 See below n 267 – and accompanying text.   
79 Agiza v Sweden, Communication No 233/2003, UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005), [13.6]. 
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they compose their asylum procedures.  Increasing recognition is given to the fact that 
positive measures are required to safeguard the rights of refugees.80  International and 
regional rights bodies are increasingly petitioned to hold states to a positive obligation 
to protect individuals from exposure to forseeable risks of violations of core rights in 
another jurisdiction caused by expulsion.81   
Significantly, this substantive obligation is accompanied by growing recognition of 
the importance of a corresponding procedural obligation on states to ensure the 
effectiveness of the non-refoulement obligation by providing an effective remedy 
prior to deportation.82  This requirement is imposed irrespective of the fact that there 
is no mention of an effective remedy in, for instance, art 3 of the CAT.83  There is no 
reason in principle why this same reasoning should not be applied to other 
administrative, legislative and judicial mechanisms needed to ensure a fair and 
effective asylum process.  Such an approach recognizes that refugee law is a ‘dynamic 
body of law’ that is informed by the broad object and purpose of the Refugee 
Convention and by developments in human rights law.84   
                                                          
80 See below n 386 – and accompanying text.   
81 See also, the jurisprudence under the ECHR: Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439; D v 
United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423; Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413; Cruz Varas v 
Sweden (1991) 14 EHRR 1; Vilvarajah v United Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 248; HLR v France (1997) 
26 EHRR 29; Gonzalez v Spain (Application No 43544/98, 29 June 1999, unreported); Dehwari v 
Netherlands (2000) 29 EHRR CD 74; Hilal v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 31. 
82 See, eg, Agiza v Sweden, Communication No 233/2003, UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005), 
[13.6] (‘The Committee observes that the right to an effective remedy for a breach of the Convention 
underpins the entire Convention, for otherwise the protections afforded by the Convention would be 
rendered largely illusory. In some cases, the Convention itself sets out a remedy for particular breaches 
of the Convention, while in other cases the Committee has interpreted a substantive provision to 
contain within it a remedy for its breach.  In the Committee’s view, in order to reinforce the protection 
of the norm in question and understanding the Convention consistently, the prohibition on refoulement 
contained in article 3 should be interpreted the same way to encompass a remedy for its breach, even 
though it may not contain on its face such a right to remedy for a breach thereof.’ [Footnotes omitted]).   
83 Ibid. 
84 See below n 346 – and accompanying text. For the importance of forging the links between refugee 
law and international human rights law, see, Summary Conclusions: The Principle of Non-Refoulement, 
Adopted at the expert roundtable organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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In step with these initiatives, UNHCR’s recent Notes on International Protection 
expressly draw attention to the obligation on states to provide refugees with equal 
protection under the law and access to an effective remedy.85  Recent comments by 
the UNHCR on proposed changes to asylum procedures have drawn a similar link 
between abbreviated asylum procedures and the increased risk of refoulement.86  
These comments complement new EXCOM Conclusions calling upon states to 
implement gender-sensitive and child-sensitive asylum procedures,87 as well as 
procedures that cater for claims to complementary forms of protection under human 
rights treaties.88    
Moreover, the UNHCR is more vigilant in its insistence on the non-discriminatory 
operation of national asylum procedures.89  This has major implications in terms of 
the state’s discretion to deny certain groups of asylum seekers access to the general 
asylum procedures found in national legislation.  In relation to Australia’s offshore 
processing of asylum claims, for example, the UNHCR made submissions to 
Australian Senate inquiries that the denial of access to onshore statutory and judicial 
asylum safeguards to certain groups of refugees was discriminatory and imposed a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, in the context of the Global Consultations 
on International Protection (University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 2001); UNHCR, Note on 
International Protection, 30 June 2008. A/AC.96/1053, [60];  EXCOM Conclusion No 95 (LIV), 2003, 
(k), (l); EXCOM Conclusion, No 50 (XXXIX) – 1988, (b); EXCOM Conclusion No 62 (XLI) – 1990, 
(a)(ii); EXCOM Conclusion, No 65 (XLII) – 1991, (u); EXCOM Conclusion No 68 (XLIII) – 1992, 
(x); EXCOM Conclusion, No 71 (XLIV) – 1993, (cc), (ee); EXCOM Conclusion No 103 (LVI) – 2005 
(c).  
85 See, most recently, UNHCR, Note on International Protection, 30 June 2008, A/AC.96/1053, [34]. 
86 UNHCR, Provisional Comments on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards on 
Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status (Council Document 
14203/04, Asile 64, of 9 November 2004), 8 (concluding on the basis of its specific concerns that ‘the 
Directive itself may not be sufficient to safeguard the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in the 
1951 Convention and in international human rights law’). 
87 EXCOM Conclusion No 105 (LVII) – 2006, (n); EXCOM Conclusion No 107 (LVIII) – 2007, (c).  
88 EXCOM Conclusion No 103 (LVI) – 2005, (q) and (r).  




penalty on those refugees due to the mode of their arrival.90  In another prominent 
example, the UNHCR recommended that EU states legislate to ensure the non-
discriminatory application of the EU Asylum Procedures Directive (which seeks to 
ensure uniform asylum procedures in EU members states).91   
Putting aside for the moment the important issue of the binding nature of UNHCR and 
EXCOM views and comments, these actions indicate the scope of positive measures 
needed to properly observe the non-refoulement obligation.  As such, they provide 
evidence of a fundamental challenge to the notion that the ‘means’ required to 
implement the non-refoulement obligation are inconsequential and discretionary – 
thereyby questioning the traditionally passive expectation upon states when it comes 
to the construction of asylum procedures.   
C The progressive realization of rights 
Continued reliance on the orthodox view that states have free reign to construct their 
asylum procedures implies that international protection obligations are static.  In 
accordance with the orthodox view, states are under no duty to utilize new 
mechanisms or measures or improvements (eg in administrative justice) that better 
ensure the identification of persons entitled to protection.   
As an illustration, the Canadian Government’s refusal to offer asylum seekers 
independent merits review – an evolution in administrative justice – implicitly relies 
on the view that it is not obliged to take advantage of the benefits that such review 
would bring in terms of ensuring the consistency and reliability of refugee status 
                                                          
90 See, below n 955 -  and accompanying text. 
91 UNHCR, Provisional Comments on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards on 
Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status (Council Document 
14203/04, Asile 64, of 9 November 2004), 6. 
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determinations.92  The Canadian Government instead maintains that initial 
determinations with a right to apply for leave to seek judicial review is sufficient to 
ensure that Canada’s asylum process complies with international law.93 
Conversely, the view that states have a wide discretion in the composition of their 
asylum procedures goes hand in hand with the proposition that states are not obligated 
to take positive steps to ameliorate the adverse impact that immigration control 
mechanisms may have on access to asylum procedures.  Specifically, the non-
refoulement obligation is interpreted not to require states to facilitate access to asylum 
procedures by developing protection safeguards that ameliorate new and sophisticated 
border control techniques.94   
Yet there is a fundamental conflict between this ‘static’ approach to key international 
protection obligations and how we understand human rights today.  As discussed in 
chapter 3 of this thesis, states are obligated to progressively realize international 
human rights within their jurisdiction through evolving safeguards.95  The Refugee 
Convention and cognate rights instruments are to be regarded as living instruments 
that must be interpreted and applied in order to ensure their effectiveness today.96  
                                                          
92 House of Commons, Canada, Safeguarding Asylum – Sustaining Canada’s Commitments to 
Refugees, Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, May 2007, 39th 
Parliament, 1st Session, n 17 – 31 and accompanying text (recommending that the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada immediately implement the Refugee Appeals Division as set out 
in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002 (Canada)).  The Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act received royal assent on 1 November 2001 and came into force on 28 June 2002.  The 
Act created the Refugee Appeal Division – a merits review body.  The Refugee Appeal Division was 
not instituted. 
93 Government Response to the Fifteenth Report of the Statnding Committee on Citizenship and 
Immigration, Safeguarding Asylum – Sustaining Canada’s Commitment to Refugees, [B – Refugee 
Appeal Division]. 
94 For a typical argument along these lines, see: Hailbronner, below n 620, 354.  See further below n 
566 – and accompanying text. 
95 See below n 358 – and accompanying text. 




Accepting that states are free to languish or even regress to inferior and substandard 
protection safeguards denies the evolutionary quality of rights.   
Fair and effective asylum procedures, it is argued in this thesis, should be defined in 
accordance with the dynamic evolutionary obligations they are designed to 
safeguard.97  They should therefore be pushed forward, not backward.  This entails, 
for instance, taking advantage of improving standards of administrative justice, such 
as independent merits review.  In this light, ‘best practice’98 in asylum processing 
takes on an obligatory character, not because of prevailing state practice or as an 
instance of general principles of international law, but because of the overarching 
obligation upon states to ensure the progressive realization of key international 
protection obligations.  The work of international agencies, regional courts and 
commissions, parliaments, national courts, law reform bodies and human rights 
agencies, as well as jurists, help define and develop our understanding of ‘best 
practice’.   
D Separating national safeguards from international obligations 
A final presumption underlying the orthodox view is the separation between the 
satisfaction of states’ international protection obligations and national mechanisms for 
ensuring the effectiveness of asylum procedures.  It is not uncommon for state 
inquiries to base recommendations for greater procedural fairness in the asylum 
process on ‘domestic’ standards of procedural fairness, yet without linking those 
standards to states’ international obligations.99   This understanding can be contrasted 
                                                          
97 See below chapter 4. 
98 UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001 
[50]. 
99 Refugee Status Determination Process, above n 36, 6 (‘The Task Force is of the view that the best 
method of avoiding these dangers [‘fragmented and discretionary decision-making’] is to ensure that 
  
28
with a growing awareness of the importance of a ‘holistic’ approach to protection 
generally – one that engages a range of national safeguards.100   
This thesis embraces the importance of administrative and constitutional law 
principles as a means of checking unfettered discretion in asylum adjudication.  
However, the failure to clearly relate those principles to the satisfaction of states’ 
international protection obligations has meant that policy-makers have become adept 
at circumventing those municipal safeguards while at the same time espousing 
compliance with international law.101   
The failure to investigate the obligatory nature of asylum procedures has also left 
those procedures overly susceptible to domestic political forces.  For instance, Martin 
- an influential figure in the development of US asylum adjudication - views the 
asylum process as a charitable act that goes beyond states’ international obligations 
because such procedures have traditionally encompassed the grant of asylum (the 
non-obligatory act of granting permanent residence).102  At the same time, Martin 
fails to address the obvious fact that eligibility procedures (including in the US) deal 
with the determination of protection against refoulement – a binding international 
obligation.  Thus, he sidesteps the task of examining the relationship between the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
our refugee determination procedures reflect Canadian standards of procedural fairness as they have 
become manifest in our general legal concept of a “fair hearing”’). 
100 A recent example is the UNHCR’s Strengthening Capacity Project commenced in 2006: UNHCR, 
Strengthening Protection Capacity Project, Protection Gaps Framework for Analysis Enhancing 
Protection of Refugees (2nd edition, 2008). 
101 See, eg, the Australian Government’s approach to processing standards under Australia’s now 
defunct extraterritorial processing scheme, discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis: below n 942 – and 
accompanying text.  The Canadian Government has employed the same reasoning in refusing to 
instigate the Refugee Appeal Division: Government Response to the Fifteenth Report of the Statnding 
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Safeguarding Asylum – Sustaining Canada’s Commitment 
to Refugees, [B – Refugee Appeal Division]. 
102 D Martin, ‘Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia’ (1990) 138 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1247, 1256. 
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asylum process and key international protection obligations.103  Other scholars have 
followed his lead.104 
Nevertheless, Martin considers himself beholden - because of the ‘fragile’ and 
‘inconstant’ nature of asylum procedures – to ensure that the design of such processes 
‘maximizes’ ‘domestic support’.105  This focus does not preclude Martin making 
insightful calls for reform to asylum adjudication, eg more and better trained and 
resourced asylum adjudicators.106  In another recent study of asylum adjudication in 
the US, the authors similarly make a number of useful reform proposals based on the 
perceived need to maintain ‘public support for the admission of genuine refugees’.107 
On the other hand, the vague notion of ‘domestic support’ ultimately depends on the 
observer’s divination of the electorate’s demands.  Martin responds to an electoral 
clamour in the US for control of ‘overflowing’ onshore asylum claims in the early 
1990s, leading him to support various measures to deter non-genuine refugees through 
‘speedy denials’.108  Vague characterisation of public concerns provides an easy 
                                                          
103 Ibid. 
104 See, eg, K Vaughns, ‘Taming the asylum adjudication process: an agenda for the twenty-first 
century’ (1993) San Diego Law Review 1. 
105 Martin, above n 102, 1257. 
106 Ibid 1279, 1338-44, 1378. 
107 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, Schrag, above n 69, 306, 380 - 389 (after noting major disparities in 
decision-making at all levels of the US asylum adjudication system, the authors propose more rigorous 
hiring standards, better training, greater resource allocation, legal aid, a multi-panel independent appeal 
tribunal, and a greater role for the courts).  See also, Legomsky, 2000, below n 774, 634 (arguing that 
asylum processing requirements should be based on ‘the substantive individual interests at stake and 
the practical value of the particular procedural safeguard at issue, but also on the public's interest in 
dispensing with that safeguard. The latter encompasses the efficient use of government time and 
resources.’) 
108 Martin, above n 102, 1269-1270, 1324, 1362-1372; D Martin, ‘Interdiction, Intervention and the 
New Frontiers of Refugee Law and Policy’ (1993) 33 Virginia Journal of International Law 473 
(conceding that streamlined asylum adjudication may not be enough to keep ahead of the ‘political 
curve’/public concern created by increasing numbers of asylum claims, and noting alternative policies 
of intervention in refugee producing countries and the interdiction of refugees at source); D Martin, 
‘Strategies for a Resistant world: Human Rights Initiatives and the Need for Alternatives to Refugee 
Interdiction’ (1993) 26 Cornell International Law Journal 753 (preferring speedy denials/deportations 
and humanitarian intervention in source countries as a better strategy than interdiction). 
  
30
means for pushing the observer’s own policy preferences.109  While such an approach 
may accord with crude notions of majoritarian democracy,110 it is hard to reconcile 
with a principled, rights-focused approach to asylum adjudication (or democracy for 
that matter).111 
These criticisms are not meant to suggest that ‘non-legal’ factors – including the 
numbers of asylum seekers accessing a system – should not be taken into account in 
the design and delivery of asylum procedures.  But the fact that high numbers of 
asylum seekers are accessing an asylum process does not preclude creative and 
humanitarian solutions to backlogs and delays.112  A fair, effective and comprehensive 
asylum process is not necessarily inconsistent with maintaining some level of 
immigration control.113  If protection is to have any meaning, there must be principles 
that direct the design of asylum procedures other than electoral apprehensions (and 
miscomprehensions), resource concerns, or downright political opportunism.   
The role of national institutions in the asylum process has significance for our broader 
understanding of the role of rights within the international legal order.  It engages 
with recent scholarship which examines the nature of a ‘rights-focused’, integrated 
international legal order.114   This thesis examines – in the asylum context - the extent 
                                                          
109 See, eg, Vaughns, above n 104 (considering that the grant of asylum, as a ‘discretionary’ matter of 
‘public policy’, should be directed by the political branches and not the judiciary – without confining 
her suggestions to the process in the US governing the discretionary grant of asylum, as opposed to the 
mandatory withholding of deportation in cases where there is a finding that a person has a well-
founded fear of persecution). 
110 Martin, ‘Interdiction’, above n 108, 475-476. 
111 See, eg, a discussion of Parliament’s potential as a rights-focused institution, below n 1112 – and 
accompanying text.  
112 S Legomsky, ‘Reforming the Asylum Process: An Ambitious Proposal for Adequate Staffing’ 
(1994) 9 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 191.   
113 Ibid 193. 
114 E de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 51, 75. 
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to which such an order is ultimately dependent on the effective and practical operation 
of constraints on the exercise of government authority within the state.  Expressed in 
terms of the sovereignty doctrine that permeates the asylum debate, this thesis 
highlights that fetters on the ‘internal’ sovereignty of government are essential to 
effective implementation of the limitations that rights place on the ‘external’115 
sovereignty of states.  
In sum, there are strong reasons for reconsidering the orthodox view that states have 
unfettered discretion in relation to the composition of their asylum procedures.  The 
next part of this introductory chapter summarizes the key proposition in this thesis 
that states should adopt appropriate legislative, judicial and administrative measures 
in order to ensure a fair and effective asylum process. 
IV STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
A The historical perspective – Chapter 2 
As a starting point, the next chapter of this thesis seeks to place the role of legislative, 
administrative and judicial measures in the asylum process in historical perspective.  
This is important for a variety of reasons.  Firstly, it highlights the longevity of the 
dispute over the propriety of arbitrary decision-making in the asylum arena and the 
proper role of the courts and parliament in the exercise of the state’s traditional right 
to grant asylum.  In tracing this historical polemic, and especially the executive’s 
resistance to any incursions into its self-proclaimed role as the sole decider of which 
foreigners were to be granted or denied protection, we begin to understand some of 
the nuances involved in the role of national institutions in the asylum process today. 
                                                          
115 The distinction between ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ sovereignty is that between the power 
‘inherent in the people of any State, or vested in its ruler, by its municipal constitution or fundamental 
laws’ (droit public interne), and that ‘branch of sovereignty that the international relations of one 
political society are maintained, in peace and in war, with all other political societies (droit public 
externe)’: Wheaton, Elements of International Law, English ed. (1878) 28-29.   
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From a historical vantage point, it is also possible to appreciate the nature and 
ramifications of arbitrary decision-making with respect to the grant of asylum, as well 
as the potential benefits (and pitfalls) of legislative and judicial intervention. 
Unfettered government power to grant asylum was, and perhaps remains, ‘Janus-
faced’.  While acting as a buttress against incursion from other states on the freedom 
of the state to grant protection, it was also applied arbitrarily and in a discriminatory 
way against certain political or religious groups in order to deny them asylum.  What 
this suggests concerning the modern drift toward executive monopoly over the asylum 
process is that we should be concerned not solely by the fact that it is ‘government’ 
that exercises this power, but more by the degree to which that power is unchecked 
and unfettered by any meaningful constraints (judicial, legislative or administrative).  
An additional point to note is that parliament’s and the courts’ role in this latter 
enterprise was not always innocent – early ‘aliens’ legislation actually facilitated the 
exercise of arbitrary executive power in order to ensure the speedy and untroublesome 
expulsion or exclusion of certain unwanted political refugees.  Judicial decisions also 
all too readily deferred to the executive’s self-proclaimed role as the guardian of the 
state’s sovereign right to guard against outsiders.  Thus, these observations give food 
for thought when considering the proper role of parliament and the courts and the 
potential benefits to be gained from parliamentary and judicial participation in the 
development or scrutiny of asylum procedures today. 
B The scope of the good faith principle as a method of interpreting and applying  
states’ international protection obligations – Chapter 3 
While these historical observations are interesting, the core normative force of this 
thesis rests on its ability to establish that states are bound as a matter of modern 
international law in the way they engage their legislative, judicial and administrative 
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mechanisms in the asylum process.  The historical observations assist in that they 
provide background and illumination; but ultimately, the success of this thesis 
depends on the extent to which it maintains a sound legal argument based on an 
analysis of the text and context of key international protection obligations in light of 
the object and purpose of the treaties in which they are found.116   
The first step in this legal argument must be to establish the proper principles that 
should guide the interpretation and application of those protection obligations.  Here 
chapter 3 of this thesis sets out the cornerstone of the legal argument: the principle 
that states should interpret and apply their international treaty obligations in good 
faith.  This is far from a new tactic in the asylum context;117 not surprisingly, given 
that it is mandated by general principles of international treaty interpretation.118  
However, there is arguably still considerable scope for exploring the consequences of 
a good faith interpretation and application of core protection obligations, such as the 
obligation not to refoule.119 
In order to do so, this thesis first examines the scope of the good faith principle or 
pacta sunt servanda that is recognized in art 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
                                                          
116 Pursuant to art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 22 
May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980)), a treaty should be interpreted in 
‘good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.’  The interpretative method advanced in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties has been adopted for the purposes of interpreting the Refugee 
Convention despite the fact that the Refugee Convention is an earlier treaty due its embodiment of the 
customary international law relating to the interpretation of treaties: M Foster, International Refugee 
Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2007) 40-41. 
117 G Goodwin-Gill and J McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2007) 391; Hathaway, above n 1, 62-64.   
118 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 22 May 1969, 
1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980).  See above n 116. 
119 See, eg, the recent attempt in UNHCR, Amicus curiae brief in R (ex parte European Roma Rights 
Centre et al) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another (UNHCR intervening) 17 IJRL 427 
(2005).   
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of Treaties.120  It observes that the good faith principle in the context of international 
human rights treaties translates into a trio of obligations - the obligations to respect, to 
protect, and to ensure (or fulfil) rights - that attach to individual political, civil, 
cultural, social and econonomic rights found in those conventions.121  Most relevantly, 
the obligation to ensure (that is expressly set out in the main international rights 
instruments) demands that states proactively and positively develop and engage their 
judicial, legislative and administrative institutions and mechanisms in order to ensure 
the effective and practical enjoyment of any particular right within their 
jurisdiction.122   
This thesis argues that the obligation to ensure should also apply to the Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees.123  This argument is pressing given the fact that the 
Refugee Convention remains an essential source of the rights of refugees in addition 
to the protection offered under general international rights instruments.124  
Consequently, this thesis contends that states should utilize appropriate legislative, 
                                                          
120 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 22 May 1969, 
1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980,) provides that ‘[e]very treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.’ 
121 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States 
Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), [3]-[7]; Committee Against 
Torture, General Comment 2, Implementation of article 2 by States Parties, UN Doc 
CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev.4 (2007), [1]-[4]; ; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health (Twenty-second session, 
2000), UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), [33]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, General Recommendation 24, Women and Health (Twentieth session, 1999), UN Doc 
A/54/38, 5 (1999), [13]; A.T. v. Hungary, CEDAW Communication No. 2/2003, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (2005), [9.6]. 
122 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), [7]; 
Committee Against Torture, General Comment 2, Implementation of article 2 by States Parties, UN 
Doc CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev.4 (2007), [2]; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 3, The nature of States parties' obligations (Fifth session, 1990), UN Doc 
E/1991/23, annex III, 86 (1991), [3]. 
123 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
(entered into force 22 April 1954) (Refugee Convention), read together with the Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 
October 1967). 
124 Hathaway, above n 1, 5-6. 
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judicial and executive mechanism when ensuring the effective implementation of their 
protection obligations whether found in general international rights treaties or in the 
Refugee Convention.    
C The Role of Legislative, Judicial and Administrative Mechanisms in Ensuring a 
Fair and Effective Asylum Process – Chapter 4 
It is clear, however, that the good faith principle by itself cannot be a source of any 
requirements that might determine how a state goes about constructing and 
implementing its asylum process.  While the good faith principle directs the 
performance of international obligations, it is not by itself a source of obligations 
where none would otherwise exist.125  In other words, the good faith principle is of an 
essentially accessory nature, which provides the means of a ‘systematic interpretation’ 
of state obligations.126  Recognizing this, chapter 4 examines to what extent a good 
faith interpretation of key protection obligations directs states towards a 
comprehensive, multi-faceted asylum adjudicative system that requires the use of 
appropriate statutory, executive and judicial safeguards.   
D Applying this thesis to restrictive asylum policies  – Chapters 5-7 
In light of this discussion, chapters 5-7 of this thesis critically examine key restrictive 
asylum policies employed by states.  The focus on the restrictive asylum policies of 
                                                          
125 In re Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v Honduras) [1988] ICJ Rep 69 [94]; In 
re Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria) [1998] ICJ 
Rep 275 [39] (‘The principle of good faith is one of the basic principles governing the creation and 
performance of legal obligations ...; it is not in itself a source of obligation where none would 
otherwise exist.’) 
126 To borrow the phrase used by the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) to explain the nature of the 
good faith obligation represented in art 2 of the ICCPR: Karen Noelia Llantoy Huamán v Peru, 
Communication No 1153/2003, UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005), [5.4]; Andrew Rogerson v 
Australia, Communication No 802/1998, UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/802/1998 (2002), [7.9]; CEA v 
Finland, Communication No 316/1988, UN Doc CCPR/C/42/D/316/1988 (1991), [6.2].  See generally, 
M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edn, Kehl, Engel 
Verlag, 2005) 29.  
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states clarifies the normative implications of the core legal argument developed in this 
thesis.  This general approach also seeks to follow the example of leading studies of 
asylum that recognize the ‘importance of testing the theoretical analysis of human 
rights standards against the hard facts of protection dilemmas on the ground.’127  
Chapters 5-7 examine only some of the restrictive asylum policies employed by 
states, but they serve sufficiently to illustrate the application and scope of this thesis.  
They include immigration controls at the ‘exported’128 or ‘externalised’129 border that 
attempt to prevent access to in-country asylum procedures (discussed in chapter 5); 
interdiction and extraterritorial processing of asylum claims that substitute in-country 
statutory, judicial and administrative safeguards with arbitrary decision-making 
(chapter 6); and restrictions on access to independent judicial scrutiny of asylum 
decision-making and procedures (chapter 7).   
The analysis of these policies seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate over the 
relationship between immigration controls and asylum.  In particular, the discussion 
critically examines recent UNHCR initiatives to encourage states to ‘sensitize’ the 
exported or externalized border.130  To what extent is it possible to ‘sensitize’ the 
exported border without sacrificing the benefits gained from in-country asylum 
adjudication?  Should focus be on granting access to in-country asylum procedures, or 
                                                          
127 Hathaway, above n 1, 10. 
128 To borrow the language of officialdom, see, eg, Mr Dodd, Director, Border and Visa Policy, UK 
Home Office, Oral Evidence, House of Lords, European Union Committee, Home Affairs, FRONTEX 
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129 EXCOM, Note on International Protection, Report by the High Commissioner, A/AC.96/1038, 29 
June 2007, [30]. 
130 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR’S Activities in Relation to the Asylum-Migration Nexus,’ EC/58/SC/CRP.12, 




seeking to replace them with what are in effect purely administrative or private 
asylum ‘procedures’ at the exported border?   
E Conclusion 
The line of argument taken in this thesis obviously poses an ambitious and polemical 
challenge to the prevailing policy preference of developed states, which is to seek 
ways to minimize the social, economic and political costs perceived to be associated 
with complicated systems of asylum adjudication.131   Denial of direct access to the 
breadth of national safeguards is seen as a way of deterring future asylum seekers 
from arriving in developed states in search of a ‘migration outcome’132 thereby 
reducing the social, political and economic costs associated with sophisticated asylum 
procedures that engage different levels of adjudication.  This thesis does not seek to 
downplay or dispute the various social, economic and political costs of 
comprehensive asylum procedures.  But it does dispute the idea that those costs 
should outweigh the humanitarian objective of providing refugees access to fair and 
effective asylum procedures. 
This thesis can be seen as part of an ongoing quest for determinacy and fairness in 
asylum decision-making.  No doubt a degree of indeterminacy in the outcome of 
asylum adjudications will survive the best of efforts to eradicate arbitrary and biased 
decision-making in the asylum arena.133  Yet as one writer has said in another context, 
                                                          
131 See, eg, the recent empirical study on the motivations and methods that have led to a gradual 
erosion of the US asylum adjudication process, and its consequences, by Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, 
and Schrag, above n 69, 306.  See also, the Canadian Government’s costs justification for refusing to 
establish the Refugee Appeal Division: The Canadian Government has employed the same reasoning in 
refusing to instigate the Refugee Appeals Division: Government Response to the Fifteenth Report of 
the Statnding Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Safeguarding Asylum – Sustaining Canada’s 
Commitment to Refugees, [B – Refugee Appeal Division]. 
132 See, eg, the comments of the then Minister for Immigration, Mr Ruddock, when introducing 
legislation to facilitate offshore processing: Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, Official Hansard, No. 14 2001, Tuesday 18 September 2001, 30846. 
133 Legomsky, above n 4, 474. 
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‘even if objectivity and determinacy [of legal rules] are elusive, we need not abandon 
that quest to arbitrariness.’134  As the same writer points out,  ‘[i]mplicit in legal 
argumentation and constitutional discourse is a structure of self-imposed constraints, 
and an appeal – and even accountability – to an “interpretative community”.’135  
Perhaps the greatest potential of diverse institutional involvement in the asylum 
context is the ability to subject outstanding issues of controversy to debate, expose 
competing policy preferences, give voice to refugees, extend the scope of protection 
to those traditionally excluded from the ambit of asylum processes, entertain the 
views of international agencies, and point to areas that need reform and clarification.   
In conclusion, this thesis suggests that the full reengagement of national institutions in 
the asylum process will depend on renewed co-operation between national institutions 
and greater engagement between national institutions and international agencies.  In 
today’s environment of restrictive asylum policies, governments are more likely to be 
swayed by united pressure from international agencies, parliamentarians, national 
human rights bodies, and judges.  This suggests a renewed effort is required to 
strengthen the national mechanisms available for the scrutiny of asylum processes and 
the links between national and international scrutiny bodies.  From a broader 
perspective, this suggestion calls for utilization of the different mechanisms available 
for entrenching rights within states in accordance with the dictates of a rights-based, 
integrated international legal order. 
                                                          
134 M Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and 
International Human Rights Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 115.  See generally, I Johnstone, 
‘Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretative Communities’ (1991) 12 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 418; M Koskenneimi, ‘The Place of Law in Collective Security’ (1996) 17 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 455, 478. 
135 Darrow, above n 134, 115. 
  
2  THE ROLE OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE ASYLUM 
PROCESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
This thesis asserts that a good faith reading of key protection obligations found in 
modern international rights instruments requires that states employ those legislative, 
judicial or executive measures that best ensure a fair and effective asylum process.  
The purpose of this chapter is to put this proposition in historical context.  It does not 
allege that any such requirement or duty existed before the modern era of 
international rights instruments.  The argument that states are bound in the way they 
construct their asylum procedures under modern international rights treaties is taken 
up in the next chapter.  Nevertheless, it is possible to point to certain historical 
developments in the institution of asylum that support and explain the existence of 
such a duty in modern international law.   
A central contention of this thesis is that comprehensive administrative, legislative 
and judicial mechanisms are essential to the realization of a fair and effective asylum 
process.  Arbitrary decision-making should not decide the fate of persons whose lives 
and well-being may be in jeopardy.  States should properly train and resource 
administrative officers charged with primary decision-making in the asylum process, 
as well as utilizing the expert functions of their parliaments and courts where these 
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can assist in the development, implementation, enforcement and scrutiny of fair and 
effective asylum procedures.   
This argument contests the current direction of the asylum policies of developed states 
that seek to deny access to the protection offered by national asylum procedures or 
circumvent meaningful administrative, legislative or judicial safeguards.  As becomes 
apparent from an indepth analysis of restrictive asylum policies in chapters 5 to 7 of 
this thesis, this trend toward the ‘denationalization’136 or ‘deformalization’137 of the 
asylum process significantly undermines its fairness and effectiveness. 
This chapter uncovers a rich vein of historical thought that supports the contention 
that the ‘asylum process’ should not be constituted solely by unfettered and arbitrary 
administrative discretion.  While scholars are right when they say that executive 
power dominated the grant of asylum throughout much of history – often with the aid 
of facilitative legislation and the acquiescence of the courts – 138 this chapter also 
shows that historically there was a growing distrust and dissatisfaction with the use of 
unfettered administrative authority as the sole determinant of the grant of protection.  
At least since the eighteenth century parliamentarians have disputed the government’s 
claim to sole authority to decide whether or not to exempt refugees from exercise of 
the state’s sovereign right to exclude and expel aliens.   
                                                          
136 See, above n 2 -  and accompanying text. 
137 Harvey, above n 3, 191. 
138 P Hyndman, ‘Australian Immigration Law and Procedure Pertaining to the Admission of Refugees’ 
(1988) 33 McGill Law Journal 716, 724-725; Johnson, above n 68, 47; Schaffer, above n 68, 204-205, 
226-227, 232;  K Neumann, Refuge Australia: Australia’s Humanitarian Record (UNSW Press, 
Sydney, 2004) 54-57; Harvey, above n 3, 47, 145-146, 155; A Dummett and A Nicol, Subjects, 
Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration Law (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 
1990) 106-109; P Shah, Refugees, Race and The Legal Concept of Asylum in Britain (Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, London, 2000) 16-19; D Stevens, ‘The Case of UK Asylum Law and Policy: 
Lessons from History?’ in F Nicholson and P Twomey (eds), Currents Issues of UK Asylum Law and 
Policy (Ashgate, Dartmouth, 1998) 20-25; D Stevens, UK Asylum Law and Policy: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) 52-68, 70. 
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Even in this early period, legislative and judicial mechanisms were increasingly 
viewed as important checks and balances on the power of the government when it 
came to safeguarding asylum: a means of ameliorating the arbitrary, secretive and 
discriminatory decision-making that marked the traditional grant of asylum.  It is this 
rival historical school of thought that championed the role of parliament and the 
courts in limiting the power of the executive to exclude or expel persons seeking 
protection that this thesis seeks to uncover.   
From an historical perspective, the central contention of this thesis - that states today 
are bound in the way they devise and implement their asylum procedures by a good 
faith reading of core protection obligations – can be viewed as a continuation of the 
historical school of thought that sought to check arbitrary discretion in the asylum 
arena.  The idea that legislative and judicial intervention in the asylum process could 
protect the individual interests of refugees has evolved slowly.  This thesis contends 
that its fruition in modern international rights treaties should now be guaranteed 
through a progressive, good faith interpretation and application of key protection 
obligations.139   
Today, this means that governments should not be permitted to avoid their state’s 
international obligations by erecting a zone of arbitrary, unenforceable discretion 
within the state (as found in the restrictive asylum policies examined in later chapters 
of this thesis).  In other words, checks on the state’s traditional sovereign right to 
exclude or expel aliens imposed by states’ international protection obligations must be 
accompanied by meaningful administrative, statutory and judicial mechanisms to 
ensure those limitations apply in practice domestically.  At base, states should not 
disengage from the limitations on their ‘external’ sovereignty found in international 
                                                          
139 See, below n 267 -  and accompanying text. 
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law by circumventing mechanisms that impose checks on the exercise of ‘internal’ 
government power within the state.   
This chapter focuses on asylum as it developed in the UK and its colonies (including 
its former colony, the US) in the context of wider European developments in the 
concept of asylum.  This approach gives unique insights into the dynamic between 
institutions of the state in the asylum context due to the UK’s long history of 
parliamentary involvement in the asylum debate, as well as the government’s 
response to calls for judicial overview of the denial of protection.  While the focus is 
on the UK, the insights also serve to illuminate the modern role of the executive, 
legislature and judiciary in the asylum arena in other jurisdictions (such as France, 
Germany, and Japan) where the debate over the proper role of these institutions with 
respect to asylum policy and procedures only gained pace in the last century with the 
establishment of new demarcations of constitutional powers.  
II ABSOLUTE ROYAL AUTHORITY OVER THE GRANT OF 
ASYLUM  
It is anachronistic to talk of the ‘asylum process’ in the context of the birth of the 
modern institution of territorial asylum.  There was no ‘process’; there was simply the 
whim of monarchs.  This section observes that the modern institution of territorial 
asylum originated in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  At that time, 
states claimed the right to grant asylum to religious refugees free from interference or 
retaliation from other states.  Yet as this section also points out, this same power 
could be as easily used to deny protection to refugees on religious grounds.  In the 
UK, as we shall see, the unfettered scope of this power was given expression through 
the absolute power of the monarch or ‘the Crown’.   
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The grant of asylum often depended on the religious affiliations of the monarch.  
Those refugees that were perceived to challenge the religious identification of the 
sovereign faced expulsion, exclusion, persecution, and sometimes death.  The grant of 
asylum was generally not subject to any of the limitations imposed upon states in 
modern times either as a matter of international law or in terms of the internal checks 
and balances derived from parliamentary or judicial involvement.  Not surprisingly, 
the grant of asylum was often discriminatory and failed to recognize that refugees 
enjoyed any right of equality before the law, including access to the courts or 
protection under statute.   
At the same time, the historical observations in this section suggest that the issue of 
the scope of discretion in asylum procedures today should not be depicted solely as 
one of ‘executive power’ versus statutory or judicial authority.  Executive power 
could be used (and still is, eg the discretion of Ministers to grant refuge after asylum 
processes have been exhausted) as a beneficial source of protection for refugees.  The 
problem is best seen as a problem of arbitrary power that lacks substantive constraints 
of whatever nature.  This power can too easily be turned against refugees to deny 
them refuge – a fact all too clear from the following historical discussion.  
A The use of royal authority to grant asylum to religious refugees 
The institution of state asylum (as distinct from the practice of church sanctuary or 
asylum)140 derived from the principle of cuius regio, eius religio [whose the state, 
whose the religion].  This principle developed in response to the religious wars that 
raged across Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  According to the 
                                                          
140 In England in the medieval period an enemy of the king could seek protection or refuge through the 
institution of church sanctuary.  This aspect of church sanctuary came to an abrupt end in 1534 under 
Henry VIII: 26 Henry VIII (‘Traitors shall not have the benefit of sanctuary’).  
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cuius regio principle, sovereigns possessed the right to determine the religion within 
their realm.  As part of this principle, there was growing recognition in the practice 
and treaties between European states that sovereigns possessed the right to grant 
asylum to co-religionists without attracting the ire or aggression of foreign powers.141   
The cuius regio principle informed the asylum policies of monarchs at the time.  
Protestant or Catholic princes granted protection as a means of asserting their 
authority over the religious settlement within their state.  In England, Henry VIII 
granted denization142 to French Protestant Huguenots in 1544143 as part of his 
rejection of Papal control.144  Succeeding Tudor and Stuart monarchs, with the 
exception of the Catholic Mary,145 also received Protestant refugees despite pressure 
                                                          
141 The Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which was to provide the basis for future agreements between 
European powers (S Verosta, ‘History of the Law of Nations: 1648 to 1815’, in Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law Vol. II (Elsevier, North-Holland, 1995), 751), entrenched the right of sovereigns to 
provide protection to co-religionists by guaranteeing the formal equality of Protestant and Catholic 
states.  See generally, L Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’ (1948) 42 The American Journal 
of International Law, 20-41, 21-22.  Hugo Grotius, in his foundational work on international law, De 
jure belli ac pacis, stated his opinion that ‘it is not contrary to friendship [between States] to admit 
individual subjects who wish to migrate from one government to another’: Grotius, De jure belli ac 
pacis, Book III, ch. XX, art. xli, I.   
142 Denization granted aliens certain rights of native-born subjects: Sir William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (first published 1765) vol 1, 374; J Chitty, A Treatise on the 
Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown; and the Relative Duties and Rights of the Subject (Butterworth 
and Son, London, 1820) 15. 
143 Proclamation of Henry VIII Ordering All French to Become Denizens or Leave the Realm, 19 July 
1544, P Hughes and J Larkin (eds) Tudor Royal Proclamations (Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London, 1964) vol 1, 336; Proclamation of Henry VIII Permitting French to Remain, Ibid 339.  A 
charter of Edward VI, dated 24 July 1550, granted rights of worship to Dutch and other Protestant 
refugees, in the name of preserving the Church of England from the ‘tyranny of the pope’: B Cottret, 
The Huguenots in England: Immigration and Settlement c. 1550-1700 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1991), 271; O Grell, Calvinist Exiles in Tudor and Stuart England (Scolar Press, 
Aldershot, 1996), 163. 
144 Henry VIII’s rejection of Papal control was expressed in the Act of Supremacy: Q Skinner, The 
foundations of modern political thought (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978) vol 2: The 
Age of Reformation, 87-89. 
145 Proclamation of Mary Ordering Deportation of Seditious Aliens, 17 February 1554, P Hughes and J 




from the Pope and Catholic monarchs in Europe.146  Elizabeth I’s grant of protection 
to Protestant refugees, for example, was undertaken despite a papal bull in 1570 that 
depicted Elizabethan England as a sanctuary and refuge for ‘the most pernicious of all 
men’.147   In the seventeenth century, Charles II and James IIs’ declarations of 
protection over the refugee communities on their coronation showed the Crown’s 
willingness to continue to protect many Protestant refugees from Europe.148  German 
Protestant refugees from the Palatinate in the eighteenth century also received royal 
protection.149   
B Absolute royal authority to deny asylum to religious refugees 
The flipside of the principle of cuius regio, eius religio was that the sovereign could 
just as easily exclude or expel religious refugees who did not share the sovereign’s 
vision of the realm’s religious or political settlement.150  Sovereigns across Europe 
understood the principle as giving them license to engage in measures of persecution 
                                                          
146 T Roche, The Key in the Lock: A History of Immigration Control in England from 1066 to the 
Present Day (John Murray, London, 1969) 35-46; L Yungblut, Strangers Settled Here Amongst Us: 
Policies, perceptions and the presence of aliens in Elizabethan England (Routledge, London and New 
York, 1996) 87-88. 
147 Cottret, above n 143, 65; R Gwynn, Huguenot Heritage The history and contribution of the 
Huguenots in Britain (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985) Ch 7. 
148 C Weiss, History of the French Protestant Refugees from the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes to 
the Present Time (William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1854) 211 and 213. 
149 W Cunningham, Alien immigrants to England (Frank Cass & Co Ltd, London, 1969) 249-253. 
150 Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94), an influential European writer on international law, considered that 
religious refugees should be expelled or accepted depending on whether the act of granting asylum to 
such persons diminished or furthered the prospect of religious and civil peace and harmony within the 
realm.  Whilst recommending to sovereign’s that they accept and tolerate those who were of a different 
confession, Pufendorf stressed that this toleration only extended so far as ‘the tolerated Party has no 
Principles of Religion, which are contrary to the Peace and Safety of the State’: The Divine Feudal Law 
(1695) (ed) S Zurbuchen (Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 2002), 18-19.  According to Seidler, this explains 
how Pufendorf could ‘approve of both Sweden’s restrictive, and Brandenburg’s liberal immigration 
policies toward Huguenot refugees’: M Seidler, ‘The Politics of Self-Preservation: Toleration and 
Identity in Pufendorf and Locke’ in T Hochstrasser and P Schröder (eds), Early Modern Natural Law 
Theories (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2003) 227-255, 233. 
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or to exclude or expel natives or foreigners that would not conform to the official 
religion or threatened civic peace.151   
In England, Tudor monarchs persecuted confessions or sects, especially Anabaptists, 
who they saw as undermining their religious and civil authority.152   A series of 
proclamations issued under Henry VIII153 and Elizabeth I 154 ordered the exclusion or 
                                                          
151 Cottret, above n 143, 114; O Grell and R Porter, ‘Toleration in Enlightenment Europe’ in O Grell 
and R Porter (eds) Toleration in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
[date]) 1-22, 1; C Clasen, Anabaptism, A Social History, 1525-1618, Switzerland, Austria, Moravia, 
South and Central Germany (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1972) 371-393, 420. 
152 Clasen, above n 151, 358-359; A Dickens, The English Reformation (BT Batsford Ltd, London, 
1989) 261-264.   
153 Proclamation of Henry VIII Ordering Anabaptists to Depart the Realm, March 1535, Hughes and  
Larkin, vol 1, above n 143, 227-228; Proclamation of Henry VIII Prohibiting Unlicensed Printing of 
Scripture, Exiling Anabaptists, Depriving Married Clergy, Removing St. Thomas à Becket from 
Calendar, 16 November 1538, Ibid 270.  Henry VIII’s proclamation against the sect in 1535 followed 
reports of the Anabaptist uprising against the temporal authorities in Münster, as well as warnings of 
the sect ‘infecting’ the Low Countries, and the flight of many Anabaptist refugees toward England 
following persecutions and the subsequent fall of Münster to civil authorities: Calendars of Letters and 
Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII (HMSO, London, 1883, reprint 1965) vol 7, 
317, 394, 397, 447, 479; Calendar of Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry 
VIII (HMSO, London, 1885, reprint 1965) vol 8, 197-9, 475, 826.  Henry VIII’s communications with 
the Smalcaldic League of Protestant princes within the Holy Roman Empire was evidence of the co-
operation between England and European Protestant princes with regards to these matters.  Henry 
VIII’s envoys to the League in 1535 exhorted them to seek agreement in Christian doctrine, noting 
‘what evils spring from diversity of opinions, as in the case of the Anabaptists’: Calendars of Letters 
and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII (HMSO, London, 1886, reprint 1965) 
vol 9, 1014.  Later, in 1538, the Protestant princes passed on correspondence to Henry VIII purportedly 
providing evidence of aliens spreading Anabaptist views in England: Calendars of Letters and Papers, 
Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII (HMSO, London, 1893, reprint 1965) vol 13, 427.  
Henry VIII quickly established a royal commission ‘to search for and examine Anabaptists, receive 
back into the Church such as renounce error, hand over those who persist in it to the secular arm for 
punishment, and destroy all books of that detestable sect’:  Ibid 498.  The King also issued his second 
proclamation of 1538 expelling Anabaptist aliens from the realm.  At the same time as the English 
Church under Henry VIII’s son, Edward VI, embraced Protestant refugees and theologians from 
Europe, it took deliberate steps to distance itself from Catholic and Anabaptist theology: W Hazlett, 
‘Settlements: The British Isles’, in T Brady (et al) (eds) Handbook of European History 1400-1600 
Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation Volume II: Visions, Programs and Outcomes (E.J. 
Brill, Leiden, 1995), 463; Dickens, above n 152, 261-264.  In addition to publishing tracts by Calvin 
against the continental Anabaptists, Edward’s Privy Council took steps to suppress doctrinal 
radicalism, including the execution of the Anabaptist leader, Joan Bocher, since Anabaptists of various 
sorts in Europe ‘seemed to be threatening all organised religion, together with the entire social order’: 
Ibid 264; I Horst, The Radical Brethren: Anabaptism and the English Reformation to 1558 
(Nieuwkoop, B. De Graaf, 1972), 109. 
154 Proclamation of Elizabeth I Ordering Deportation of Anabaptists, 22 September 1560, Hughes and 
Larkin, above n 145, 148.  At the same time as championing the cause of Protestant refugees, Elizabeth 
I expressed concern to the Archbishop of Canterbury that some were ‘infected with Dangerous 
opinions, contrary to the faith of christs church as Anabaptists and such other Sectarys ...’: Yungblut, 
above n 146, 85.  In 1560 Elizabeth moved to persecute Anabaptists, who at this time were largely 
foreign refugees, including the exclusion and expulsion of the sect from the realm.  Her Privy Council 
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expulsion of Anabaptist refugees.155  The proclamations followed similar acts of 
persecution against Anabaptists elsewhere in Europe.156  Persecution and expulsions 
of religious dissenters in Europe continued throughout the seventeenth century, 
subject to very limited rights to religious worship and emigration in peace treaties.157 
Emerging notions of religious toleration in Europe during the seventeenth century at 
the very most created only an expectation, not a duty, that a ‘good’ prince would grant 
protection to religious refugees of all persuasions.158  For instance, the Catholic James 
                                                                                                                                                                      
likewise ‘frown[ed] on aliens who lacked the qualification of Protestantism, and in 1586 ordered the 
banishment of strangers “not being of any church or congregation” …’: Gwynn, above n 147, 44. 
155 Presumably on the basis of these precedents the prominent common lawyer Sir John Davies (1569-
1626) (James I appointed Davies Lord Chief Justice of England in 1626 shortly before Davies' death) 
declared that the English Crown possessed the power to exclude ‘such persons as come to corrupt 
Religion … [and are therefore] not fit to enter in at the Gates of the Kingdome’:  Sir John Davies, The 
question concerning impositions, tonnage, poundage, prizage, customs & c. fully stated and argued, 
from reason, law, and policy dedicated to King James in the latter end of his reign (Printed by S.G. for 
H. Twyford …, and Rich. Marriot …, London, 1656), Wing (CD-ROM, 1996)/D407A) 84-85. 
156 European rulers regarded Anabaptism as heretical in the way it sought to undermine the necessity 
for temporal authority: Clasen, above n 151, 352-360, 374-375. 
157 Alongside the principle of equality between all Protestant and Catholic states within the Holy 
Roman Empire, the Peace of Westphalia also sought to ensure limited safeguards for religious 
minorities: Gross, above n 141, 20-41, 21-22.  Westphalia confirmed the right of states to favour a 
religion subject to the restoration of rights of public and private worship to religious minorities who 
held such rights as at 1 January 1624 – the date fixed as a compromise between the Catholic and 
Protestant parties as the religious ‘normal year’: IPO, V. 25-27.  (I follow the convention of citing the 
Instumentum Pacis Osnabrück as IPO, followed by the relevant clause and sub-clause numbers.  The 
Latin, French and English text is found in C Parry (ed) The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 1 (1648-
1649) (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1969), 119-269).  The ‘right of emigration’(ius 
emigrandi) restrained states from preventing persons from leaving their jurisdiction to seek asylum in 
another state: IPO, V. 28 and IPO, V. 30 respectively.  In accordance with the right of emigration, 
religious dissidents could remove elsewhere voluntarily without difficulty or hindrance by their ruler: 
Ibid.  The conferral of a right of emigration broke with the feudal notion that subjects could not exempt 
themselves from the power of their natural lords, effectively binding subjects to the personal 
jurisdiction of their prince even when outside the jurisdiction: For a discussion of emigration from the 
sixteenth to eighteenth century, see: G Butler and S Maccoby, The Development of International Law 
(Longmans, Green & Co, London, 1928), 341-342.  Thus, the Peace of Westphalia was not a wholesale 
endorsement of the principle of cuius regio, eius religio as suggested by T Walker, A History of the 
Law of Nations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1899) 143 and A Nussbaum, A 
Concise History of the Law of Nations (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1954) 61.   
158 In his essay ‘On the right of a Christian prince in religious matters’, Christian Thomasius, a disciple 
of Pufendorf, wrote that ‘the prince can accept as his subjects foreign peoples of a different religion … 
He does not do well if he refuses to accept them as subjects for no other reason than difference of 
religion’: On the right of a Christian prince in religious matters, Christian Thomasius, in his Gemischte 
Philosophische und Juristische Händel [Mixed Philosophical and Juristic Essays] (Renger, Halle, 
1724), translation by I Hunter, in I Hunter, T Ahnert, F Grunert (eds & trans) Christian Thomasius: 
Essays on Church, State and Politics (Liberty Fund, forthcoming) [73].  James I of England considered 
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II’s grant of protection to French Protestant refugees following the revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes in 1685 was less evidence of a binding ‘duty’ to provide sanctuary 
based on principles of religious toleration and freedom, and more likely evidence of 
his intentions to use the Protestant dissenters in England as allies against the 
established church.159  
C Absolute royal authority to expel or extradite enemy aliens and political offenders 
The monarch’s absolute authority over the grant of asylum also extended to what 
today would be known as enemy aliens (foreign nationals of a hostile power).  
Expulsion of enemy aliens was common.  In a series of proclamations, Henry VIII 
ordered French aliens, including presumably the increasing number of French 
religious refugees in England, to become denizens or to leave the realm.160  The 
proclamations, issued because of hostilities with France, stated that ‘all Frenchmen 
not being denizens may and ought to be reputed and taken for his grace’s enemies.’161  
A subsequent proclamation, expressed to be ‘by his gracious toleration’, permitted 
them to remain.162   
The sovereign’s power also included the power to exclude or expel aliens who today 
would be referred to as political refugees, but were then known as rebels or fugitives.  
In England, a number of examples exist from the medieval period of treaties entered 
                                                                                                                                                                      
it is his duty as a ‘good prince’ to ‘protect all who have abandoned their country for religion’s sake’: 
Weiss, above n 148, 207.   
159 Cottret, above n 143, 187-195.  See generally, Weiss, above n 148, 197-202, 207, 209, 211-214.   
160 Proclamation of Henry VIII Ordering Alien French to Leave Realm, 16 May 1544, Hughes and 
Larkin, above n 143, 326; Proclamation of Henry VIII Ordering All French to Become Denizens or 
Leave the Realm, 19 July 1544, Ibid 336.   
161 Ibid.   
162 Proclamation of Henry VIII Permitting French to Remain, Hughes and Larkin, above n 143, 339. 
  
49
into by the Crown that provided for the mutual expulsion of all rebels and fugitives.163  
The practice continued under the Tudors.164  There are also a number of examples of 
articles providing for the exclusion or expulsion and general non-assistance of rebels 
and traitors found in the treaties between Great Britain and other European powers in 
the seventeenth century.165  A typical provision was article 5 of the Treaty between 
Great Britain and Denmark of 1661, which stated that ‘neither of the foresaid Kings 
shall harbour, or suffer in His Kingdoms or Provinces, the enemies or rebels of the 
                                                          
163 See the examples collected from T Rymer (ed.), Foedera, conventiones literae inter reges Angliae 
et alios quovis imperatores (20 vols. 1704-1735), Vol 1, 50,  in G Schwazenberger, ‘International Law 
in Early English Practice’ (1948) The British Year Book of International Law 52-90, 74-75, such as: the 
agreement between King Henry II and King Louis of France in 1177 AD, which included an 
undertaking to banish on request each other’s enemies from their dominions; the treaty in 1189 AD 
between Richard I and King Philip of France, which provided for the mutual expulsion of 
‘wrongdoers’.   See also: A Grahl-Madsen The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol. II (A.W. 
Sijthoff, Leiden, 1972) 8.   
164 Announcing the peace treaty with France in 1498, Henry VII’s royal proclamation declared that the 
terms of the peace included that the parties would not permit entry to foreigners who were ‘rebels, 
traitors, or other suspects persons of treason’, and the parties would deliver up such rebels and traitors 
within 20 days of receiving a request from the other party: Proclamation of Henry VII Announcing 
Peace Treaty with France, 23 August 1498, Hughes and Larkin, above n 143, 43.  A similar statement 
is found in the Proclamation of Henry VII Announcing Alliance with Emperor Maxmilian against 
Turks, 11 November 1502, Ibid 57-58.  In 1568 Elizabeth I issued a royal proclamation, in support of 
treaties with Spain, that charged ‘all and every her officers and ministers … having office or charge in 
any her ports or creeks … that they suffer none of the [King of Spain’s] subjects in whom may be 
found any apparent suspicion of rebellion against the said King … to land in any place of her 
dominions …’: Proclamation of Elizabeth I Ordering Stay of Low Country Rebels in English Ports, 15 
July 1568, Hughes and Larkin, above n 145, 296. 
165 Treaty between England and the Netherlands, signed at Westminster, 5 April 1654, C Parry (ed) 
The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 3 (1653-1655) (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1969), 225, 
248-249, arts 6 and 7; Treaty between England and Portugal, signed at Westminster, 20 July 1654, Ibid 
281, 298, art 1; Treaty between England and Denmark, signed at Westminster, 15 September 1654, 
Ibid 355, art 5; Treaty between Great Britain and France, signed at Westminster, 3 November 1655,  C 
Parry (ed) The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 4 (1655-1658) (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 
1969), 15, 16, 19, arts 2 and 28 (providing for the mutual expulsion out of England of Marisin, the 
elder Cugnac &c and out of France of Charles II, the Duke of York &c); Treaty of Friendship and 
Commerce between Great Britain and Sweden, signed at Whitehall, 21 October 1661, C Parry (ed) The 




other, knowing them to be such.’166   Charles II utilized these treaties to secure the 
return of the regicides, John Barkstead, John Okey and Miles Corbet.167   
During the first half of the eighteenth century, treaties of alliance entered into by 
Great Britain with other European powers likewise contained articles providing for 
the expulsion or exclusion of rebels and traitors.   The house of Hanover used such 
treaties to eliminate the sanctuaries available to the Pretender and his followers.  The 
first such article was included as ‘an additional and secret article’ attached to the 
Treaty of Alliance between the Emperor and Great Britain in 1716, which stated that 
the Emperor would within his hereditary estates in Germany and the Netherlands 
grant no ‘hospitium, refugium vel transitum’ [hospitality, refuge or passage] to his 
Britannic Majesty’s rebels subjects, nor to the Pretender.168  In return, George I 
accepted a mutual obligation in relation to the rebel subjects of the Emperor.169   
                                                          
166 Treaty between Great Britain and Denmark, signed at Whitehall, 13 February 1661, C Parry (ed) 
The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 6 (1660-1661) (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1969), 245, 
246. 
167 The full and exact relation of the apprehension, arraignment, trial condemnation and execution of 
those three grand regicides, Iohn Berkstead, Iohn Okey, and Miles Corbet (London:  printed for Nath. 
Brooke and Edw. Thomas, 1662), Wing (CD-ROM, 1996), F2277aA.  Giving rise to concerns from the 
foreign Anabaptist churches in the Low Countries that prompted a memorial to the government seeking 
‘confirmation of privileges of liberty and estates … hoping that … what was once said in the praise of 
the Athenians, that they were a hiding place and comfort to all afflicted men everywhere, may be truly 
verified of the Hollanders …’: Anon., A Memoriall Intended to be delivered to the Lords States, 
Monday 10 March, Stilo. Novo.  To the High and Mighty Lords the States of Holland by the Forraign 
Anabaptist Churches, upon the apprehending and giving up Colonel Barkestead, Colonel Okey, and 
Mr Miles Corbet.  To the English Resident (London, 1662), Wing/M1690.  The treaties were in the 
name of the King and made under the Crown’s prerogative over war and peace: Treaty between Great 
Britain and Denmark, 13 February 1661, above n 166; Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between 
Great Britain and Sweden, 21 October 1661, above n 165.  Peace treaties entered into during the period 
of the Commonwealth were the exception.  They were in the name of Parliament (Treaty between 
England and the Netherlands, signed at Westminster, 5 April 1654, above n 165, Treaty between 
England and Portugal, 20 July 1654, above n 165), or the Protector (Treaty between England and 
Denmark, 15 September 1654, above n 165). 
168 Treaty of Alliance between the Emperor and Great Britain, signed at Westminster, 25 May 1716, C 
Parry (ed) The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 29 (1714-1716) (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 
1969), 453, 463, ‘Additional Separate and Secret Article’. 
169 Ibid 464.  Both sides agreed that they would expel any rebel within eight days of receiving an 
application for their expulsion from the other party: Ibid.  A similar article is found in the Quadruple 
Alliance between the Emperor, France, Great Britain (and the Netherlands) entered into in 1718, which 
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Articles providing for the mutual denial of protection to rebel subjects were standard 
in peace treaties entered into by European powers, including Great Britain, up to the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.170  As discussed further in section III below, the 
practice was finally challenged with the emergence of the so-called ‘political offence 
exception’ in extradition treaties in the nineteenth century. 
D The seeds of future constraints on state power and executive discretion with respect 
to the grant of asylum 
Yet despite all this, the seeds were sown during this early period for future challenges 
to the state’s and the Crown’s unfettered authority over asylum.  In particular, the 
same peace treaties that contained provisions excluding or extraditing ‘political 
offenders’ also recognized the liberty of movement of aliens generally.  Today, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
provided a mutual obligation not to grant ‘protectionem vel azylum’ to those declared rebels, and to 
command their departure from the respective jurisdictions within eight days of application made by 
another party: Quadruple Alliance between the Emperor, France, Great Britain (and the Netherlands), 
signed at London, 22 July 1718, C Parry (ed) The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 30 (1718) (New 
York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1969), 415, 429, arts 5 and 6.  Spain acceded to the Quadruple 
Alliance on 17 February 1720: Accession of Spain to the Quadruple Alliance of 22 July 1718 between 
the Emperor, France, Great Britain (and the Netherlands), signed at The Hague, 17 February 1720, C 
Parry (ed) The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 31 (1718-1724) (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 
1969), 149.  
170 Typical examples include: the Treaty of Alliance between Brandenburg and Russia, signed at 
Koenigsberg, 22 June 1697, C Parry (ed) The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 21 (1695-1697) (New 
York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1969), 305, 310, art 3, which provided that neither party would 
harbour or protect rebel subjects of the other but would on the contrary apprehend and extradite them; 
the Treaty of Peace between the Empire and France, signed at Ryswick, 30 October 1697, C Parry (ed) 
The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 22 (1697-1700) (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1969), 5, 
81, art 1, which included an agreement that neither party was to ‘receive, protect nor assist any of the 
Rebels, or refractory Subjects of either Party …’; the Treaty of Peace between the Emperor and 
Turkey, signed at Carlowitz, 26 January 1699, C Parry (ed) The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 22 
(1697-1700) (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1969), 219, 240, art 9, which provided that it was 
unlawful for either party to ‘give any Sanctuary or Support to wicked men, Rebels, or Malecontents 
…’; the Definitive Treaty of Peace between France, Great Britain and Spain, signed at Paris, 10 
February 1763, C Parry (ed) The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 42 (1760-1764) (New York: Oceana 
Publications, Inc, 1969), 279, 322, art 1, which stated in general terms that no assistance or protection, 
directly or indirectly, was to be given to those who would cause any prejudice to the parties; the 
Definitive Treaty of Peace between France and Great Britain, signed at Versailles, 3 September 1783, 
C Parry (ed) The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 48 (1781-1783) (New York: Oceana Publications, 
Inc, 1969), 437, 461, art 1, as in the peace treaty of 1763 (above); the Definitive Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship between Great Britain and the Netherlands signed at Paris, 20 May 1784, C Parry (ed) The 
Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 49 (1784) (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1969), 65, 75, art 1, 
as in the peace treaties of 1763 and 1784 (above). 
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refugee law scholars recognize the important precedent set by these early examples of 
‘international aliens law’ for the establishment of the modern international refugee 
rights regime.171  Such provisions recognized the vulnerability of aliens and the 
willingness of states through bilateral and multilateral treaties to protect them.172 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also saw the maturation of the other great 
development that would provide the basis for international human rights treaties – the 
natural rights doctrine.  The natural rights doctrine, as espoused by John Locke and 
others, proclaimed that freedom of religious belief and political opinion were 
inalienable rights.173  Yet the natural rights doctrine did not find immediate 
application to refugees.  The principal reason for this is that the natural rights doctrine 
that emerged in the seventeenth century was condemned by sovereigns who 
understood too well that it encapsulated a radical vision of ‘popular religious 
sovereignty’ and ‘popular political sovereignty’ that challenged their absolute 
authority.174   
The doctrine was so fiercely repressed in England, in particular, that it was not until 
the early twentieth century that we first see UK parliamentarians referring to 
inalienable ‘natural’ rights (as opposed to common law rights) in the asylum context – 
despite the obvious synergy between religious and political freedoms and asylum.175  
Even then, government Ministers fiercely disputed the idea that the natural right to 
                                                          
171 See below n 335 – and accompanying text. 
172 Ibid. 
173 J Tully, ‘Locke’ in J Burns (ed) The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991) 616-652. 
174 Ibid 652.  See generally, J Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1978) ix, chapter 4. 
175 See below n 214 - and accompanying notes. 
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religious freedom or political expression formed the basis for the grant of asylum.176  
Despite its suppression, the doctrine of fundamental religious and political freedoms 
was to prove an irrepressible force in international affairs, finally giving rise to the 
human rights instruments that serve as the context for asylum today.177   
III CHALLENGES TO THE CROWN’S AUTHORITY TO GRANT 
ASYLUM 
This section traces the first involvement of parliament in the asylum arena.  The 
following observations signal a caveat concerning the involvement of parliament in 
the asylum process today.  They demonstrate that legislation can as easily facilitate 
the exercise of unfettered and arbitrary administrative discretion in relation to the 
asylum process as impose checks on it.  Legislation does not by itself guarantee 
greater protection to refugees – this is abundantly clear in modern times from a 
number of restrictive asylum policies dealt with later in this thesis (e.g. legislation 
introducing carrier sanctions or legislation facilitating the offshore processing of 
asylum claims).  What is essential is the beneficial protective intent or objective of the 
legislation.  
On the other hand, it is important to look beyond the legislative record in order to 
appreciate the full significance of parliament’s initial foray into the asylum area.  
Alongside expressions of state sovereignty and Crown authority or prerogative, we 
see UK parliamentarians drawing on the common law method to construct arguments 
supporting the freedoms and liberties of refugees against the tyranny of unfettered 
executive power.  The historical accuracy of these arguments is perhaps less 
                                                          
176 Ibid. 
177 See below n 243 – and accompanying text. 
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important than the fact that parliamentarians made them.  Significantly, they point to 
the willingness of legislators to construct rights-based limitations on the Crown’s 
traditional authority with respect to asylum.  It is not being overly anachronistic to 
characterize these developments as an early challenge to arbitrariness in asylum 
decision-making. 
A Facilitative aliens legislation  
At the end of the eighteenth century, the French Revolution and the later wars 
between Imperial France and other European powers resulted in large numbers of 
refugees arriving in England.  For the first time, the UK Parliament introduced 
legislation to deal with the refugees.178  The nature of the legislation was, however, 
counter-intuitive.  The legislation was not intended to limit government authority over 
the grant of asylum or aliens; it was designed to entrench it.   
Specifically, the purpose of the legislation was to ensure that the Crown – acting 
through its ministers and civil servants - possessed the power to exclude or expel 
French émigrés that sought to spread revolutionary ideals.179  With this overriding 
objective in mind, the series of Aliens Acts introduced in the UK between 1793 and 
                                                          
178 UK: 38 Geo. III. c. 50, 77; 41 Geo. III. c. 24; 42 Geo. III. c. 93; 43 Geo. III. c. 155; 54 Geo. III. c. 
155; 55 Geo. III. c. 54; 56 Geo. III. c. 86; 58 Geo. III., c. 96; 1 Geo. IV. c. 105; 3 Geo. IV. c. 97; 5 Geo. 
IV. c. 37; 7 Geo. IV. c. 54.  See generally: Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 
(Methuen & Co Ltd, London, 1938) vol. 10, 396-397.  US: Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798).   
179 After noting the provision of asylum to French refugees (émigrés) in England at the time, Lord 
Grenville when introducing the Alien Bill of 1792 asked their lordships three questions - ‘would their 
lordships remove from that asylum those who had already found it?  would they shut their doors 
against other unfortunate men, who might still come to seek refuge among them? would they suffer 
them, when here, to be precisely on the same footing with natural-born subjects of the king, with 
respect to privileges and rights?’: Parliamentary History, XXX, col. 157.  He considered that their 
lordships would not want the unfortunates already in England, and those still to come, to be 
disappointed in their hope of finding asylum.  However, in relation to the third question, he stated that 
‘the safety of the state was not to be sacrificed to hospitality’: Ibid.  Lord Grenville thus defended the 
legislation on the basis that it was a mechanism to ensure the exclusion or expulsion of French agents 
sent to England (under the guise of asylum) in the hope of raising an insurrection and overthrowing the 
government: Parliamentary History, XXX, col. 158.   
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1816 were intended to facilitate the Crown’s traditional powers or prerogatives with 
respect to the exclusion or expulsion of aliens and refugees noted in section II 
above.180  The Crown’s powers under the legislation were therefore largely 
unfettered.181  The nature and object of this body of legislation was replicated in a 
short-lived act of 1848 in response to the arrival of revolutionaries from Europe.182   
                                                          
180 Before the introduction of the Alien Bill of 1792 the government sought advice from the Crown 
lawyers whether the Crown had the prerogative power, without act of parliament, to exclude or expel 
foreigners from the realm.  The Crown lawyers appeared to be of the opinion that the Crown did 
possess the prerogative power to exclude or expel aliens, but due to the long abeyance of this power it 
was advisable to have recourse to an act of parliament: J Dinwiddy, ‘The Use of the Crown’s Power of 
Deportation Under the Aliens Act, 1793-1826’ (1968) 41 Bulletin of the Institute of Historical 
Research, 193-211, 193.  The Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, subsequently introduced in the House 
of Lords the 1792 Bill ‘for establishing regulations respecting Aliens arriving in this kingdom, or 
residing therein in certain cases’: Parliamentary History, XXX, col. 146-147.  With respect to the 
question of the prerogative, Lord Grenville stated ‘it was not to be doubted that the Crown possessed 
all the power with which this bill was to invest it’: Parliamentary History, XXX, col. 157.  See also: 
Lord Loughborough (col. 167) and in the Commons, Mr Hardinge (col. 203); Mr Jenkinson (col. 206).  
Lord Grenville justified the legislation on the basis that the prerogative had been so seldom exercised 
there may be doubt about the means of exercising it: Ibid.  During the debates over the Alien Bill of 
1816, Lord Ellenborough maintained that the Crown possessed the prerogative of sending aliens out of 
the country: Parliamentary Debates, XXXIV, col. 1069.  The government expressly confirmed its view 
that the bill was facilitative in nature.  Lord Eldon, the Lord Chancellor, declared that ‘the Crown had 
at common law the prerogative of sending aliens out of the country, and that [the] bill was only 
necessary, in order to give proper facilities for the exertion of that prerogative’: Parliamentary 
Debates, XXXIV, col. 1144.  Government members in the Commons also claimed the bill 
implemented the traditional prerogatives: e.g. Mr Addington (Ibid col. 432-433).  Chitty later 
concluded that ‘independently of the powers vested in it by the Alien Act’, the Crown retained the right 
‘at common law, and by the law of nations’ to exclude or expel aliens: Chitty, above n 142, 49. 
181 The Alien Act (1793) stated that the King had the power by proclamation, order in council, or order 
under his sign manual to exclude from the realm any alien ‘when and as often as his Majesty, his Heirs 
and Successors, shall think it necessary for the Safety or Tranquillity of the Kingdom:’  33 Geo. III. 
c.4, Article VII.  The King also had the power, ‘whenever deemed necessary for the Public Safety, to 
send out of this Realm any Alien’: Ibid Article XXIX.  The Alien Act (1798) likewise empowered any 
of His Majesty’s secretaries of state to arrest any alien suspected to be ‘a dangerous person’, and to 
hold the alien ‘until his Majesty’s Pleasure be known’ or the alien was expelled: 38 Geo. III. c. 50, 
Article XVI.  The Alien Acts passed between 1803 and 1816 contained similar powers: 43 Geo. III. c. 
155; 54 Geo. III. c. 155; 55 Geo. III. c. 54; 56 Geo. III. c. 86. 
182 With the end of hostilities the last of the Alien Acts modelled on the original Act of 1793, the Alien 
Act 1816 (U.K.), was repealed and replaced in 1826 with an act providing solely for the registration, 
and not the exclusion or expulsion, of aliens: 7 Geo. IV. c. 54.  The registration requirements of the 
1826 Act were further reduced by an Act of 1836: 6 & 7 William IV. c. 11.  The next alien act 
providing for the exclusion and expulsion of aliens was introduced into Parliament in 1848: Removal 
of Aliens Act 1848 (U.K.), 11 & 12 Vict. c. 20.  Similar to the earlier acts, the government believed the 
1848 Bill was necessary to keep out those refugees arriving in England from the conflicts in Europe 
who sought to encourage radical republicanism in the domestic population and to ‘intrigue’ against the 
UK’s institutions: Hansard’s Debates, 1066-1918.  3rd Series.  Parliamentary Debates 1830-1891.  Vol. 
XCVIII, 1848 (April 7 – May 26) (1 May 1848) col. 560-561 (Sir G. Grey).  See generally: P Shah, 
Refugees, Race and The Legal Concept of Asylum in Britain (Cavendish, London, 2000) 22; D Stevens, 
UK Asylum Law and Policy: historical and contemporary perspectives (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2004) 27-28.  The intention of the 1848 Bill was therefore ‘to arm the Government with a power 
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  B The arbitrary and discriminatory implementation of broad powers 
Due to the unfettered nature of the powers conferred on the Crown, the early UK 
aliens legislation lacked any substantive or procedural protection for refugees subject 
to exclusion or expulsion proceedings.183  As a result, administering agencies were 
free to apply the law arbitrarily.  The Alien Office, established to administer the Alien 
Acts, exercised its powers in a secretive manner and in line with a very elastic 
interpretation of the ‘public good’ objective.184  The Office took strong measures to 
exclude and expel aliens, including émigrés, who held political views that were 
objectionable to the government, those suspected of being spies or agents of the 
French government, and those who were simply regarded as undesirable persons.185  
Moreover, the government used such powers ‘freely’ and showed ‘very little regard 
for the liberties of the individual’.186 
C Parliament’s potential 
                                                                                                                                                                      
similar to that which is exercised under the former Alien Act …’: Hansard’s Debates, 1066-1918.  3rd 
Series.  Parliamentary Debates 1830-1891.  Vol. XCVIII, 1848 (April 7 – May 26) (1 May 1848) col. 
561 (Sir G. Grey).  The first section of the Removal of Aliens Act 1848 (UK) empowered the Secretary 
of State or Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to order aliens to depart out of the realm, when, upon 
information in writing, there was reason to believe that it was expedient to remove the alien for the 
preservation of peace and tranquillity of the realm: 11 & 12 Vict. c 20.  In line with the relatively 
unfettered character of the powers in the legislation, there were no safeguards in place to protect aliens 
in genuine need of protection despite the acknowledgment that the bill was directed at French émigrés: 
Hansard’s Debates, 1066-1918.  3rd Series.  Parliamentary Debates 1830-1891.  Vol. XCVIII, 1848 
(April 7 – May 26) (11 April 1848) col. 137-8 (Marquis of Lansdowne).  Whether the 1848 Act 
achieved its objective of protecting the realm was not known, as it was stated to lapse after a year (s 7) 
and was formally repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 1875.   
183 The extent of the recognition of asylum in the UK Alien Acts was a passage in the preamble to the 
Alien Act of 1798, which recognized the need to ensure the safety of  ‘persons who either really seek 
Refuge and Asylum from Oppression and Tyranny’: 38 Geo. III. c. 50; repealed by 43 Geo. III. c. 155.  
However, the Preamble quickly moves on to make it clear that the Act was designed to ensure that 
asylum was not abused by foreigners ‘dangerous to the interests and safety’ of the Kingdom: Ibid.   
184 The Alien Office consisted of two departments – the ‘Open’ and the ‘Secret’.  The latter dealt with 
all coercive business, secret reports, detentions and expulsions: P Polden, ‘John Reeves as 
Superintendent of Aliens, 1803-14’ (1982) 3 The Journal of Legal History, 31-51, 47.   
185 Dinwiddy, above n 180, 195. 
186 Polden, above n 184, 47, 41. 
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On the other hand, the full scope of Parliament’s early involvement in the asylum 
arena illuminates the potential benefits to be had from the input of parliamentarians 
into the asylum process.  A closer look at the historical record shows that Parliament 
was not solely a rubber stamp for the government’s unfettered authority over asylum.  
On the contrary, many parliamentarians were at the center of efforts to challenge the 
legislation that sought to entrench government authority over the grant of asylum.  
Parliamentarians sought to extend to refugees many common law rights that we now 
find in modern international human rights instruments, including: the freedom to be 
free from return or expulsion to a place of persecution;187 equality before the law;188 
and freedom from arbitrary detention.189   
D Statutory and judicial safeguards 
Parliamentarians also recognized that such rights that were necessary to safeguard 
refugees depended on statutory and judicial safeguards.  The overwhelming concern 
among those opposed to the UK aliens bills was that such rights as freedom from 
expulsion, equality before the law etc, could not be safely guaranteed by delivery up 
of persons ‘who had sought refuge from persecution and oppression, to the sole 
discretion of the executive power.’190   
                                                          
187 This was expressed as an instance of the right of asylum or a liberty of movement within the state.  
According to Mr Harmer, asylum operated ‘when this country was disturbed by contests for the 
Crown’ and ‘when religious differences excited disturbances’, as well as when the Pretender was at 
large during the eighteenth century: Mr Harmer, Parliamentary Debates, XXXIV, col. 459.  Lord 
Holland in the Lords also argued that the liberty of foreigners to reside in the kingdom was the basis for 
the grant of asylum to Protestant subjects of James II’s ally and friend, Louis XIV, after the revocation 
of the Edict of Nantes: Parliamentary Debates, XXXIV, col. 1067. 
188 As stated by one member of the UK Parliament during the debates, ‘every man in England shall 
have the equal benefit of the laws of England, with no more distinction between the foreigner and the 
native, than between the peer and the peasant’: Mr Grant, Parliamentary Debates, XXXIV, col. 619.    
189 Expressed as a right to habeas corpus: Mr Brougham, Parliamentary Debates, XXXIV, col. 434-
436.   
190 Earl of Guilford, Parliamentary History, XXX, col. 162. 
  
58
While parliamentarians opposed to the aliens bills were unsuccessful in defeating the 
legislation, they did achieve symbolic victories.  Most importantly, they successfully 
sponsored amendments that ensured a right of appeal from an expulsion order to the 
Privy Council.191  While the right of appeal was limited,192 it queried for the first time 
the government’s underlying view that an émigré was not entitled to the rule of 
law.193  The right of appeal brought into play in the asylum arena the idea of the legal 
equality of aliens that was beginning to surface in judicial decisions at the time.194  It 
also reflected that common lawyers had begun to use the courts to defend the liberty 
of refugees to speak out against their home government without fear of prosecution 
for libel.195   
E Towards greater statutory and judicial safeguards against the extradition of 
refugees – the political offence exception in extradition proceedings 
The momentum toward greater legislative and judicial involvement in the asylum 
process continued to gather pace in England during the nineteenth century largely due 
to the emergence of the ‘political offence exception’ in extradition proceedings.  The 
emergence of the ‘political offence exception’ in extradition proceedings, while 
                                                          
191 54 Geo. III. c. 155, s 4; 56 Geo. III, c. 86, s 3. 
192 An alien was not entitled to know the charge against him, to be defended by counsel, or to examine 
witnesses: Mr Mackintosh, Parliamentary History, XXXIV, 478, 629-630.  Mackintosh unsuccessfully 
moved a motion to include an amending clause in the 1816 bill to remedy these procedural flaws: Ibid. 
193 As expressed by Dicey, the rule of law embraces the idea of legal equality, an independent judiciary 
to uphold the rights of individuals in particular cases, and the exclusion of ‘arbitrariness, of 
prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government’: A. Dicey, 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (first published 1885, 8th edition, MacMillan 
and Co., London, 1927) 189, 191-193, 198.   
194 Courts were beginning to recognize the rights of aliens generally before the courts: Sommersett's 
Case (1772) 20 St. Tr. 1.  For a modern judicial statement of the importance of Sommerset’s Case, see:  
Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1984] 1 AC 74, 111-12 (Lord Scarman).   
195 The same parliamentarian and lawyer, Sir James Mackintosh, who championed the appeal rights of 
refugees under the Aliens Acts also defended Jean Peltier, a French royalist emigrant, against 
prosecution by the Crown for libels on the French First Consul after the treaty of Amiens: The 




legally distinct from exclusions or expulsions under general immigration legislation, 
fostered the notion that legislative conditions and judicial mechanisms were important 
safeguards for religious, as well as political, refugees.   
From the nineteenth century, refugees who were sought for political crimes found 
protection from extradition196 in England under bilateral treaty provisions197 
incorporated by legislation into domestic law198 and overseen by judicial 
proceedings.199  Section II of this chapter observed that historically sovereigns had 
freely extradited political fugitives and rebels.200  However, from the nineteenth 
century onwards there was growing acceptance of the practice that states were entitled 
to deny an extradition request if it related to a fugitive accused of a political offence 
(the so-called ‘political offence exception’ to extradition requests).201  The political 
offence exception was an instance of the maturation of the principle of asylum.202   
                                                          
196 Extradition refers to the centuries-old practice of states of the formal surrender, upon request by 
another state, of an individual accused or convicted of an offence in the requesting state: I. Shearer, 
Extradition In International Law (Mancester University Press, Mancester, 1971) 12, 21. 
197 See, eg, art 11 of the extradition treaty between England and Switzerland of 26 November 1880.  
198 Extradition Act 1870 (U.K.), s 3(1). 
199 Re Castioni [1891] 1 QB 149. 
200 See above n 164 – and accompanying text. 
201 Oppenheim, International Law (8th ed., 1955), Vol. I, 704-707. 
202 The first signs of the emergence of the so-called ‘political offence exception’ in extradition 
proceedings dates back to the UK Government’s refusal to countenance use of the Alien Acts 1793-
1816 as a mechanism for expelling political fugitives at the request of France.  In 1802, France 
supported its request for the expulsion of Bourbon émigrés in England by demanding that the U.K. 
government use its powers under the Alien Act to send them away: Note from M. Otto to Lord 
Hawkesbury, 17 August 1802, Parliamentary History, XXXVI, col. 1271.  In reply, the Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Hawkesbury, maintained that the Alien Acts were made for the purpose of excluding or 
expelling foreigners who threatened the internal peace of the King’s dominions, and would not be 
applied ‘upon the complaint of foreign governments’: Dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury to Mr Merry, 
28 August 1802, Parliamentary History, XXXVI, col. 1275.  Lord Hawkesbury further wrote that 
although his Majesty had no desire for Bourbon émigrés to reside in his dominions, he nevertheless 
‘[felt] it to be inconsistent with his honour, and his sense of justice, to withdraw from them the rights of 
hospitality’: Dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury to Mr Merry, 28 August 1802, Parliamentary History, 
XXXVI, col. 1276.   
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In England, the political offence exception found its way into statute as a result of the 
emergence of the convention at common law that an enabling act was required in 
order to implement an extradition treaty.203  The UK Government remained faithful to 
the political offence exception despite vigorous complaints by European powers 
which saw the UK as the safe haven for European revolutionaries.204  The 
involvement of the courts helped ensure that the application of the political offence 
exception stayed as independent as possible from foreign policy considerations.205 
F Towards greater statutory and judicial safeguards against the exclusion and 
expulsion of refugees – exemptions from general aliens legislation 
Meanwhile, parliamentarians’ insistence on statutory conditions that restrained the 
government’s discretion to exclude or expel refugees under general immigration laws 
finally came to fruition when the UK Government introduced an Alien Bill in 1904206 
                                                          
203 British Digest of International Law (Stevens & Sons, London, 1965) Part VI, 470-471.   
204 See generally: N Sibley and A Elias, The Aliens Act and The Right of Asylum (William Clowes and 
Sons, Limited, London, 1906), 129-130; B Porter, The refugee question in mid-Victorian Politics 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979), Ch 5 and 6; R Ashton, Little Germany: Exile and 
Asylum in Victorian England (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986).  The Orsini Affair in the 1860s 
illustrated the power of the political offence exception in domestic affairs in England by the mid-
nineteenth century: Hansard’s Debates, 1066-1918.  3rd Series.  Parliamentary Debates 1830-1891, Vol. 
CXLVIII, 1857-58, col. 694-1743-1744.  The Orsini Affair involved the failed assassination attempt 
against Napoleon III, which originated from French émigrés based in Britain: R Brent, Liberal 
Anglican Politics: Whiggery, Religion, and Reform 1830-1841 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987) 35.  
On 14 January 1858, bombs constructed by Orsini, a refugee, in Birmingham exploded near the Place 
de l’Opéra in Paris.  Subsequently, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to the British Foreign 
Office demanding that the right of asylum not be extended to such assassins: Count Walewski, French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Lord Clarendon, Foreign Office, January 20, 1858: Papers respecting 
Foreign Refugees, Presented to Parliament, 1858, cited in British Digest of International Law, Vol. 6, 
57.  During the debate in Parliament the government maintained its commitment to ‘that sacred right of 
asylum to foreigners by which our country has always been characterized …’: Hansard Debates 1066-
1918.  3rd Series.  Parliamentary Debates 1830-1891.  Vol. CXLVIII, 1857-58, col. 696 (Earl of 
Derby).  Both the government and the opposition upheld the principle that asylum would not be 
violated ‘for the security of the Sovereign of France, or of all the Sovereigns of Europe twenty times 
over’: Hansard’s Debates, 1066-1918.  3rd Series.  Parliamentary Debates 1830-1891, Vol. CXLVIII, 
1857-58 (4 February 1858), Col. 694 (Earl of Derby). 
205 Re Castioni [1891] 1 QB 149; In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 112, 14 L.Ed.345 (1852). 
206 Aliens Bill 1904, No. 147. 
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and 1905.207  The Bill was designed to exclude ‘undesirable’ immigrants from 
Europe.208  Many of those immigrants were in fact Jewish refugees fleeing anti-
Semitism in Eastern Europe.209  The ‘dangerous person’ of the Alien Acts 1793-1816 
had become the ‘undesirable alien’210 in the Aliens Act of 1905.211   
The opposition justifiably feared that the wide discretion of the executive to exclude 
‘undesirable’ aliens would be used to exclude refugees.212  Parliamentarians appealed 
to the ‘great tradition’ of asylum in the UK to make their case for amendments that 
ensured refugees enjoyed protection from exclusion or expulsion.213  Parliamentarians 
also debated whether rights to religious equality and political freedom supported the 
exemption of refugees from the Act.214  The Prime Minister at the time observed: 
‘The two hon. Members who preceded him both talked of the immemorial right of 
asylum based on religious equality and political freedom; and he had pointed that that 
had no historic foundation whatever.’215   
                                                          
207 Alien Bill 1905, No. 187.   
208 N Sibley and A Elias, The Aliens Act and the Right of Asylum (William Clowes & Sons Ltd, 
London, 1906) 37; D Stevens, ‘The Case of UK Asylum Law and Policy: Lessons from History?’ in F 
Nicholson and P Twomey (eds) Current Issues of UK Asylum Law and Policy (Aldershot, Ashgate, 
1998) 15-20. 
209 Sibley and Elias, above n 208, 129-130, 140-141. 
210 Ibid 39. 
211 5 Edw. VII, c 13. 
212 Sir Charles Dilke (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 2 May 1905.  Hansard, Vol. CXLV, 
col. 696, 699); Mr Trevelyan (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 2 May 1905.  Hansard, Vol. 
CXLV, col. 703-704). 
213 Mr Cripps (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 10 July 1905.  Hansard, Vol. CXLIX, col. 
154). 
214 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 133, 1904, 25 April 1904, col 1085-1086, 1088 (Major Evans 
Gordon); Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 151, 1905, 13 April 1905, col. 712, 713 (Major Evans Gordon); 
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 150, 1905, 10 July 1905, col. 156, 157, 159 (Mr Balfour, Prime Minister) 
cf Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 150, 1905, 10 July 1905, col. 154 (Mr Cripps), col. 159 (Mr Stuart 
Samuel). 
215 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 150, 1905, 10 July 1905, col. 159 (Mr Balfour, Prime Minister). 
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On this occasion the opposition successfully forced amendments that exempted 
religious and political refugees from exclusion216 and protected those wanted for a 
political crime from expulsion.217  These provisions amounted to an early, imperfect 
expression of the obligation not to expel or exclude a refugee that is now found in the 
non-refoulement principle in modern international law.218  Irrespective of the 
historical accuracy of arguments supporting the exemptions, the fact they were 
successfully included in aliens legislation for the first time demonstrates the gradual 
maturation of the linkage between notions of religious and political freedoms and 
asylum. 
Despite its limited scope and short life-span, the 1905 Act also evidenced growing 
awareness of the need to safeguard the rights of refugees through statutory and 
judicial safeguards.  Limitations on the state’s right to exclude or expel refugees – 
derived from common law tradition and natural rights - found expression in the 1905 
Act as a binding statutory limitation on executive discretion.  There was also 
recognition that the courts should have some role in reviewing decisions to expel 
                                                          
216 5 Edw. VII, c. 13, s 1(3) (‘an immigrant who proves that he is seeking admission to this country 
solely to avoid prosecution or punishment on religious or political grounds or for an offence of a 
political character, or persecution, involving danger of imprisonment or danger to life or limb, on 
account of religious belief.’) 
217 5 Edw. VII, c 13, s 3 (1) (a) and (b).  Re Zausmer (1911) 7 Crim. App. Rep. 41.   
218 5 Edw. VII, c. 13, s 1(3), s 3 (1) (a) and (b).   ‘Imperfect’ because there was no right of non-
expulsion based on claims to political or religious persecution for a refugee who fell within the 
categories for expulsion under the 1905 Act: D. Stevens, ‘The Case of UK Asylum Law and Policy: 
Lessons from History?’ in F. Nicholson and P. Twomey (eds) Current Issues of UK Asylum Law and 
Policy (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998) 18.  The 1905 Act only offered protection from expulsion to 
refugees who feared return to their home country because they were wanted for a political crime – a 
recognition of the long-standing ‘political offence’ exception in extradition proceedings: 5 Edw. VII, c 
13, s 3 (1) (a) and (b).  Re Zausmer (1911) 7 Crim. App. Rep. 41.  The fact that there was no protection 
for refugees once resident in the country was a major flaw in the legislation given the increasing 
practice of European states at the time to expel economically and socially undesirable refugees from 
country to country without their having any chance of settling in a place of sanctuary. 
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political offenders.219  Calls for judicial review of decisions to exclude aliens also 
mounted.220   
IV THE IMPORTANCE OF RECOGNIZING THE DIVISIBILITY OF 
SOVEREIGN RIGHTS WITHIN THE STATE 
The above observations have underlying significance for the role of parliament and 
the courts in the asylum process today.  From a modern viewpoint, parliament’s 
intrusion into the executive’s traditional territory represents a deeper contest over the 
role of parliament and the courts in interpreting and applying international law within 
the state.  Today, legislative and judicial control of the asylum process rests on the 
recognition that sovereign rights and obligations should be divisible within the state, 
ensuring that all institutions of the state are actively responsible for their translation 
and implementation.  Restrictive asylum practices that seek to entrench unfettered 
administrative authority ignore this. 
The importance of the recognition of the divisibility of sovereign rights within the 
state is apparent from the above debate over early aliens legislation in the UK.  
Obviously, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the debate did not concern the 
role of parliament and the courts in interpreting and applying the rights of refugees in 
international law as we find them today.  But the debate did revolve around a similar 
issue of parliament’s role in the interpretation and application of traditional principles 
                                                          
219 5 Edw. VII, c 13, s 3 (1) (a) and (b).  Re Zausmer (1911) 7 Crim. App. Rep. 41.   
220 The opposition at the time unsuccessfully pushed for judicial determination of whether a person 
was an ‘undesirable’ immigrant, which included whether an alien fell within the asylum exception: 
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 133, 1904, 25 April 1904, col. 1094 (Mr Asquith); col. 1103, 1104 (Mr 
Walter Long); col. 1108 (Mr Norman); col. 1146, 1147 (Mr Akers-Douglas).  The judiciary also had no 
role under the 1905 Act in reviewing decisions of immigration officers or the board to refuse leave to 
land to ‘undesirable’ aliens, including the officer’s investigation of any claims made with respect to 
asylum.  See generally: N Sibley and A Elias, The Aliens Act and the Right of Asylum (William Clowes 
& Sons Ltd, London, 1906) 43-80. 
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of international law, including the state’s right to exclude or expel aliens (as well as 
the relationship between that right and the tradition of granting asylum). 
During the introduction of the first UK aliens legislation, government ministers 
argued that the unfettered right of the state to exclude or expel aliens in international 
law gave the government unfettered authority within the state with respect to the 
exclusion or expulsion of aliens.221  But many prominent parliamentarians contested 
this point of view.222  They argued that the existence of the sovereign right to exclude 
and expel aliens did not support the authority of government to exercise this right 
within the state without constraints imposed by legislative conditions or judicial 
remedies.223  The opposition particularly disputed the government’s use of statements 
                                                          
221 During the debates over the UK alien bills 1792-1816, the government bolstered its argument in 
support of an unfettered prerogative - and thereby the broad powers found in the legislation - by 
reference to the law of nations and the sovereignty of the English ‘state’: Mr Jenkinson (Parliamentary 
History, XXX, col. 206); Mr Addington (Ibid col. 432).  The government placed particular reliance on 
Blackstone, who cited Pufendorf in support of the proposition that ‘it is left in the power of all states, to 
take such measures about the admission of strangers, as they think convenient …’: Sir William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (first published 1765) vol 1, 259-260, citing 
Pufendorf’s De jure naturae, et gentium book 3 chapter 3 paragraph 9.  In a similar vein, Lord 
Ellenborough cited the Swiss international law scholar, Vattel, as further authority for the proposition 
that the Crown possessed the prerogative of sending aliens out of the country: Parliamentary Debates, 
XXXIV, col. 1069.  The relevant views of Vattel (and Grotius) are discussed at Grahl-Madsen, above n 
163, 14-16.  As Grahl-Madsen notes, although Vattel recognized the right of a person ‘to live 
somewhere or other’ he also conceded that ‘if in the abstract this right is a necessary and perfect one … 
it is only an imperfect one relative to each individual country; for … every Nation has the right to 
refuse to admit an alien into its territory when to do so would expose it to evident danger or cause it 
serious trouble … Hence an exile has no absolute right to choose a country at will and settle himself 
there as he pleases; he must ask permission of the sovereign of the country; and if it be refused, he is 
bound to submit’: Ibid 14.  The US Government likewise cited Vattel and Blackstone in support of the 
sovereign right of states to exclude or expel aliens, which the Government argued supported 
Congress’s authority to grant the broad Presidential powers under the 1798 Act despite no clear 
enumerated head of power under the US Constitution: S Legomsky, Immigration and the Judiciary: 
Law and Politics in Britain and America (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987) 184; L Henkin, Foreign 
Affairs and the Constitution (1972) 18.  Cf: T Alienikoff and D Martin, Immigration: Process and 
Policy (1985) 16-17 (arguing that the overall structure of the U.S. Constitution implies an intent to 
confer on the federal government powers customarily held by nations, including the power to exclude 
aliens).  See also: T Aleinikoff, ‘Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution (1989) 83 American 
Journal of International Law 862, 866. 
222 Sir James Mackintosh (Parliamentary Debates, XXXIV, col. 469); Mr Brougham (Parliamentary 
Debates, XXXIV, col. 435); Mr Grant (Parliamentary Debates, XXXIV, col. 620);  Earl Grey 
(Parliamentary Debates, XXXIV, col. 1070).   
223 Ibid.  Modern authors have highlighted the non sequitur in the reasoning of government lawyers 
who sought to imbue the executive with what is in fact a sovereign right of nations to exclude or expel 
aliens: C Thornberry, ‘Dr. Soblen and the Alien Law of the United Kingdom’ (1963) 12 International 
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of royal authority derived from European theorists who fashioned their notions of 
indivisible sovereignty around absolutist forms of government concentrated in a 
single royal or republic institution – notions seen as unsuitable for English 
parliamentarianism.224  Thus, the opposition’s case effectively based legislative and 
judicial involvement on an understanding of the divisibility of sovereign rights within 
the state.   
The argument was not peculiar to the UK context.  In the US at the time, US 
legislators were engaged in a similar debate in the context of the US’s constitutional 
framework.  The debates occurred as the US government pushed through aliens 
legislation in 1798 that granted the President power to exclude or expel refugees 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and Comparative Law Quarterly 414-474, 425.  See also: C Vincenzi, ‘Aliens and the Judicial Review 
of Immigration Law’ (1985) Public Law 93, 101. 
224 The opposition found fault with the Government’s reliance on Blackstone and Pufendorf in support 
of executive authority on the basis that they failed to distinguish the sovereign power of the State from 
the power of the Crown: Sir James Mackintosh (Parliamentary Debates, XXXIV, col. 469); Mr 
Brougham (Parliamentary Debates, XXXIV, col. 435); and Mr Grant (Parliamentary Debates, 
XXXIV, col. 620).  Earl Grey in the Lords gave a similar response to Lord Ellenborough’s use of 
Vattel in this way: Ibid col. 1070.  In his memoirs, Sir Samuel Romilly – another vocal opponent of the 
Aliens Bills - refers to Lord Ellenborough’s use of Vattel as ‘absurd’: Sir Samuel Romilly, Memoirs of 
the life of Sir Samuel Romilly, Vol. III (John Murray, London, MDCCCXL), 239-240.  The view of 
those in opposition to the bill was, therefore, that whilst Pufendorf and Vattel might confirm the 
sovereign right of states to expel or exclude aliens, they were of little help in understanding where the 
sovereign power to expel or exclude aliens resided in England: Mackintosh, Ibid.  Wholesale 
application of indivisible absolutist notions of sovereign power in the context of English 
parliamentarianism was questionable, because no matter how ‘incoherent and theoretically fictitious 
the doctrine of king-in-parliament may have been, it was a correct description of the accommodation 
by which English politics actually proceeded’: J Pocock and G Schochet, ‘Interregnum and 
Restoration’ in J Pocock (ed) The Varieties of British political thought, 1500-1800 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1993) 151.  For an understanding of the process of translation of ideas of 
sovereignty into England, see generally, Nussbaum, above n 157, 77; G Butler and S Maccoby, The 
Development of International Law (Longmans, Green & Co, London, 1928) 8; O Hinze, ‘Calvinism 
and Raison d’Etat’, in F Gilbert (ed) The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1975), 137-139; J Tully, ‘Introduction’ in J Tully (ed) (M Silverthorne trans) Samuel 
Pufendorf’s On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1991) xxxv; Franklin, above n 174, 67; M van Gelderen, ‘The state and its rivals in early-
modern Europe’ in Q Skinner and B Stråth (eds) States & Citizens (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003) 79-96.  An interesting case study is the translation of the abridged form of 
Pufendorf’s De jure naturae et gentium, De officio hominis et civis, by Andrew Tooke in 1691, that 
was undertaken for an audience of London Whigs.  Tooke’s translation toned down Pufendorf’s 
absolutist leanings to a form ‘better fitting the Whig view of sovereignty as shared with Parliament and 
embedded in society’: I Hunter and D Saunders, ‘Introduction’ in Samuel Pufendorf, The Whole Duty 
of Man, According to the Law of Nature (trans. By Andrew Tooke, 1691) (Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 
2003) xvii.   
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fleeing the troubles in Europe who he deemed to be a danger to the nation.225  US 
legislators opposed to the 1798 Act argued that the existence of the sovereign right to 
exclude or expel aliens in international law should be subject to the constitutional 
limitations placed on the law-making powers of Congress.226  In a characteristic 
statement, John Taylor of Virginia argued that the federal government possessed only 
enumerated powers and could not ‘at pleasure dip [its] hands into the inexhaustible 
treasures of the … law of nations’.227  Legislators argued that the Act was inconsistent 
with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the US Constitution, which 
they pointed out applied to all ‘person’, not just citizens.228  At the end of the day, US 
legislators won a limited right to the preservation of the property of aliens expelled 
under the US legislation.229   
The modern significance of this debate lies in the fact that parliamentarians 
recognized that divisibility of sovereign rights was a precondition for legislative and 
judicial intervention.  The extent that this remains the case today in terms of the 
involvement of legislatures and the courts in the translation of sovereign obligations 
towards refugees is considered in later chapters of this thesis.  This thesis goes on to 
argue that in modern times all state institutions have the role and responsibility of 
ensuring that the rights of refugees in international law are respected, protected and 
fulfilled within the jurisdiction of the state.  This principle does no more than 
                                                          
225 Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798).  Like its English equivalents, the U.S. 1798 Alien Act, 
established a broad executive power to expel ‘dangerous’ aliens – principally French émigrés who the 
U.S. government feared would aid the French in the then undeclared hostilities between the two 
countries: S Cleveland, ‘Powers inherent in sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the nineteenth 
century origins of plenary power over foreign affairs,’ (2002) 81 Texas Law Review 1-284, 91-92. 
226 The opposition to the US 1798 Act queried the use of international law to justify the existence of a 
non-enumerated ‘inherent’ Congressional power: Cleveland, above n 225, 95.   
227 Ibid 95. 
228 Ibid 96-97. 
229 Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798), s. 5. 
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recognize that the state’s international obligations are implemented by state 
institutions, not the legal fiction that constitutes ‘the state’ in international law.   
V THE MODERN LEGACY OF ARBITRARY DECISION-MAKING 
IN THE ASYLUM ARENA  
A The resurgence of unfettered discretion 
The first half of the twentieth century saw the notion that meaningful legislative and 
judicial safeguards were necessary in order to protect refugees from exclusion or 
expulsion under general immigration laws fall into disuse.  Unfettered discretion in 
relation to the grant of asylum was effectively restored following the repeal of the 
1905 Act on the eve of the outbreak of war between the UK and German in 1914. 230  
The immigration legislation of that year replaced the substantive asylum protections 
found in the 1905 Act with general provisions that gave the Crown unfettered 
discretion to exclude, deport (the word ‘deportation’ appearing in UK aliens 
legislation for the first time), and to detain aliens.231  This led to refugees being 
excluded who were ‘undesirable in other respects.’232  Lack of statutory protection for 
refugees also meant that there were no judicial remedies available to refugees under 
the 1914 Act.233   
                                                          
230 4 & 5 Geo. V. c.12, s 1(1). 
231 4 & 5 Geo. V. c.12, s 1(1). 
232 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 110, col. 310. 
233 The English Court of Appeal considered that the absence of any reference to asylum in the 1914 
Act, in contrast to the 1905 Act, was an indication that it was entirely up to the executive’s discretion to 
take into account asylum claims during deportation proceedings: R v Home Secretary; Ex parte Duc De 
Chateau Thierry [1917] 1 KB 922, 929 (Swinfed Eady LJ); 932-933 (Pickford LJ).   
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Unfettered executive authority became a feature of the grant of asylum in the UK,234 
the US,235 and in other countries in Europe during the inter-war period.236  The grant 
of asylum largely depended on the unfettered and unchecked authority of government.  
The courts had little or no role in reviewing the legality of government decision-
making in the asylum arena.237  Lack of judicial review was symptomatic of an often 
arbitrary, non-transparent, unreliable, and discriminatory process of identifying 
persons in need of protection.238   
Government appeals to the state’s right to grant asylum239 – an extension of the state’s 
traditional right to exclude and expel aliens at international law - became an excuse 
for government officials to deal with refugees how they liked.  Such appeals were not 
dissimilar to the use of the state’s traditional right to exclude or expel aliens at 
international law to support unfettered administrative discretion, noted above.  The 
state’s ‘right of asylum’ was a euphemism for the exercise of arbitrary exclusion and 
expulsion powers. 
The lack of effective statutory and judicial safeguards had devastating consequences 
for the tens of thousands of victims of Nazi persecution, who struggled to find 
                                                          
234 The Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919, s 1 (1), extended the duration of the 1914 Act.  The 
Annual Expiry Laws Continuance Acts continued the 1919 Act until repealed by the Immigration Act 
1971: 9 & 10 Geo. V. c.92, s 1(1).  See generally: Report of the Committee on Immigration Appeals.  
Cmnd. 3387 (HSMO, London, 1967) 4.  Parliamentarians unsuccessfully argued that reference be made 
in the legislation to asylum so as to ensure that the continuation of the 1914 Act did not detract from 
the work of the League of Nations with respect refugees: Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 
15 April 1919.  Hansard, Vol. 114, col. 2781.   
235 Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National 
Interest, Committees on the Judiciary House of Representatives and United States Senate, Ninety-
Seventh Congress, First Session, August 1981 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1981) 
153, 154-155. 
236 M Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (1985) 122-295.   
237 D Stevens, UK Asylum Law and Policy (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004), 49-52, 55-56. 
238 Ibid 55, 60-61, 67, 70. 
239 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, vol. 230, col. 603 (Mr Clynes). 
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permanent asylum because of the economic depression in countries of refuge.240  
Those refugees were more often than not greeted by arbitrary and brutal government 
asylum policies and processes that placed economic and social factors above their 
protection needs.241  This lack of meaningful statutory or judicial safeguards 
undermined the efficacy of the emerging principle of non-refoulement that was taking 
shape in multilateral treaties during the inter-war period.242   
B Emergence of external and internal constraints – human rights 
Developments in the post-war period continued to highlight the adverse consequences 
of unfettered administrative power for the effective implementation of the rights of 
refugees found in international instruments.  These developments demonstrate the 
importance of the normative and practical interdependence between restrictions on the 
powers of the state in international law and the mechanisms that implement those 
limitations and obligations in domestic law.  
The entry into force of the Refugee Convention243 and the ICCPR,244  along with 
other cognate rights instruments, guaranteed refugees and other persons seeking 
                                                          
240 L Holborn, The International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of the United Nations, 
Its History and Work, 1946-1952 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 10-23, 26, 29; Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest, 
Committees on the Judiciary House of Representatives and United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh 
Congress, First Session, August 1981 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1981) 153, 154-
155 (the Select Commission noted the fatal consequences of restrictive US asylum policies and 
practices on Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany in the 1930s).    
241 Holborn, above n 240, 10-23, 26, 29. 
242 Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National 
Interest, Committees on the Judiciary House of Representatives and United States Senate, Ninety-
Seventh Congress, First Session, August 1981 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1981) 
153, 154-155. 
243 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
(entered into force 22 April 1954) (Refugee Convention), read together with the Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 
October 1967). 
244 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (ICCPR). 
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asylum the protection of international rights standards that constrained the state’s 
historically unbounded discretion in the asylum context.245  Most relevantly, those 
instruments recognized the inalienability of the right not to be expelled or returned to 
a place of persecution (the non-refoulement principle).246  
Despite the entry into force of international protection instruments, the legacy of 
executive control in relation to the grant of asylum continued to permeate policy in 
many states.  This included the UK,247 Australia,248 and the US.249  The lack of any 
statutory safeguards in these jurisdictions also had the effect of largely negating 
meaningful judicial scrutiny of asylum decision-making.250   
                                                          
245 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [5] (Lord Bingham, Lord 
Hoffmann, Baroness Hale, Lord Carswell and Lord Brown); C Harvey, ‘Taking Human Rights 
Seriously? A Perspective on the Development of Law and Policy’ in F Nicholson and P Twomey (eds), 
Currents Issues of UK Asylum Law and Policy (Ashgate, Dartmouth, 1998) 216.   
246 See below n 386 – and accompanying text. 
247 See generally, C Thornberry, ‘Dr. Soblen and the Alien Law of the United Kingdom’ (1963) 12 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 414-474, 425, 436; Report of the Committee on 
Immigration Appeals.  Cmnd. 3387 (HSMO, London, 1967) 6.  See statement of the practice by Home 
Office Ministers in debate: 529 H.C. Deb. 1508 (1 July 1954); 566 H.C. Deb. 749 (8 March 1957); 583 
H.C. Deb. 1422-3 (6 March 1958); 668 H.C. Deb. 429 (28 November 1962).   
248 Australia was the sixth state to ratify or accede to the Refugee Convention, doing so on 22 January 
1954 with effect from 22 April 1954 (Australian Treaty Series, 1954, No 5.).  Australia’s accession to 
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees took effect from the date of accession (13 December 
1973) (Australian Treaty Series, 1973, No 37.).  See generally: Neumann, above n 138, 57.  In 
Australia, refugee status determination remained within the sole discretion of the executive until 
legislative amendments in 1980: Simsek v MacPhee (1982) 148 CLR 636, 638 (Stephen J); Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Mayer (1985) 157 CLR 290, 300-301 (Mason, Deane and Dawson 
JJ); NAGV v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 222 CLR 161, [35] 
(Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).  See generally, Hyndman, above n 
138, 729; Ayling and Blay, above n 68, 258; Johnson, above n 68, 47; Schaffer, above n 68, 225-226; 
Crock, above n 41, 54.   
249 Namkung v Boyd 226 F. 2d 385, 388 (1955) (‘the withholding of deportation in cases where the 
alien fears persecution rests wholly in the administrative judgment and ‘opinion’ of the Attorney 
General or his delegate’). 
250 UK: The UK Court of Appeal confirmed that an alien possessed no right to be heard on claims to 
asylum before the making of a deportation order: R v Brixton Prison Governor; Ex parte Soblen [1963] 
2 QB 243, 298 (Lord Denning, MR), 305-306 (Lord Donovan LJ), 316 (Pearson LJ).  Aliens Order, 
1953 (S.I. 1953 No. 1671), arts 8 (1), 20 (1), (2), 21 (4).  See generally, R Thomas, ‘The Impact of 
Judicial Review on Asylum’ [2003] Public Law 479-510, 480; Grahl-Madsen, above n 22, 366-367.  
Australia: In R v Liveris; Ex parte da Costa, Andrade & Teixeira, involving the Australian 
government’s refusal to grant asylum to Portuguese Navy deserters, the court concluded that ‘political 
asylum’ was outside its jurisdictional competence and therefore ‘quite irrelevant to these proceedings’: 
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In many instances, this led to arbitrary and discriminatory eligibility determinations.  
In Australia, for example, the Australian Government utilized broad executive 
authority confirmed by statute to exclude refugees on racial grounds.251  As far as the 
Australian Government was concerned, the asylum process could be as summary and 
arbitrary as it chose.252  In the Australian Government’s view, the right of the state to 
exclude and expel aliens and the right of the state to grant asylum gave it unfettered 
government authority to determine the manner in which it processed asylum claims.253  
This attitude undermined to a large degree the practical enjoyment of those rights 
under Australian law. 
Nevertheless, the momentum for greater legislative and judicial involvement in the 
asylum process gathered force once again from the 1950s onwards.  First published in 
1966, Grahl-Madsen’s foundational treatise on The Status of Refugees in International 
Law highlighted the emerging impact of constitutional provisions, legislation and the 
courts on the asylum process in a number of European jurisdictions.254  This included 
judicial decisions, such as the judgment of the German courts in Majstorovic 
                                                                                                                                                                      
R v Liveris; Ex parte da Costa, Andrade & Teixeiera (1962) 3 FLR 249, 257-258 (Bridge J).  See 
generally, Hyndman, above n 138, 729; Ayling and Blay, above n 68, 258; Johnson, above n 68, 47; 
Schaffer, above n 68, 225-226.  US: Namkung v Boyd 226 F. 2d 385, 388 (1955). 
251 Australia’s education or ‘dictation test’ ensured the government retained the discretion to refuse 
admission to those refugees from abroad that did not meet the racial requirements for admission: 
Neumann, above n 138, 23-24.  The government used this authority to relax the requirements of the 
Immigration Act to admit refugees from Asia fleeing the Japanese advance during the Second World 
War.  Then, after the war, the government either arranged for repatriation outside the terms of the 
Immigration Act, or alternatively, reengaged the dictation test and deportation machinery under the 
Immigration Act to deport many of the refugees.  This included the repatriation and deportation of 
Indonesians to Dutch controlled parts of the archipelago where they were at risk of persecution due to 
the fact that the Dutch regarded certain of them as ‘extremists or dangerous’: National Archives of 
Australia, A433, 1949/2/8187.    
252 Neumann, above n 138, 57. 
253 At the time of the 1956 Olympic Games in Melbourne, Australia, the Australian Government 
expressed the view high-level Cabinet documents that the state’s right to decide who to admit into its 
territory meant that its international obligations did not require Australia to process potential asylum 
requests from Iron Curtain athletes in any particular way: Ibid. 
254 Grahl-Madsen, above n 63, 25-27. 
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(upholding a claim to asylum and refugee status where reasons for the claim resulted 
from the actions of the claimant while in the country of refuge).255  Together, these 
reflected a cross-jurisdictional trend toward ‘legality’ in protection eligibility 
procedures – a gradual shift toward greater administrative, legal and judicial controls 
on the grant of protection.256   
In the UK and Australia, this trend toward legality in the asylum process followed 
later as part of a wider trend in administrative law reform in the 1970s and 1980s that 
saw greater statutory conditions and judicial control imposed on administrative 
discretion generally.257  In the asylum context, this led to the incorporation of the 
refugee definition into legislation in order to create binding conditions for the exercise 
of administrative discretion.258  This in turn led to greater judicial willingness to 
engage in scrutiny of asylum decision-making and asylum procedures.259   
                                                          
255 9 BverfGE 174 (1959) and 1960 MDR 523. 
256 Harvey, above n 3, 145. 
257 In Australia, committees established to consider changes to administrative justice recommended a 
range of reforms to administrative law in Australia: Report of the Commonwealth Administrative 
Review Committee, Parl Pap No 144 of 1971 (Kerr Committee), Final Report of the Committee on 
Administrative Discretions, Parl Pap No 316 of 1973 (Bland Committee), Report of Committee of 
Review of Prerogative Writ Procedures, Parl Pap No 56 of 1973 (Ellicott Committee).  See generally: 
R Creyke and J McMillan, The Making of Commonwealth Administrative Law (ANU, CIPL, 1996).  
They included, relevantly, legislative conditions on Ministerial discretion (Final Report of the 
Committee on Administrative Discretions, Parl Pap No 316 of 1973 (Bland Committee), 17); and the 
availability of judicial review of Ministerial discretion in the Federal Court even though involving 
considerations of policy (Report of Committee of Review of Prerogative Writ Procedures, Parl Pap No 
56 of 1973, 7).   
258 UK: A new rule was inserted into the UK Immigration Rules providing that ‘[w]here a person is a 
refugee full account is to be taken of the provisions of the Convention and Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (Cmnd. 9171 and Cmd. 3906).  Nothing in these rules is to be construed as 
requiring action contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations under this Convention’: Proposals for 
revision of the Immigration Rules, November 1979, Cmnd. 7750; Statement of Changes in 
Immigration Rules (1980) (H.C. 394); Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules (1983) (H.C. 169), 
paras. 16 and 96.  Australia: Migration Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 (Cth), s 6. 
259 Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514; Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs v Mayer (1985) 157 CLR 290; Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 
(1989) 169 CLR 379; Azemoudeh v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 ALD 281. 
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In the US, laws were passed in the 1950s and 1960s authorizing the Attorney-General 
to withhold deportation of an alien upon a finding that the person would be subject to 
persecution in the country to which he or she was to be deported.260  The decision of 
the Attorney-General was subject to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals.  
However, the courts had only a small role due to the breadth of the Attorney-
General’s discretion.261  This changed with the Refugee Act of 1980, which 
incorporated a mandatory statutory duty upon the Attorney General to withhold 
deportation where persecution was threatened.262  As in the UK and Australia, the 
effect of codification was to give the courts a legal basis for intervention in refugee 
cases.263 
From an historical perspective, the significance of this trend toward legality was that 
it subjected the traditional right of the state to exclude or expel aliens and to grant 
asylum to both external and internal constraints.  The non-refoulement obligation and 
other obligations found meaningful expression through practical implementation by 
statutory and judicial safeguards.  However, almost as soon as these measures began 
to take hold, states began to experiment with restrictive asylum measures designed to 
circumvent the effective enjoyment of the rights of refugees under international 
instruments. 
C A counter-trend toward arbitrary decision-making  
                                                          
260 Section 23 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, adding a new § 20(a) to the 
Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, 64 Stat. 1010; Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 214; § 10, 79 Stat. 918. 
261 Namkung v Boyd 226 F. 2d 385, 388 (1955). 
262 § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 USC § 1253(h) (1976 ed.), as amended 
by § 203(e) of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107. 




From an historical perspective, the restrictive asylum policies of states that have 
emerged since the 1980s – discussed in later chapters of this thesis - are an attempt to 
reinvigorate traditional unfettered administrative control and authority in relation to 
the grant of asylum.  The problem lies not so much in the fact that the trend is towards 
the executive as the dominant repository of authority in this area, but that the trend is 
toward unfettered administrative discretion.  It is important to note in this respect that 
a key feature of the restrictive trend in asylum policy in recent years is that important 
administrative controls on the exercise of discretion, e.g. independent merits review of 
eligibility determinations, are also undermined or circumvented. 
This thesis contends in the following chapters that this trend is fundamentally at odds 
with the modern duty on states to interpret and apply their international protection 
obligations in good faith.  When applied in good faith, key international protection 
obligations require that states utilize fully their national judicial, parliamentary and 
administrative mechanisms to safeguard the rights of refugees to a fair and effective 
asylum process.  Viewed in historical context, this approach adopts the mantle of the 
school of thought that has challenged arbitrary decision-making in the asylum arena 
for over three centuries.   
VI CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to show that the duties upon states to engage their national 
institutions in the asylum process, outlined in the following chapters, have historical 
precedent.  The history of asylum is one of contest over the institutions responsible 
for its grant (or denial).  Unfettered administrative discretion in the asylum arena has 
been disputed since at least the eighteenth century.  And for good reason.  As this 
chapter has also demonstrated, parliamentarians who contested the application of 
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arbitrary power to refugees did so in the full realization that such powers could not be 
trusted to preserve the sanctity of asylum and to protect those vulnerable to 
persecution upon return to their home countries.    
The historical observations in this chapter also help deconstruct and contest 
government appeals to the ‘sovereignty’ doctrine to justify arbitrary powers in the 
asylum arena.  The sovereign right to exclude or expel aliens, to grant asylum, or to 
maintain immigration ‘control’, as a traditional principle of international law, should 
not dictate as a matter of international law how that power should be exercised or 
implemented within the state.  This thesis argues that the state’s traditional powers are 
now subject to clearly expressed limitations found in international human rights 
instruments that reach ‘inside’ the state.   
In the next chapter, those instruments penetrating the veneer of state sovereignty to 
impose positive obligations on states to utilize judicial, legislative and executive 
institutions for the purpose of protecting citizens and foreigers alike are examined.  
From an historical perspective, the interpretative approach advocated in the next 
chapter and the remainder of this thesis represents a modern manifestation of the 
earlier developed notion that the protection of refugees should not be left solely to 
arbitrary power.   
 
 
3  THE SCOPE OF THE GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE WHEN 




This thesis asserts that a good faith reading of core protection obligations requires that 
states employ appropriate legislative, judicial and executive mechanisms when they 
construct and implement an asylum process.  The purpose of this chapter is to lay the 
foundations for this approach by examining the scope of the good faith principle when 
applied in the context of international human rights treaties and the Refugee 
Convention. 
Section II examines the operation of the good faith principle within the international 
bill of rights (consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights264 and the 
United Nations Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights265 and on Civil 
and Political Rights).266  It observes that the good faith principle translates into a trio 
of state obligations when applied to human rights treaties: a duty to respect rights; a 
duty to protect rights; and perhaps most importantly, a duty to ensure and fulfil rights 
through the use of judicial, executive and legislative mechanisms.   
                                                          
264 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III)) UN 
Doc A/C 3/SR. 121. 
265 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976).  
266 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 172 (entered into force 23 March 1976).  See generally, Nowak, above n 126, xix.  
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Sections III and IV contend that this same trio of obligations applies to the Refugee 
Convention.  Consequently, States Parties to the Convention are also under an 
overarching duty to engage appropriate legislative, administrative and judicial 
safeguards to ensure the effective operation of their protection obligations.  The next 
chapter expounds on these interpretative principles in the context of individual 
protection obligations and the asylum process. 
II THE GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS  
A The good faith principle  
States are under a clear obligation under general principles of international law to 
interpret a treaty in good faith and in a way that ensures the effective achievement of 
its object and purpose.267  Thus, while the method of incorporation of a treaty may 
vary between different domestic legal orders, what matters is its effective and 
practical observance and implementation within the particular political and legal 
milieu of individual states.268  The obligation to ensure the effectiveness of a treaty 
applies equally to the Refugee Convention269 and cognate rights instruments.270   
                                                          
267 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 24-26. 
268 Tomuschat, above n 275, 98. 
269 Hathaway, above n 1, 62-64; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 117, 7-8, 387-390.  States must 
implement the Refugee Convention in good faith to ensure its effectiveness in achieving its object and 
purpose: Hathaway, above n 1, 62-64; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 117, 391.  The Convention 
‘must be interpreted in a way that makes it practical and effective.  It is only be adopting this approach 
that the commitment to human rights protection can be made meaningful’: Harvey, above n 3, 144.  
The Convention must be ‘able to function as part of a ‘complex and evolving legal environment’: 
Hathaway, above n 1, 65.  The good faith obligation is concerned with ‘the practical effect of State 
action, not its intent or motivations’: Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 117, 387. 
270 In the context of the ICCPR, Christian Tomuschat observes: ‘It is the substantive criterion of 
effectiveness which the [Human Rights Committee] has employed as the guiding principle for its 
assessment of the different methods of implementation, rather than the formal criterion of incorporation 
…’: Tomuschat, below n 275, 98.     
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B The modern typology of state duties under international human rights treaties 
The effective implementation of a treaty depends on the proactive and positive 
engagement of national institutions.  In the human rights context this is clear when we 
examine the historical background to the drafting of international human rights 
treaties.  Following the atrocities of the Second World War, the Commission on 
Human Rights decided that the best way to ensure practical and effective rights 
protection was through improving national laws and institutions, not replacing 
them.271  It was clear from the outset of its deliberations that the Commission on 
Human Rights envisaged that national laws and institutions would be the primary 
means of ensuring the effective realisation of human rights.272   
This principle found expression in international human rights law.  According to 
Louis Henkin in his book, The Age of Rights, ‘[t]he law, politics, and institutions of 
international human rights … do not replace national laws and institutions, they 
provide additional international protections for rights under national law.’273  
International human rights law, Henkin reiterated, ‘parallels and supplements national 
law … but it does not replace, and indeed depends on, national institutions.’274  In line 
with this duty, the work of human rights supervisory bodies, like the HRC and the 
                                                          
271 UN, Economic and Social Council, Official Records, First Year: Second Session, From the first 
meeting (25 May 1946) to the fifteenth meeting (21 June 1946), and annexes, Annex 4, Report of the 
Commission on Human Rights (document E/38), 226-227. 
272 Ibid. 
273 L Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press, New York 1990) 17.  See also: L Sohn, 
‘The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals rather than States’ (1982) 32 The 
American University Law Review 15, 22-23. 
274 L Henkin, ‘Introduction’ in L Henkin (ed) The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Columbia University Press, New York 1981) 7. 
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Committee against Torture, focuses on the implementation of rights within the 
domestic institutional context.275 
The principle is specifically reflected in the modern typology of state duties under 
human rights treaties.  International human rights treaties recognize that states parties 
have three types of duties with respect to rights (more than one may apply to a single 
right or obligation): a duty to respect, to fulfil and to protect human rights.276  The 
obligation to respect human rights encapsulates a duty to refrain from state 
intervention, while the duty to protect extends to the protection of individuals against 
human rights abuses by private persons.277   
The positive and proactive engagement of national institutions is principally 
envisaged by the third duty: the duty to fulfil (or to ensure).  The duty to ensure, 
which applies regardless of the categorization of rights as civil, political, economic, 
cultural or social, ensures that states are under ‘an obligation to fulfil human rights by 
means of positive legislative, administrative, judicial and practical measures 
necessary to ensure that the rights in question are implemented to the greatest extent 
possible.’278   The duty to ensure the enjoyment of rights recognizes a core element of 
the human rights creed, i.e. that ‘society must ensure these rights, must act as 
“insurer” for them; it must do what is necessary to see that such rights are in fact 
enjoyed.’279    
C The duty to ensure the effectiveness of the ICCPR and CAT 
                                                          
275 C Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2003) 98. 
276 Nowak, above n 126, xx.  
277 Ibid xxi. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Henkin, above n 273, 8. 
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The duty to ensure rights by positive and proactive utilization of judicial, legislative 
and administrative mechanisms is encapsulated in art 2 of the ICCPR.  Article 2(1) 
obligates the states parties to respect all the rights in the Covenant and to ensure them 
to all individuals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction.  The obligation 
to respect entails that states parties must forbear restricting the exercise of rights in 
the ICCPR, whereas the obligation to ensure imposes a duty to take positive measures 
to protect and to fulfil ICCPR rights.280   The obligation to ensure imposes 
‘affirmative obligations’ on the state;281 a duty of protection, as well as non-
interference.282   
An example of the duty to ensure in operation would be the obligation on states to 
implement positive measures to reduce infant mortality and to eliminate malnutrition 
in accordance with the right to life in art 6.283  Another example of its operation is the 
right to a fair trial (art 14).  When interpreted in light of art 2, art 14 calls for 
‘institutional protection by providing procedural guarantees and implanting specific 
legal institutions.’284  A further example in the asylum context is the obligation on 
states to provide access to an independent review of a decision to expel an alien in 
breach of the implied non-refoulement obligation under the ICCPR.285 
                                                          
280 Nowak, above n 126, 38. 
281 T Buergenthal, ‘State Obligations and Permissible Derogations’, in L Henkin (ed) The International 
Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press, New York 
1981) 77. 
282 Tomuschat, above n 275, 96. 
283 Ibid 38-39.    
284 Ibid xxi.    
285 Mohammed Alzery v Sweden, Communication No 1416/2005, UN Doc CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 
(2006), [11.8] (HRC expressed the view that ‘[t]he absence of any opportunity for effective, 
independent review of the decision to expel … amounted to a breach of article 7, read in conjunction 
with article 2 of the Covenant.’) 
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The operation and scope of the obligation to ensure depends on the nature of the 
particular right, but is applicable to all the rights in the ICCPR.286  Thus, the ICCPR is 
now understood as containing a progressive obligation to adopt proactive measures to 
safeguard negative rights.287  Thus, the classic liberal idea that political and civil 
rights imposed negative obligations on governments has broken down as the 
jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) and other 
human rights supervisory bodies have interpreted traditional negative human rights 
‘as entailing a broad range of positive State obligations’.288  The underlying 
imperative is to provide practical and effective protection for all civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights289 - and to recognize the pivotal role played by 
national institutions in securing that observance. 
The obligation to ensure in art 2(1) of the ICCPR is reinforced by the requirement on 
States under art 2(2) to adopt such ‘legislative or other measures as may be necessary 
to give effect to the [Covenant] rights’.  The words ‘to give effect to’ require not only 
the provision of a remedy for a violation of a right (expressly required under art 2(3) 
                                                          
286 Nowak, above n 126, 38. 
287 Ibid 37-38. 
288 Despite the different wording in the ICESCR equivalent to art 2 of the ICCPR, there is no 
difference in the nature of the obligations under the two Covenants.  Both recognize that states are 
under a progressive obligation to take positive steps to ensure the effective realisation of both negative 
and positive rights, whether political, civil, economic, social or cultural.  The traditional distinction 
between the ICESCR and ICCPR rights, which depicted the former as positive obligations to be 
implemented gradually through positive measures and the latter as negative obligations to be 
guaranteed immediately through prohibitions on state conduct, has broken down with the evolution of 
the jurisprudence on both Covenants: M Sepulveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2002) 137, 
155.  The ICESCR is also recognized as containing both negative and positive rights requiring 
immediate and progressive implementation: Foster, above n 116, 170-173; R Cholewinski, ‘Economic 
and Social Rights of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Europe’ (2000) 14 Georgetown Immigration 
Law Journal 709, 718-720, 724.  See also, CESCR, General Comment 9: The domestic application of 
the Covenant, 3 December 1998, EC 12/1998/24, [6]-[7]. 
289 Sepulveda, above n 288, 137. 
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of the ICCPR), but also the adoption of measures that avoid or prevent the violation of 
a right.290   
Article 2(2) may also require the adoption of measures other than legislation in order 
to ensure the effectiveness of rights.291  The measures adopted will depend on the 
right in question, but may include, for example, educational and information provision 
to inform individuals of their rights, affirmative action, or fostering institutions that 
remove barriers to the full enjoyment of rights.292   
The obligation under art 2(2) is directly applicable and imposes an immediate 
international obligation to respect and to ensure the rights set out in the ICCPR.293  
Yet this does not preclude the progressive realization of the rights set out in the 
ICCPR.  As Nowak points out, the immediate obligation to respect and to ensure the 
enjoyment of rights does not prevent states from also being under ‘a progressive 
obligation to ensure these rights by all appropriate legislative, political, 
administrative, judicial, social, economic and other measures.’294  Nowak gives the 
example that while any act of torture constitutes an immediate violation of art 7 of the 
ICCPR, ‘there remains plenty of possibilities in all States of the world to 
progressively improve the respective training of law enforcement personnel, to 
develop more effective measures for the prevention of torture, to raise the standards 
                                                          
290 O Schachter, ‘The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law’ in L Henkin (ed) The 
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press, 
New York 1981) 319; Nowak, above n 126, 60.    
291 Nowak, above n 126, 60.    
292 Schachter, above n 290, 319.  For example, Nowak gives the example of the training of prison 
personnel as being one measure that may be necessary for the prevention of torture: Nowak, above n 
126, 60.    




and conditions of detention, to investigate all allegations of ill-treatment, to bring the 
perpetrators to justice, to protect women against domestic violence, etc.’295   
The general obligation to ensure and fulfil the rights found in the ICCPR is further 
spelled out in art 2(3).  As already noted, art 2(3) expressly requires that states 
provide remedies to individuals for violations of Covenant rights.  While art 2(3) does 
not preclude international remedies, it emphasizes the central role of domestic 
remedies.296  Article 2(3)(b) specifically recognizes the right to a remedy before a 
competent domestic authority, if possible, a court.297  Decisions by political or 
administrative organs do not satisfy paragraph 3(b).298  Paragraph 3(b) therefore 
imposes a progressive obligation to develop judicial remedies, not to take deliberate 
steps to remove or avoid those already in existence – a point of particular relevance in 
the asylum context given recent attempts to exclude the courts from reviewing asylum 
decision-making in many states.  
In line with these observations, the work of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
focuses on reviewing the practice of states to ensure the effective implementation of 
Covenant rights through practical and accessible legislation, constitutional provisions, 
and judicial remedies.299  In general, it can be said that the HRC supports the 
                                                          
295 Ibid. 
296 Schachter, above n 290, 325. 
297 Nowak, above n 126, 63.  
298 Ibid 64. 
299 Tomuschat, above n 275, 98 ff.  This same approach is reflected in the relaxation by regional rights 
bodies of the requirement that petitioners prove the exhaustion of domestic remedies.  Pursuant to 
Inter-American human rights mechanisms a petitioner is not required to prove exhaustion of domestic 
remedies before bringing a complaint before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights if domestic 
legislation does not ‘afford due process of law for protection of the right or rights that have allegedly 
been violated’: American Convention, art 46(2); Commission Rules, art 31(2)(a).  See generally, B 
Lyon and S Rottman, ‘The Inter-American Mechanisms’, in J Fitzpatrick (ed) Human Rights 
Protection for Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Internally Displaced Persons, A Guide to International 
Mechanisms and Procedures (Transnational Publishers, Inc. Ardsley, New York) 457.  This has been 
extended by the Court to include ‘the total ineffectiveness’ of the judiciary: Velásquez Rodríguez Case, 
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imposition of a progressive obligation upon states to ensure the effective enjoyment of 
the rights found in the ICCPR by all appropriate legislative, political, administrative, 
judicial, social, economic and other measures.300   
In a similar way, the equivalent art 2(1) of the CAT has been interpreted by the 
Committee against Torture as obliging state parties ‘to take actions that will reinforce 
the prohibition against torture through legislative, administrative, judicial, or other 
actions that must, in the end, be effective in preventing it.’301  The Committee against 
Torture has reminded states that the obligation in art 2 is ‘wide-ranging’ and imposes 
an evolving ‘baseline’ of effective measures that states should employ.302 
The ‘baseline’ identified in the Committee’s 1998 general comment on the 
implementation of art 2 illustrates the scope of measures that states should employ 
under rights treaties.  The ‘baseline’ encompasses: the elimination of legal obstacles 
that impede the eradication of torture; the review and improvement of relevant laws in 
response to comments by the Committee; making the offence of torture punishable as 
an offence under criminal law; establishing an official register of detainees; ensuring 
the right of detainees to be informed of their rights; providing a right to receive 
independent legal advice; putting in place mechanisms for inspecting detention 
centres; and ensuring the prompt investigation of allegations of torture and ill-
treatment and the availability of judicial and other remedies that guarantee the prompt 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Preliminary Objections [Honduras], Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, ¶ 88 (June26, 1987); Fairén 
Garbi and Solis Corrales, Preliminary Objections [Honduras], Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 2, 47, 
78 ¶ 81(June 26, 1987); Godínez Crus Case, Preliminary Objections [Honduras], Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 3, 45, 79, 80 ¶ 95 (June 26, 1987). 
300 Sohn, above n 273,  21. 
301 Committee against Torture, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, General Comment No. 2 (Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties), 
CAT/C/GC2/CRP.1/Rev.4, [2]. 
302 Ibid [3]-[4]. 
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and impartial examination of allegations and the capacity to challenge the legality of 
detention or treatment.303 
A further illustration of the scope of the duty to ensure under the CAT is the 
requirement that states ensure that individuals have the right to an effective remedy 
for breach of their rights even where the CAT does not expressly set out a remedy for 
particular breaches. 304  An example is the non-refoulement obligation in art 3.305  In 
the case of Agiza v Sweden, the Committee against Torture observed that ‘the right to 
an effective remedy for a breach of the Convention underpins the entire Convention, 
for otherwise the protections afforded by the Convention would be rendered largely 
illusory.’306  Thus, the Committee considered that the prohibition on refoulement 
contained in art 3 of the CAT encompassed a remedy for its breach even though it did 
not contain a remedy on its face.307 
III THE HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVE OF THE NATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the core purpose of international human 
rights instruments is to safeguard the rights of persons seeking protection through the 
progressive development of positive legislative, administrative and judicial measures.  
This section argues that this purpose is evident in the Refugee Convention, which 
remains at the core of the international refugee protection regime.  This section begins 
by highlighting evidence of this humanitarian purpose in the preparatory work leading 
up to the Refugee Convention’s promulgation.   
                                                          
303 Ibid [2]-[14]. 






The Refugee Convention should be interpreted in ‘good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.’308  This demands a holistic or combined approach to 
interpretation so that the ordinary meanings of the words in the Refugee Convention 
are ‘not to be determined in a vacuum removed from the context of the treaty or its 
object and purpose.’309  The drafting history of the Refugee Convention is a starting 
point for analysis of its treaty and purpose.310    
Analyzing the drafting history of the Refugee Convention is an important step in this 
thesis.  The concept of national protection envisaged by the drafters of the Refugee 
Convention is often depicted as predominantly a ‘real politic’ attempt to wrest back 
state control over the protection process for the purposes of furthering state interests.  
If this is the case, the focus of the Refugee Convention shifts dramatically toward the 
preservation and pursuit of state interests – including immigration control.  As the 
historical record in chapter 2 shows, the surest way for states to engage in 
immigration control is to rely on arbitrary and unfettered administrative powers.  If, 
on the other hand, the national protection of refugees under the Refugee Convention 
was primarily for humanitarian purposes, there is much greater scope for calling on 
states to engage a range of institutional measures that protect refugees. 
A The transition to refugee assistance and protection at the national level 
                                                          
308 Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 22 May 1969, 
1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980). 
309 Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 190 CLR 225, 253 
(McHugh J).   
310 The articles of the Refugee Convention should be interpreted ‘in light of the object and purpose 
appearing in the preamble and the operative text and by reference to the history of the negotiation of 
the Convention’: Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 190 CLR 
225, 231 (Brennan CJ).  Reference to the Convention’s preparatory work is both necessary and 
desirable to provide a contemporary interpretation of the Refugee Convention that is based on evidence 
of the true meaning of the Convention’s text ‘construed purposively, in context, and with a view to 
ensuring its effectiveness’: Hathaway, above n 1, 59.   
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As a starting point, the drafting history shows a clear propensity toward an 
international refugee regime built firmly on assistance and protection offered by 
states.  Although the ‘refugee problem’ was acknowledged from the outset of the UN 
Economic and Social Council’s deliberations on the issue to be ‘international in scope 
and nature’ (and therefore mandating an internationally co-ordinated response through 
international bodies),311 it was clear that states retained ultimate responsibility for 
providing assistance and protection to refugees even where they delegated the 
protection function to an international organization.312   
This is clear from the fact that following the post-war repatriation and resettlement 
work of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), asylum states generally agreed 
with the IRO that assistance to refugees should revert to a primarily national 
function.313  As the delegates to the UN Economic and Social Council recognized, if 
assistance once more became a national function, ‘protection must follow suit.’314 
Practically, this meant that states would perform many of the key functions previously 
done by the IRO, including undertaking the core function of safeguarding against 
expulsion or return of refugees to places of persecution by determining eligibility for 
protection and facilitating proper travel documentation.  In keeping with this 
progression toward national protection, the French and Belgian delegates to the UN 
Economic and Social Council put forward the proposal for a new international 
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convention on refugees ‘to settle the details of the measures which national authorities 
would have to put into effect.’315   
B The humanitarian purpose of national protection  
The national protection principle was principally driven by humanitarian concerns, 
not state interests.  Much attention is devoted to the Cold War undercurrents flowing 
through the work of the UN Economic and Social Council during this period with the 
result that too often the birth of the modern refugee regime is portrayed as simply an 
instance of ‘real politic’.316  This characterisation can lead to a restrictive reading of 
the Refugee Convention based on the misleading assumption that because the 
Convention was drafted against the background of the Cold War the states that 
participated in the drafting of the Convention ‘had no commitment to basing the 
Convention in the protection of human rights.’317 
Contrary to this assertion, the drafting history supports the sincerity of the French and 
Belgian insistence that their proposal for a new convention on refugees was 
‘prompted much more by humanitarian motives than by consideration of politics or 
self-interest.’318  While it was acknowledged that the refugee problem could be a 
cause of tension between states, it is clear from the drafting history that ‘the problem’ 
was humanitarian in nature and demanded a humanitarian response.  Significantly, 
both the Eastern Bloc and Western states viewed the refugee problem as essentially a 
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humanitarian one; the disagreements arose when each side accused the other of 
playing politics with it.319   
Consistent with these observations, in recent times the judgments of leading courts 
have stressed the importance of adopting a humanitarian and evolving interpretation 
of the Refugee Convention.320  The fact that Cold War tensions that lingered in the 
background of the drafting of the Refugee Convention have long since abated while 
the proclaimed humanitarian objective of the Convention lives on321 bears witness to 
the durability of the true purpose and spirit within which the Convention was drafted.  
It would be contrary to that objective, as well as the Convention’s claim to 
universality, to chain its provisions to the transient political distrusts and suspicions of 
post-war Europe. 
C The humanitarian purpose of national protection – the Preamble 
The humanitarian object and purpose of the Convention is also evident from its 
preamble.  The Refugee Convention’s Preamble is the principal indicator of the 
Convention’s object and purpose.322  The Preamble to the Refugee Convention begins 
with a clear affirmation of the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the imperative of assuring to refugees ‘the widest 
possible exercise’ of fundamental rights and freedoms.  While the Preamble also 
                                                          
319 UN, Economic and Social Council, Official Records, First Year: Second Session, Special 
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extols states parties to ensure that they prevent the ‘problem from becoming a cause 
of tension between States’, this is expressly subject to the recognition of the 
humanitarian nature of the refugee problem.  Thus, while states addressed the ‘refugee 
problem’ with an eye to reducing tensions between states, the ‘problem’ was 
conceived in humanitarian terms.323   
D The humanitarian purpose of national protection – context 
A further reason for seeing the shift to national protection in a humanitarian light is 
the wider human rights context of the Refugee Convention.  The Refugee 
Convention’s Preamble clearly places the Convention within the international bill of 
rights.324  In the words of Brennan CJ of the Australian High Court:  
By invoking “the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and 
freedoms without discrimination” and by speaking of the United Nations’ “profound 
concern for refugees” and its endeavour “to assure refugees the widest possible exercise 
of these fundamental rights and freedoms”, the preamble places the Convention among 
the international instruments that have as their object and purpose the protection of the 
equal enjoyment by every person of fundamental rights and freedoms.325   
As noted in section II above, a critical force at the time of the instigation of the 
Refugee Convention in the UN Economic and Social Council was the work of the 
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Commission on Human Rights.326  There was significant cross-pollination between 
the two enterprises.  The International Refugee Organization’s involvement in the 
work of the Commission ensured that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
contained articles of special application to refugees and displaced persons, including 
the right of emigration (art 13), the right to seek asylum (art 14) and the right to a 
nationality (art 15).327   
Ideas and principles flowed from the Commission’s draft covenant on human rights 
into the preparatory work of the Refugee Convention.328  This was consistent with a 
guiding principle of the Economic and Social Council at the time that ‘pending the 
adoption of an international bill of rights … international treaties involving basic 
human rights … shall conform to the fundamental standards relative to such rights set 
forth in the [UN] Charter.’329  Turning to the operative provisions of the Refugee 
Convention in the next part, we find the same focus on securing the national 
protection of rights as espoused by the Commission.330 
E The humanitarian purpose of national protection – operative provisions 
The Refugee Convention’s operative provisions contain the same stress on national 
protection that is present in other human rights instruments.  The Convention was a 
bold step forward in refugee protection because it was ‘an attempt to establish an 
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international code of rights of refugees on a general basis.’331  Many provisions in the 
Refugee Convention are designed to ensure that refugees have access to the same 
beneficial treatment accorded to aliens or nationals under domestic law in the 
Contracting State.  Article 7.1 provides, for example, that ‘[e]xcept where this 
Convention contains more favourable provisions’ states must ‘accord to refugees the 
same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally.’  There are a number of other 
provisions that require a Contracting State to extend to refugees the same treatment or 
protection afforded under its domestic law to aliens,332 most-favoured foreign 
nationals,333 or nationals.334   
Many of these rights derive from developments in international aliens law, which 
sought to overcome the vulnerability of persons outside the protection of their own 
state.335  International aliens law shares an underlying humanitarian object with 
refugee protection.336  As noted by Hermann Mosler, many of the rights found in 
international aliens law are considered to apply regardless of nationality, eg access to 
the courts and tribunals, freedom from humiliating treatment and forced labour, and 
prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty and property.337  By including many of 
these protections, the Refugee Convention similarly aims to ensure that refugees have 
access to national protection. 
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Even where the Refugee Convention imposes obligations on Contracting States that 
apply to refugees irrespective of the domestic measures applicable to other groups, 
there is a clear understanding that national laws and institutions are essential to the 
carrying out of those duties.  The right of access to the courts (art 16) and 
administrative assistance (art 25) under the Convention are important and obvious 
reminders that the drafters of the Convention recognized the fundamental importance 
of ensuring that refugees had access to the protection offered by national institutions.  
Most significantly, as will be argued further in the next chapter, the core non-
refoulement obligation in art 33 of the Convention, while silent on the procedures for 
determining a putative refugee’s entitlement to protection, nevertheless is understood 
as imposing a responsibility on states to implement fair and effective asylum 
procedures.  It is argued further in the next chapter, that a good faith interpretation 
and application of this obligation necessitates that states exploit to the fullest extent 
possible their array of judicial, legislative and administrative protection safeguards. 
This argument holds true irrespective of UNHCR involvement in asylum processing 
in certain states.  It is important to view the long-standing involvement of the 
UNHCR in refugee status determinations in light of the High Commissioner’s 
repeated calls for states to bear the responsibility and function of determining refugee 
status.338  The UNHCR position is indicative of the fact that it is states that assume 
responsibility to protect aliens and refugees within their jurisdiction.339   
By reiterating this position, the UNHCR also acknowledges that it is incapable as a 
matter of practice of providing the same level of protection as that available within the 
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framework of state legal and institutional structures.340  The UNHCR position 
therefore acknowledges the practical need for a robust and diverse national 
institutional framework for protection.  As noted by Colin Harvey, it is ‘[t]he 
institutions and structures of protection [that] shape the practical implementation of 
legal standards in [the asylum] area.’341  
F National protection and regional developments 
To date, regional refugee rights regimes have at least formally aimed at 
supplementing, not replacing, national protection systems.342  The EU’s gradual move 
towards the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has focused on overcoming 
the difficulties that have arisen from inconsistent application of the Convention 
between EU Member States.  Developments thus far have been formally aimed at 
unifying substantive and procedural mechanisms within Member States, rather than 
replacing them with a supranational structure.343   
The formal objective of EU asylum intergration accords with the ongoing state 
responsibility of individual member states under international law.  EU member states 
remain separate entities for the purposes of international law and each member is 
therefore responsible for promoting universal respect for, and observance and 
protection of, international human rights.344   
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Although formally preserving the role and responsibility of member states, it is open 
to debate whether the development and implementation of the CEAS has eroded the 
involvement of national institutions.  For instance, chapter 5 of this thesis examines 
whether the recent extraterritorial operations of the EU’s new border control agency, 
FRONTEX, are in practice undermining the access of asylum seekers intercepted 
outside the physical borders of the EU to statutory and judicial rights and remedies 
available within Member States.345   
In summary, the transition to a national protection model in the international refugee 
rights regime should be seen in broadly humanitarian terms.  A key aspect of the 
transition to national protection was the imperative to ensure the effective realisation 
of refugee rights through access to national protection safeguards.  If national 
protection is essential to safeguarding the rights of refugees, the issue arises to what 
extent States Parties to the Refugee Convention and cognate rights instruments are 
obligated to provide putative refugees with access to the full scope of national 
protection safeguards, including legislative, judicial and administrative measures?   
IV THE OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
REFUGEE CONVENTION  
Asylum procedures stand to benefit from widespread improvements in administrative 
justice in the last fifty years.  They include improvements in administrative decision-
making, statutory conditions and duties directing administrative discretion, as well as 
judicial scrutiny of the asylum process.  Denying the application of those 
developments to asylum procedures substantially deprives refugees of recourse to 
safeguards that, it will be argued in the next chapter, provide an essential framework 
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for a fair and effective asylum process.  It effectively returns asylum to the historical 
tradition of arbitrary, discriminatory and secretive decision-making observed in 
chapter 2 of this thesis.  This is precisely the tradition that constituted the mischief 
that the Refugee Convention and cognate rights instruments were designed to cure by 
ensuring that rights were observed and enforced as a matter of practice.  The adverse 
legacy of the tradition of arbitrary decision-making in the asylum context is all too 
apparent in the modern, restrictive asylum policies examined in chapters 5 to 7 of this 
thesis.   
There are sound reasons to apply to the Refugee Convention the typology of duties 
found in general international human rights instruments, including the progressive 
obligation to ensure the effective observance of rights and obligations.  These reasons 
derive from an interpretation of the Refugee Convention that is contextual and which 
accords with its object and purpose.  As summarized by leading experts at the Global 
Consultations on Protection in 2001 (and endorsed by EXCOM), ‘[r]efugee law is a 
dynamic body of law, informed by the broad object and purpose of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as by developments in related areas of 
international law, such as human rights law …’346  This basic approach is in 
accordance with the growing linkages between international agencies and norms in 
the areas of international refugee law and international human rights law.347 
A Context 
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When interpreted in the context of other rights treaties, the good faith obligation that 
applies equally to the Refugee Convention implies the same requirements as found in 
art 2 of the ICCPR and CAT.  As pointed out by Professor Tomuschat, the 
stipulations found in art 2 of those treaties reflect the basic nature of the good faith 
obligation (or pacta sunt servanda).348  They simply serve as a ‘useful reminder’ that 
compliance with human rights treaties require proactive steps to protect rights.349  The 
requirements in art 2(1) of the ICCPR and CAT (and art 2(1) of the ICESCR) codify 
the good faith principle that is equally applicable to the Refugee Convention despite 
the absence of a similar provision.   
Given the acknowledged linkages between refugee law and human rights law,350 it 
would be implausible to permit the Refugee Convention to be used as a tool for 
denying the scope and degree of protection afforded to individuals under the ICCPR, 
CAT or other human rights treaty.351  States are obligated to ensure the contemporary 
relevance of the Refugee Convention.  States must ensure that the mechanisms 
available for satisfaction of the obligations in the Convention continue to evolve 
alongside developments in international human rights law.  This is especially 
important given that despite the substantial overlap between the Refugee Convention 
and the ICCPR, CAT, and ICESCR, which also apply to non-nationals,352 the Refugee 
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Convention still offers significant additional protection to refugees that is sometimes 
not granted to those who benefit from subsidiary or complementary protection.353   
B Object and purpose 
In addition to its context, the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose also mandates 
the application of the modern typology of state duties under human rights treaties – 
including the obligation to ensure the progressive realization of the rights of refugees.  
The Convention’s Preamble cites expressly to the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, which exhorts all individuals and organs of society to strive ‘by progressive 
measures, national and international, to secure … universal and effective recognition 
and observance’ of human rights.354   
The Convention’s Preamble, as noted above, also gives expression to the human 
rights purpose of the Convention that guarantees that states parties will give refugees 
the widest possible enjoyment of rights.355  Consequently, the purpose of the Refugee 
Convention, as evident also in art 5, is to ‘grant refugees as many rights as possible, 
not restrict them.’356  Consistent with this aim, the Refugee Convention not only 
establishes a minimum set of rights for refugees, but also obligates states to grant 
more liberal rights ‘whenever they exist at present or this is possible.’357 
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Moreover, the humanitarian object of the Refugee Convention requires that states do 
justice to the contemporary relevance of the Convention as a humanitarian instrument 
in an evolving legal and political environment.358  This acknowledges that human 
rights are in a state of ‘dynamic evolution’.359  States should adopt an ‘evolutionary 
approach’ to the interpretation of international human rights instruments and the 
Refugee Convention that pays due regard to the fact that ‘their object is to protect the 
rights and freedoms of individual human beings generally or falling within a 
particular description’.360  As stated by Lord Craighead in the recent House of Lords’ 
decision of R v Asfaw, ‘a generous interpretation should be given to the wording of 
the articles [in the Refugee  Convention], in keeping with the humanitarian purpose 
that it seeks to achieve and the general principle that the Convention is to be regarded 
as a living instrument.’361 
In line with this general object and approach, contracting states to the Refugee 
Convention should exploit the regulatory tools available to them to ensure the 
effectiveness of protection.  The law should facilitate fair and effective protection, not 
act as an exclusionary tool.362  This requires, in the asylum context, that states give 
due regard to the ‘enabling aspects of law’.363  The enabling power of national 
legislative and administrative measures has found repeated recognition in EXCOM 
conclusions.364  Specifically, EXCOM has urged states to ensure the effective 
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implementation of the Refugee Convention through appropriate administrative and 
legislative measures, including national procedures for determining refugee status.365   
As will be seen from this thesis’s examination of certain restrictive asylum policies, 
the enabling or facilitative aspect of the law is ‘a neglected area in the asylum 
context’.366  The importance of laws that facilitate restraints on executive power in the 
asylum context, as opposed to laws that facilitate the unbridled exercise of that power, 
is clear from the historical perspective taken in chapter 2 of this thesis.   
In addition, the humanitarian object and purpose of the Refugee Convention demands 
that states also be proactive in removing or ameliorating legal, political and other 
obstacles to the effective realisation of refugee rights.367  The law in the asylum area 
all too often functions in an exclusionary way.368   Where legal (or political, economic 
or social) regimes frustrate the objective of the Convention, states are under an 
obligation to ensure that the Refugee Convention is effective within host countries ‘as 
presently constructed’.369  Recognizing this, an interpretation of the Convention’s 
provisions, or a practice or policy not expressly prohibited under the Refugee 
Convention but that frustrates the object and purpose of the Convention, will amount 
to a breach of the Convention.370   
                                                                                                                                                                      
364 EXCOM Conclusion No 2 (XXVII) – 1976, (c); EXCOM Conclusion No 11 (XXIX) -1978, (h); 
EXCOM Conclusion No 14 (XXX) – 1979; EXCOM Conclusion No 29 (XXXIV) – 1983, (g), (h); 
EXCOM Conclusion No 41 (XXXVII) – 1986, (g); EXCOM Conclusion No 49 (XXXVIII) – 1987, 
(d); EXCOM Conclusion No 57 (XL) – 1989, (a) – (d).  
365 Ibid.  
366 Harvey, above n 3, 145. 
367 EXCOM Conclusion No 57 (XL) – 1989 (‘Invited States also to consider taking whatever steps are 
necessary to identify and remove possible legal or administrative obstacles to full implementation’). 
368 Harvey, above n 3, 145. 
369 Hathaway, above n 1, 63. 




C Operative provisions 
Lastly, the application to the Refugee Convention of the progressive obligation to 
ensure the effectiveness of rights, as part of the trio of State obligations applicable to 
all human rights, also gains support from an examination of the nature and 
development of some of the Convention’s core provisions.  This argument is taken up 
further in the next chapter.  
V  UNDERLYING REASONS TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE 
PROTECTION – AN INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER 
This thesis essentially seeks to establish a nexus between municipal protection 
safeguards and the international refugee protection regime.  The justification for this 
nexus ultimately rests on the normative structure of an integrated international legal 
order.  While the obligation to ensure the protection of rights at the national level 
derives from international instruments, it signifies the interdependence of the 
international and domestic legal orders.  The rights doctrine is at the core of this 
relationship.  Rights do not simply represent a restraint on a state’s external 
sovereignty, but to be effective must also act as a restraint on the internal sovereignty 
of political institutions within the state.371   
In accordance with this general understanding of the dual function of rights, it can be 
observed that refugee rights set limits to the scope of discretionary power whether 
discretion is understood as an expression of the state’s external authority or as a 
particular form of decision-making by national institutions.  Together with other 
                                                          




internal safeguards, rights in this context manifest as an external and an internal 
restraint on national institutions in their dealings with refugees.372  Thus, national 
asylum law operates at the intersection of national, regional and international legal 
orders.373   
This discussion has profound implications for the place of refugee rights within the 
domestic sphere.  As observed in the previous chapter, the historical authority of the 
UK government (or Crown) to act as it pleased with respect to refugees in part 
depended on the internal marginalisation of the rights doctrine as a legitimate force in 
the political ordering of the state.374  Yet, as the discussion in this chapter indicates, 
the convergence of substantive and procedural protection safeguards at the national 
level should be viewed in terms of the maturation and realization of the rights agenda 
in international law and as a doctrine of political ordering within states.  International 
human rights symbolize a triumph of the idea of divisible and limited internal 
sovereignty based on the Lockean notion of inalienable natural rights.375  
The international protection regime also extends the rights doctrine to non-members 
of the political community and sees the convergence of the rights doctrine with 
equally long-standing notions and practices of international aliens law and the rule of 
law.  Moreover, the international protection regime moves beyond a classical liberal 
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understanding of the scope of negative rights.  States are now under an obligation to 
adopt positive and progressive measures in order to fulfil their protection obligations 
– an obligation that signifies a limitation on the discretion of the state in international 
law as well as on the internal organs of the state. 
It is no longer possible, or desirable, for governments to create two normative 
spheres: the ‘external’ in which state discretion is bound by international rights, and 
the ‘internal’ where discretion is unfettered because the necessary substantive and 
procedural checks and balances are missing or circumvented.  Attempts to reject or 
circumvent the application of refugee rights within the municipal milieu are 
objectionable as a matter of international obligation: ‘States must abide by their 
duties.  They are not authorized to restrict the substance and scope of their 
commitments by opting for methods of implementation which seem to be less onerous 
than others.’376   
The international protection regime reflects that international law acts to prevent the 
‘abuse of power in all spheres’.377  National, regional and international legal 
institutions and laws are interdependent.378  Tying them together is an international 
value system – human rights.379  The power of human rights is to transcend traditional 
boundaries between international and national law, imposing fundamental limitations 
on the power of the state and the authority of governments.  
It is imperative for the effective implementation of rights at the national level that the 
legislative, judicial and administrative arms of the state are engaged in the translation 
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process.  As was evident from the discussion in chapter 2 of this thesis, the 
involvement of all organs of the state in the translation of international norms into the 
domestic sphere is the recognition of the divisibility of the sovereign order within the 
state.  State organs must be encouraged to operate both within the national and 
international legal communities.380  In the asylum arena, this entails governments 
accepting that legislatures and the courts have an equal role in applying the state’s 
international protection obligations. 
VI CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the international treaties that contain a state’s protection obligations 
require that states utilize evolving legal and institutional mechanisms to ensure the 
progressive realization of the rights of refugees.  This proposition symbolizes a 
broader and deeper commitment to an integrated international legal order that sees 
international, regional and municipal institutions united by core human rights 
standards that direct their actions. 
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4  THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS IN ENSURING A FAIR AND 




Thus far, this thesis has provided a historical context for comprehensive asylum 
procedures.  In addition, the previous chapter put forward a doctrinal case for an 
expansive good faith interpretation and application of states’ international protection 
obligations.  This requires that states ensure the effective implementation of their 
international protection obligations through progressive and positive legislative, 
administrative and judicial measures.381   
This chapter addresses these principles to asylum adjudication.  Any obligation/s upon 
states to embrace progressive and positive mechanisms and techniques of asylum 
adjudiciation must flow from specific international protection obligations.  The good 
faith principle provides the framework for our understanding of the scope of the 
modern typology of state duties, including the duty to ensure the fulfilment of rights.  
However, the good faith obligation is ‘accessory’ in character in the sense that it 
                                                          
381 See above n 280 – and accompanying text. 
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provides the means for the ‘systematic interpretation’ of international obligations. 382  
It is not itself a source of obligations where none would otherwise exist. 383 
This distinction can be hard to sustain.  It becomes difficult to maintain that the good 
faith principle does not create ‘obligations’ when it effectively requires a particular 
course of action that is not apparent from the face of the text, eg to provide a remedy 
for breach of the non-refoulement obligation,384 or to train prison guards as to what is, 
and what is not, torture.385  Nevertheless, the distinction is important because it 
ensures that we find a specific duty (to train prison guards) in a good faith reading of 
a specific obligation (the obligation not to torture).   
Applying this approach, this chapter seeks to derive institutional requirements relating 
to a state’s asylum process from a good faith reading of core international protection 
obligations.  The core rights and obligations examined include the non-refoulement 
obligation, the obligation to provide access to the courts, the right of non-
discrimination, the right of equality before the law, and the right of refugees not to be 
penalized for illegal entry.   
                                                          
382 Drawing on the jurisprudence of the HRC on art 2 of the ICCPR, which encapsulates the good faith 
obligation: Karen Noelia Llantoy Huamán v Peru, Communication No 1153/2003, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005), [5.4]; Andrew Rogerson v Australia, Communication No 802/1998, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/802/1998 (2002), [7.9]; CEA v Finland, Communication No 316/1988, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/42/D/316/1988 (1991), [6.2].  See generally, Nowak, above n 126, 29.  
383 In re Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v Honduras) [1988] ICJ Rep 69 [94]; In 
re Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria) [1998] ICJ 
Rep 275 [39] (‘The principle of good faith is one of the basic principles governing the creation and 
performance of legal obligations ...; it is not in itself a source of obligation where none would 
otherwise exist.’) 
384 Agiza v Sweden, Communication No 233/2003, UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005), [13.6]. 
385 See, eg, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, United States of 
America, UN Doc CAT/C/USA/C/2 (2006), [19]; United Nations Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No 20: Replaces general comment 7 concerning prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or 




Based on a good faith reading of those rights and obligations, this chapter adopts an 
expansive view of the judicial, legislative and executive safeguards that should 
underpin the construction and implementation of an asylum process.  It highlights a 
number of measures that states can, and should, use to improve the delivery of asylum 
adjudication.  This discussion is meant to highlight the importance of a 
comprehensive array of institutional measures, and does not purport to exhaustively 
set out or define asylum procedures. 
Important administrative measures include: the training of asylum decision-makers; 
the allocation of appropriate resources and materials for asylum decision-makers to 
make informed and unhurried decisions; internal quality reviews of decision-making; 
and independent merits review.  Legislative measures include: statutory incorporation 
of eligibility criteria and the non-refoulement obligation and other rights where 
incorporation is necessary to translate international obligations into practically 
enjoyable rights; and the incorporation of binding procedural safeguards (eg the right 
to reasons for rejection of an asylum application and the right to an effective remedy).   
Legislative and administative measures can also facilitate access to judicial safeguards 
by providing a right to legal assistance on appeal, non-suspensive appeal rights, and 
reasonable time limits.  The judiciary, meanwhile, contributes to fair and effective 
asylum processing through inclusive interpretation of eligibility criteria, and anxious 
scrutiny of the fairness of administrative decision-making and procedures. 
The final section of this chapter sets the scene for the remainder of this thesis.  It 
examines how restrictive asylum policies that have gained ground in developed states 
seek to separate the asylum process from the benefits afforded comprehensive 
legislative, judicial and administrative safeguards.  The remaining chapters of this 
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thesis then go on to critically examine attempts to isolate asylum from meaningful 
national safeguards.  
II THE NON-REFOULEMENT OBLIGATION 
A Elements 
The non-refoulement obligation is described as the cornerstone of the Refugee 
Convention.386  It prohibits the return of refugees to a place where they have a well-
founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, 
or membership of a particular social group.387  Furthermore, art 3 of the CAT 
prohibits expulsion, return or extradition of a person to a place where they would be 
in danger of being subject to torture.  A corresponding implied prohibition against 
refoulement is found in the ICCPR, which prevents states from returning a person to 
another state where they face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (art 7), a 
threat to the right to life (art 6) or, in principle, any other deprivation of an ICCPR 
right.388  A modern legislative statement of the non-refoulement principle is found in 
the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002.389 
                                                          
386 Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, Supreme Court of the United States, Ahmed Ali v. Deborah Achim, Michael 
Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and Michael Mukasey, United States 
Attorney General, No. 06-1346, November 2007, 5. 
387 Refugee Convention, art 33(1). 
388 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: art 7 (Prohibition of torture, or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), UN Doc HRI/ GEN/1/Rev.7, 10 March 1992, 
[9]; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, [12]; ARJ v 
Australia (Communication No. 692/1996, 11 August 1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996), [6.8]-
[6.9]; R (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] All ER 153, [21]-[24] (Lord 
Bingham).  See generally, Nowak, above n 126, 150. 
389 Section 115(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provides: 
Principle of Non-refoulement 
A protected person or a person who is recognized as a Convention refugee by another country to 
which the person may be returned shall not be removed from Canada to a country where they 
would be at risk of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
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Consistent with the trio of obligations applicable to all human rights treaties,390 the 
non-refoulement obligation has different facets.  First, it encompasses a duty to 
respect the right of a person not to be refouled.  Thus, States are prohibited from 
taking active measures to refoule, such as ejection from the jurisdiction391 or forced 
repatriation.392  Second, the non-refoulement obligation encompasses a duty to 
protect.  This requires, for example, that states protect persons from refoulement by 
non-state actors.    
Third, the non-refoulement obligation encompasses a duty to ensure or to fulfil the 
obligation by way of positive measures.   Those measures include legislative, 
administrative, judicial and other regulatory tools.  States should adopt such measures 
that avoid or prevent the violation of a right.393  When applied to the non-refoulement 
obligation, this requires that states implement measures that reduce the risk of 
refoulement to the greatest extent possible.  This follows from the fact that ‘the nature 
of refoulement is such … that an allegation of breach of that article relates to a future 
expulsion or removal.’394  Compliance depends on the means adopted to ensure the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
particular social group or political opinion or at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment. 
390 See above n 276  – and accompany text. 
391 EXCOM, No. 102 (LVI) – 2005 (j) (‘Recalls its Conclusions No. 6 (XXVII) and 7 (XXVIII), as 
well as numerous subsequent references made in its other Conclusions to the principle of non-
refoulement; expresses deep concern that refugee protection is seriously jeopardized by expulsion of 
refugees leading to refoulement; and calls on States to refrain from taking such measures and in 
particular from returning or expelling refugees contrary to the principle of non-refoulement.’) 
392 Hathaway, above n 1, 287, 318-319. 
393 O Schachter, ‘The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law’ in L Henkin (ed) The 
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1981) 319; Nowak, above n 126, 60.    
394 Agiza v Sweden, Communication No 233/2003, UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005), [13.7]. 
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result of non-refoulement.  As Penelope Mathew observes, non-refoulement is ‘both 
an obligation of result and an obligation of conduct’.395   
The duty to ensure the effective operation of the non-refoulement obligation is 
reflected in the requirement that states ensure the fairness and effectiveness of asylum 
procedures.396  As a limitation on the orthodox view that states have the discretion to 
determine what procedure will govern the asylum process,397 states are obligated to 
take positive steps to adopt a fair and effective asylum process in order to reliably and 
accurately identify those in need of protection.398   
B The right to a remedy for a breach of the non-refoulement obligation 
The duty to ensure the effectiveness of the non-refoulement obligation also requires a 
right to a remedy for its breach.399  An appeal should have suspensive effect, ie an 
asylum seeker should not be deported prior to his or her appeal being finally 
determined.  In a recent complaint under the Optional Protocol, the HRC observed 
that ‘article 2 of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 7, requires an effective 
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Conclusion No 105 (LVII) – 2006, (n); UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum 
Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001 [4]–[5].   
397 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Mayer (1985) 157 CLR 290, 294 (Gibbs CJ), 300 
(Mason, Deane and Dawson JJ), 305 (Brennan J); Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 117, 533.   
398 Arakaki, above n 37, 46.  See, G Goodwin-Gill, ‘Opinion Re SN’ (Submission to the Tokyo District 
Court, 24 September 1994) 4; G Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (1st ed. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1983) 148; G Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (2nd ed. Clarendon Press, 
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Sijthoff, Leyden, 1966), 339: cited in Ibid.  
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remedy for violations of the latter provision …’400  The HRC observed that due to the 
nature of refoulement, ‘effective review of a decision to expel … must have an 
opportunity to take place prior to expulsion, in order to avoid irreparable harm to the 
individual and rendering the review otiose and devoid of meaning.’401   
As noted in the previous chapter, the Committee against Torture has similarly found 
that the non-refoulement obligation in art 3 of the CAT contains procedural 
requirements.402  In the case of Agiza v. Sweden, a case involving the refoulement of 
an asylum seeker in contravention of art 3 of the CAT, the Committee began by 
observing that ‘the right to an effective remedy for a breach of the Convention 
underpins the entire [CAT], for otherwise the protections affored by the Convention 
would be rendered largely illusory.’403  The Committee went on to state that ‘the 
prohibition on refoulement contained in article 3 should be interpreted … to 
encompass a remedy for its breach, even though on it may not contain on its face such 
a right to remedy for a breach thereof.’404   
III OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
A Article 16 of the Refugee Convention 
Article 16 of the Refugee Convention provides the right to a remedy for a breach of 
the non-refoulement obligation under art 33 of the Convention.  Art 16 imposes a duty 
on Contracting States to ensure that refugees have free access to the courts in the 
territory of all Contracting States.  Early commentary on art 16 did not appreciate its 
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potential application to the asylum process.405   Following the trend toward legality in 
asylum procedures noted in earlier chapters, the application of art 16 has since 
broadened to meet the expanded role of the courts in the asylum process.  Article 16 
ensures that refugees have access to the courts to dispute not only civil matters, but 
also any adverse determination of refugee status.406  This right should now be 
recognized as essential if a putative refugee is to have the opportunity of establishing 
his or her status as a refugee and the resultant entitlement to non-refoulement and 
other Convention rights.407     
The application of art 16 has also benefited from the cross-pollination of human rights 
instruments, evident in the increased willingness of courts and commentators to read 
the provisions of the Refugee Convention in the context of cognate international 
rights instruments.  James Hathaway, for example, observes that art 14 of the ICCPR 
offers support for the expanded scope of the right of access to the courts in art 16 of 
the Refugee Convention by ensuring that the right of access to the courts is matched 
by subject matter jurisdiction of the courts to review an adverse eligibility 
determination.408   
The effect of art 16 of the Refugee Convention when read with art 14(1) of the 
ICCPR, is to ensure that putative refugees also have access to the courts to challenge 
the legality of the decision.409  Nowak observes that art 14(1) of the ICCPR deems 
that ‘most decisions of administrative authorities, which determine individual rights, 
need to be subject to full judicial review by an independent and impartial tribunal  … 
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in line with the obligation of States under art 2(3)(b) of the Covenant to “develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy against any violation of Covenant rights.”’410   
An implied requirement of arts 16 and 14(1) is that states adopt a statutory and 
constitutional framework that ensures that courts have jurisdiction to rule on the 
legality of an adverse eligibility claim.  As pointed out in later chapters, restrictive 
asylum policies that rely on government action or legislative measures to circumvent 
judicial review of asylum decision-making fail to comply with a good faith reading of 
arts 16 and 14(1).  Extraterritorial processing of asylum claims, discussed in chapter 6 
of this thesis, is a controversial example of states adopting purely administrative, 
extraterritorial asylum procedures that frustrate the practical enjoyment of arts 16 and 
14(1).411   
B Article 3 of the Refugee Convention and Article 26 of the ICCPR 
Article 3 provides that Contracting States shall apply the Convention’s provisions to 
refugees ‘without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin’.  The 
question arises whether art 3 applies to eligibility procedures given that they are not 
expressly mentioned in the Convention.  The preferred opinion is that although art 3 
applies ‘only to matters that are regulated by the Refugee Convention,’412 it applies to 
procedural matters not expressly dealt with in the Convention if it can be shown that 
the lesser standards heighten the risk of rejection of a claim to protection and 
therefore refoulement.413   
                                                          
410 Nowak, above n 126, 318. 
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Furthermore, when read in light of the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose, art 
3 affirms the principle of non-discrimination in the UDHR414 and therefore should be 
read together with art 26 of the ICCPR.415  Article 26 provides in terms that extend to 
all aliens416 that ‘all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law.’  Over time it has become clear that the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination in art 26 is ‘not limited to those 
rights which are provided for in the Covenant.’417  Article 26 prohibits discrimination 
in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public authorities.418   
In line with this contextual reading, art 3 and art 26 obligate States Parties to 
implement any measures employed to realise the full enjoyment of the Refugee 
Convention or ICCPR rights in a non-discriminatory manner.  The discriminatory 
application of refugee status determination processes as between different groups of 
refugees would therefore contravene the prohibitions in art 3 and art 26.  This 
prevents Contracting States depriving certain groups or classes of refugees access to 
the standard of protection available to other refugees under their jurisdiction.419   
C The right to an effective remedy before a national authority under regional 
instruments 
A right to an effective remedy in the asylum context is further guaranteed for asylum 
seekers in the Council of Europe by a combined reading of arts 3 and 13 of the 
                                                          
414 Grahl-Madsen, above n 10, 8. 
415 Hathaway, above n 1, 257. 
416 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment on the status of aliens, 15/27, §§ 2, 7, 9. 
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ECHR.420  Cases such as East African Asians v. United Kingdom and  Lukka v. United 
Kingdom recognized for the first time substantive and procedural limitations on a 
state’s power to exclude and expel non-citizens where deportation could lead to an 
infringement of art 3 of the ECHR.421   
Article 13 of the ECHR provides that ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national 
authority …’  As stated by the ECtHR in Kudla v Poland, art 13 gives ‘direct 
expression to the States’ obligation to protect human rights first and foremost within 
their own legal system, establishing an additional guarantee for an individual in order 
to ensure that he or she effectively enjoys those rights.’422  Sedley LJ in R v Camden 
and Islington Health Authority ex parte K likened art 13 to the ‘long-standing 
principle’ of the common law that ‘where there is a right there should be a remedy’.423   
Article 13 requires that persons must have access to effective remedies in order to 
prevent expulsion in violation of art 3 of the ECHR.424  Traditional grounds of judicial 
review of the exercise of executive discretion in asylum proceedings – illegality, 
irrationality, procedural impropriety - are able to accommodate art 3 considerations so 
as to constitute an effective remedy for the purposes of art 13.425  However, the 
                                                          
420 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
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court’s examination of the existence of a real risk of ill-treatment under art 3 must be 
a rigorous and consider the underlying factual material to determine if it discloses a 
risk of inhuman or degrading treatment.426   
The body granting the remedy should be a court, or a quasi-judicial body composed of 
impartial members that enjoy safeguards of independence, that has the competence to 
determine the existence of the conditions laid down by art 3 and to grant appropriate 
relief.427  The appeal should also include procedural safeguards, including reasonable 
time limits for exercising the appeal, practical accessibility (e.g. legal aid), and 
scrutiny of the allegations that return will lead to a violation of human rights.428 The 
appeal should also have suspensive effect.429  Access to a court must also comply with 
the due process requirements of art 6 of the ECHR.430   
                                                                                                                                                                      
the administrative authorities in asylum cases and are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 
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A right of access to the courts is also found in art XVIII of the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man, which provides that every person has the right to 
‘resort to the courts to ensure respect for … legal rights’ and to have to access to a 
‘simple, brief procedure whereby the courts’ will protect him or her ‘from acts of 
authority that … violate any fundamental constitutional rights.’  Further, in 
accordance with art II of the Declaration, ‘all persons are equal before the law and 
have the rights and duties established in this Declaration …’  These rights apply 
equally to aliens as a founding principle of the Declaration was to assure ‘the equal 
protection of the law to nationals and aliens alike …’431  The Commission has also 
found that art XVIII is not confined to persons accused of crimes, but also extends to 
asylum claimants seeking to vindicate their rights.432 
According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the effect of the 
right of access to the courts and right of equal protection is ‘to require the provision of 
a domestic remedy which enables the relevant judicial authority to deal with the 
substance of the complaint and grant appropriate relief where required.’433  The 
Commission further stated that ‘implementation of the overarching objective of the 
Declaration – ensuring the effectiveness of the fundamental rights and freedoms set 
                                                          
431 Inter-American Juridical Committee, Draft Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of 
Man and Accompanying Report (1946), 56, cited in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Organization of American States, Report on the Situation of the Human Rights of Asylum Seekers 
within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 Doc 40 rev., 28 February 
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forth – necessarily requires that judicial and other mechanisms are in place to provide 
recourses and remedies at the national level.’434   
In the context of asylum procedures, the Commission has noted the importance of 
these rights to the realization of other core rights in the Declaration.435  The 
Commission observed that ‘the right particularly at issue in the refugee context is to 
seek asylum with the corresponding guarantees, as set forth in Article XXVII of the 
Declaration.  Those guarantees are themselves a means to safeguard the fundamental 
rights to, inter alia, liberty, integrity and life recognized in Article 1 of the 
Declaration.’436  The Commission further observed: 
A procedural framework that is adequate to make those rights effective is one which 
provides mechanisms which effectively establish whether a person meets the applicable 
standard of risk.  In the refugee context, this requires procedures effective in 
establishing the relevant facts, and interpreting and applying the relevant norms.437 
IV THE IMPORTANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE, STATUTORY AND 
JUDICIAL MECHANISMS TO A FAIR AND EFFECTIVE ASYLUM 
PROCESS  
A The trend toward legality in asylum procedures 
In examining the recent development of asylum, Colin Harvey describes ‘an 
evolutionary movement towards legality …’ in the asylum arena.438  According to 
Harvey, this saw an area dominated by administrative discretion gradually come 
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under the influence and control of legal regulation.439  Harvey’s analysis accords with 
the observations in the second chapter of this thesis.  As observed in that chapter, 
legislative measures designed to safeguard asylum seekers against exclusion and 
expulsion disappeared with the onset of the world wars as unfettered administrative 
decision-making again dominated in the UK as elsewhere.440  However, the post-war 
period gradually saw greater control over the determination process by parliament and 
greater oversight of individual asylum determinations by the courts and other 
independent tribunals and scrutineers (tribunals, human rights commissions, 
ombudsman).441   
The shift to legality in the asylum area was symptomatic of the extension of 
administrative law principles to immigration decisions in many states during this 
period.442  In the US, for instance, Motomura observed that the ‘flowering’ of due 
process protections in immigration cases in the US during the 1970s and 1980s owed 
‘much of its growth to the “due process revolution” of the 1970s, which greatly 
expanded constitutional scrutiny of procedural protections in civil matters 
generally.’443 
In the asylum arena, this general shift toward legality saw the evolution of key 
protection safeguards.  They included: the incorporation of a legislative basis for the 
                                                          
439 Ibid. 
440 Australia: NAGV v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 222 CLR 
161, [35] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ); Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs v Mayer (1985) 157 CLR 290, 300-301 (Mason, Deane and Dawson JJ), 305 
(Brennan J); Hyndman, above n 138, 729; Ayling and Blay, above n 68, 258; Johnson, above n 68, 47; 
Schaffer, above n 68, 225-226; Neumann, above n 138, 57.  UK: V Bevan, The Development of British 
Immigration Law (Croom Helm, London 1986) 223; Thomas, above n 250, 481; US: P Schuck, ‘The 
Transformation of Immigration Law’ (1984) Columbia Law Review 1, 39.   
441 Ibid. 
442 Schuck, above n 440, 52-53; H Motomura, ‘The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: 
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights’ (1992) Columbia Law Review 1625, 
1632-1656.   
443 Motomura, above n 442, 1632. 
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grant of refugee status, usually accompanied by the incorporation of the definition of 
refugee in art 1A of the Refugee Convention;444 the establishment of a statutory 
procedure to determine the grant of asylum;445 the instigation of merits review of 
adverse asylum determinations by independent tribunals;446 the oversight of the 
administration of laws by the Ombudsman and human rights agencies;447 and a new-
found willingness of courts to review the legality of protection decisions.448  
In large part, these reforms were driven by a growing concern that government should 
not be sole arbiter of the grant of protection, with no statutory procedural 
                                                          
444 Australia: Migration Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 (Cth), s 6; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v Mayer (1985) 157 CLR 290; Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 
CLR 379;  Hyndman, above n 138, 748.  UK: The Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on 
Entry laid before Parliament in 1972 under s 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971, H.C. 509, rule 58; R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Sivakumaran [1988] A.C. 958, 990 (Lord Keith); 
Harvey, above n 3, 152.  US: Refugee Act 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980), 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1157-1159 (1982); Schuck, above n 440, 39.  Switzerland: Asylum Law (Asyl Gesetz) (1979); N 
Steiner, Arguing About Asylum (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 22. 
445 Australia: S Cooney, The Transformation of Migration Law (AGPS, Canberra, 1995) 1; Schuck, 
above n 440, 39; Note, ‘United States Asylum Procedures: Current Status and Proposals for Reform’ 
(1981) 14 Cornell International Law Journal 405; US: D Martin, ‘The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past 
and Future’ (1982) Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies 91.  Japan: Arakaki, above n 37, 
19 (observing that ‘Japan formed a statutory basis for refugee protection in the Immigration Control 
and Refugee Recognition Act’).  Switzerland: Steiner, above n 444, 22.   
446 UK: Report of the Committee on Immigration Appeals, Cmnd. 3387 (HSMO, London, 1967) 34; 
Immigration Appeals Act 1969 (UK); Immigration Act 1971 (UK), Pt II; R v Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal ex parte Hassanin [1986] 1 WLR 1448, 1460 (Dillon LJ).   
447 Hyndman, above n 138, 725. 
448 UK: Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514; R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department Ex p. Singh [1987] Imm AR 489; R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department Ex parte Yemoh [1988] Imm AR 595; Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
Thirukumar [1989] Imm AR 402.  Australia: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Mayer 
(1985) 157 CLR 290; Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379; 
Azemoudeh v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 ALD 281; Johnson, above n 68, 51.  
New Zealand: Benipal v Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Immigration (29 November 1985) High 
Court Auckland A993/83 Chilwell J (exposing unfairness in refugee status procedures). US: 
Motomura, above n 442, 1673-1675 (discussing the Orantes-Hernandez litigation filed in the US in 
1980: Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D.Cal.1982) (preliminary  injunction); 
Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. 1988) (permanent injunction), aff’d sub nom. 
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that the INS unlawfully impeded the Salvadorans' access to asylum ‘with a summary removal process, 
usually carried out by the INS with little or no regard for procedural or substantive rights:’ Orantes, 
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requirements for decision-making and no right of appeal to an independent 
authority.449  Arbitrariness in asylum decision-making was seen as unfair.  Asylum 
decision-making should be governed by the rule of law.   
Supporters of the Swiss Asyl Gesetz of 1979, for example, argued for statutory control 
of the asylum process on the basis that ‘the institutions of the state must abide by 
norms and the substantial content of these norms cannot be based on instructions and 
departmental guidelines, but must be anchored in clear formal laws.’450  These were 
essentially the same concerns that drove parliamentarians to contest the domination of 
arbitrary power in the asylum arena in the 18th century.451  Now, however, these 
concerns were heightened by the existence of modern day limitations on state 
discretion in international law (e.g. the non-refoulement obligation). 
B How to make use of progressive developments in asylum procedures 
It is debatable whether the trend toward legality in the asylum policies of states during 
the post-war period amounts to ‘state practice’ for the purposes of interpreting the 
Refugee Convention and cognate rights instruments.  According to art 31(3)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,452 treaties are to be interpreted in the light 
of ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.’  However, it is far from clear 
                                                          
449 See, eg, W Wilson, ‘Report to the Rt Hon WF Birch, Minister of Immigration, on the Process of 
Refugee Status Determination’ (Wellington, 1992), 10 (The NZ ‘procedures were changed … because 
of the perception that it was unfair that Government was the sole arbiter, with no right of appeal to an 
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450 Steiner, above n 444, 31. 
451 See above n 187 – and accompanying text. 
452 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 22 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
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that such practices were motivated by the necessary sense of legal obligation (opinio 
juris).453   
In any event, the better approach is to use these evolving practices as evidence of 
‘effective measures’ that states should employ in order to enhance the fairness and 
effective of their own eligibility procedures.   This follows the general approach of the 
HRC, the Committee Against Torture, and the CESCR, which discern the existence of 
‘effective measures’ that direct states’ implementation of their obligations under 
international rights treaties.454   
These supervisory bodies derive evidence of ‘effective measures’ through the review 
of successive reports from states, the examination of individual communications, and 
the monitoring of developments.455  In terms of the general obligation on states to 
                                                          
453 See, eg, Refugee Status Determination Process, Report of the Task Force on Immigration Practices 
and Procedures, Office of the Minister Employment and Immigration, Government of Canada, Canada 
(1980), 1.  While acknowledging that fairness ‘in the area of refugee claims procedure’ is ‘crucial’, the 
Report referred to UNHCR requirements for the determination of refugee status as ‘general principles’ 
and reiterated that ‘the actual [refugee status determination] process is left for each country to establish 
on its own:’ Ibid 1.  See also, the US House Judiciary Committee Report explaining proposed 
provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980 which made mandatory the Attorney-General’s prior discretion 
to withhold deportation of a refugee: H.R.Rep. No. 96-608, 1-5 (1979) 17-18.  The Committee stressed 
the importance of codification of the mandatory requirement as a way of ‘clarifying’ the US’s 
obligations, while at the same time asserting that the existing scheme based on largely unfettered 
administrative discretion complied with art 33 of the Refugee Convention: Ibid.  See also, INS v Stevic 
467 US 407, 104 S Ct 2489, 2500 Fn 22 (1984).   
454 Committee against Torture, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, General Comment No. 2 (Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties), 
CAT/C/GC2/CRP.1/Rev.4, [4], [12] (‘[4] … States parties also have the obligation continually to keep 
under review and improve their national laws and performance under the Convention in accordance 
with the Committee’s concluding observations and views adopted on individual communications … the 
Committee’s understanding of and recommendations in respect of effective measures are in a process 
of continual evolution …); CESCR, General Comment 9: The domestic application of the Covenant, 3 
December 1998, E/C.12/1998/24, (‘[5] … Although the precise method by which Covenant rights are 
given effect in national law is a matter for each State party to decide, the means used should be 
appropriate in the sense of producing results which are consistent with the full discharge of its 
obligations by the State party …  [7] But whatever the preferred methodology, several principles 
follow from the duty to give effect to the Covenant and must therefore be respected. First, the means of 
implementation chosen must be adequate to ensure fulfilment of the obligations under the Covenant 
…’).  
455 Committee against Torture, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, General Comment No. 2 (Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties), 
CAT/C/GC2/CRP.1/Rev.4, [12]; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32: Article 14: 
Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, 
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ensure the domestic implementation of treaties (under art 2 of the ICCPR, ICESCR 
and CAT) and to build upon specific articles in rights treaties, these bodies then make 
recommendations for specific actions designed to enhance each state’s capacity to 
effectively implement measures that are necessary and appropriate to prevent the 
breach of human rights.456  The requirements spelt out by these supervisory bodies 
amount to an evolving ‘baseline’ of compliance.457  
In this way, evidence of evolving human rights practices and standards define states’ 
progressive and positive obligations to ensure the practical and effective 
implementation of their protection obligations.458  This ensures that progressive 
human rights practices are able to evolve ‘upwards’ from the national to the 
international and regional level, filtering out those practices that are regressive rather 
than progressive.  They are then utilized as evidence of ‘effective measures’ that 
states should utilize in the context of their own domestic framework where they 
enhance the protection of rights. 
This approach allows for a principled use of emerging national practices, rather than 
seeking to establish them as ‘state practice’ (an inherently unreliable and difficult task 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(HRC deriving a series of baseline measures necessary to safeguard the right to equality before the 
courts and tribunals from the HRC’s views as expressed in individual communications). 
456 Ibid. 
457 Committee against Torture, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, General Comment No. 2 (Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties), 
CAT/C/GC2/CRP.1/Rev.4, (‘[4] … the Committee’s understanding of and recommendations in respect 
of effective measures are in a process of continual evolution … [13] The Committee’s 
recommendations concerning effective measures aim to clarify the current baseline and are not 
exhaustive …  [14] Experience since the Convention came into force has enhanced the Committee’s 
understanding of the scope and nature of the prohibition against torture, of the methodologies of 
torture, of the contexts and consequences in which it occurs, as well as of evolving effective measures 
to prevent it in different contexts. For example, the Committee has emphasized the importance of 
having same sex guards when privacy is involved. As new methods of prevention (e.g. videotaping all 
interrogations, utilizing investigative procedures such as the Istanbul Protocol of 1999, or new 
approaches to public education or the protection of minors) are discovered, tested and found effective, 
article 2 provides authority to build upon the remaining articles and to expand the scope of measures 
required to prevent torture.’) 
458 See above n 349 – and accompanying text. 
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when undertaken in the context of multilateral human rights treaties).  It also allows 
for the evolution of standards of protection.  Human rights treaties are ‘living 
instruments’ so that while their ‘meaning does not change over time [their] 
application will.’459  The reach of the Refugee Convention and other relevant 
international and regional rights treaties are not fettered to the intentions of those who 
framed them.460  States should ‘afford continuing protection for refugees in the 
changing circumstances of the present and future world.’461  Thus, states should take 
advantage of improvements in national legal and institutional mechanisms that 
enhance the fairness and effectiveness of the asylum process, rather than circumvent 
their application.    
Implementing ‘effective measures’ at the national level involves comparison and 
understanding of how those mechanisms are best employed within the legal and 
constitutional context of each country.  While the exact configuration of asylum 
procedures will differ between states, a common element should be that they are 
designed and implemented in accordance with the humanitarian object of protection.  
As stated recently by the Assistant High Commissioner – Protection, UNHCR: 
States have a flexible margin of discretion to design and implement a national 
procedure that is appropriate to their national context.  All procedures must, however, 
                                                          
459 Sepet and Bulbul v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 15 (HL) [6] (Lord 
Bingham).  See also, Bankovic v Belgium (2001) 11 BHRC 435, [64]. 
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serve the humanitarian object and purpose for which they were intended – here, the 
effective identification and protection of the rights of refugees.462 
It follows that mechanisms that improve the fairness and effective of asylum 
procedures should not be seen as simply evidence of ‘best practice’,463 but as 
‘effective measures’ that states are obliged to apply where they enhance the fairness 
and effective of asylum procedures within their own jurisdictions.   
The following discussion seeks to identify administrative, judicial and legislative 
mechanisms that amount to ‘effective measures’ that are capable of general 
application by states.  By highlighting how these mechanisms contribute to a fair and 
effective asylum process, this chapter serves to illustrate ways in which states should 
make use of those mechanisms in their asylum procedures.  The following discussion 
makes use of a range of sources, including general UNHCR documents464 and 
UNHCR comments on the asylum procedures of states,465 the views and comments of 
the HRC and the Committee against Torture, and the effective measures identified in 
regional and national inquiries and reports.    
                                                          
462 Statement by Ms Erika Feller, Assistant High Commissioner – Protection UNHCR, The role of the 
judiciary in the protection of refugees, Council of Immigration Judges, Annual General Meeting, 
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C Administrative mechanisms and practical measures that contribute to a fair and 
effective asylum process 
The first instance stage of national asylum procedures usually involve administrative 
decision-makers and tribunals.  Key administrative measures that are essential to 
effective first instance decision-making include: the establishment of one central 
authority to determine protection claims; training of decision makers; the allocation of 
proper resources to first instance decision-making processes; the use of suitably 
qualified and impartial interpreters; and the creation and maintainance of a reliable 
country of origin information base.  As the following discussion demonstrates, these 
administrative measures are essential components in reducing the risk of refoulement 
and safeguarding protection by ensuring the timely466 and accurate identification of 
persons in need of protection.   They also seek to ensure the non-discriminatory 
treatment of asylum seekers by providing a common baseline of good and unbiased 
decision-making. 
The body responsible for examining and deciding asylum applications in the first 
instance should be a single, specialized authority.467  The existence of one central 
authority to determine protection claims focuses the specialist expertise and 
knowledge required to determine claims to protection under various international 
rights instruments into one organization.468  It follows that decisions on asylum should 
                                                          
466 Feller, above n 462, 6. 
467 EXCOM Conclusion No 8 (XXVIII)-1977, (e)(iii); Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum 
Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001 [50](i). 
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for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and 
Withdrawing Refugee Status (Council Document 14203/04, Asile 64, of 9 November 2004), 7. 
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not be made by border officials, but should be referred to the competent authority.469  
To be effective, this requires that border officials be required to act in accordance 
with the non-refoulement obligation and to refer claims to the competent authority.470 
A case study of where this requirement has been undermined is the recent EU Asylum 
Procedures Directive.471  As noted by the UNHCR, the EU Asylum Procedures 
Directive arguably threatens the efficacy of the requirement by allowing a wide range 
of exceptions to the general rule that Member States designate one central authority 
for determining asylum claims.472  This increases the risk of refoulement by exposing 
asylum seekers to decision-making by authorities that are of lesser quality due to a 
lack of appropriate expertise and experience or access to relevant country 
information.473  One could add, the decision-making of border control officials in such 
cases as Gebremedhin v France (discussed further below)474 indicates that border 
officials are also more likely to unduly preference immigration control over 
protection. 
Training and selection of decision-makers ensures that officials properly apply the 
refugee definition and other eligibility criteria to include all persons entitled to 
                                                          
469 EXCOM Conclusion No 8 (XXVIII)-1977, (e)(i) (‘to refere such cases to a higher authority’) cf 
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protection.475  Decision-makers are required to exercise considerable expertise and 
skill in determining an asylum application.  A recent study of the US asylum 
adjudication system has highlighted the importance of training for both officials 
responsible for the initial determination and officials or tribunal members responsible 
for reviewing the merits of first instance decisions.476  As noted above, border 
officials who refer claims to the competent authority should also receive training in 
identifying possible claims to protection. 
Given the nature of asylum applications, there should be inter-cultural training that 
safeguards against discrimination.477  Training should be provided to enable the 
sensitive handling of claims involving applicants with special needs, including 
applicants who have suffered torture and trauma.478  States should also ensure that 
officers are trained and operate in gender-sensitive and child-sensitive asylum 
procedures.479  There should also be regular updates on changing country conditions 
in key refugee-producing countries and regions.  Decision-makers should be selected 
who possess a base set of skills and qualifications that enable them to perform the 
challenging task of collating country information, forming judgments as to the 
veracity of the applicant’s claim, and weighing complex legal eligibility criteria.480 
Resources must be adequate to enable decision-makers to properly perform their role 
in accurately identifying persons in need of protection.  In an examination of 
Australia’s refugee status determination system, the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
                                                          
475 Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001 [50](j). 
476 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, Schrag, above n 69, 381. 
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References Committee observed that as ‘decision-makers play a critical part in the 
fulfilment of the [non-refoulement] obligation, consideration should be given to 
whether they are well enough resourced to assist them in identifying ‘refugees’.481  
The Senate committee subsequently recommended that ‘the Government ensures 
decision-makers are well enough resourced to facilitate proper assessment of claims 
for refugee status in accordance with the Convention definition of ‘refugee’’.482  As 
noted by Canada’s Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, the number 
of decision-makers must also be equal to the task of dealing with applications.483 
Interpreter and translator services are also essential to the proper communication 
between the asylum claimant and the asylum claimant’s legal adviser and the 
decision-maker.  Accurate information is critical to the eligibility determination 
process.  Asylum claimants must be able to understand their rights and obligations 
and the basis on which their claims for asylum will be accepted.  Access to 
interpreters (and translators) is ‘critical since it is generally the medium by which 
such communication takes place’.484  Poor interpretation can create ‘an almost 
insuperable obstacle to the clear presentation of a claim.’485  Interpreters therefore 
should be competent.486   They should also be impartial.487  The claimant should also 
perceive the interpreter to be impartial – as trust is essential between claimant and 
                                                          
481 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, above n 74, [2.40]. 
482 Ibid [2.42]. 
483 House of Commons, Canada, Safeguarding Asylum – Sustaining Canada’s Commitments to 
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interpreter if the claimant is to divulge sensitive information through the interpreter.  
For example, the situation should be avoided where an interpreter is from an ethnic 
group that has historically persecuted the applicant’s ethnic group.  
Prompt access to legal advice and assistance upon the entry of an asylum seeker into 
the jurisdiction of a state is essential to ensuring that an asylum claimant is able to 
clearly present his or her claim to protection.488  The importance of this requirement is 
reflected in the report of the Canadian Task Force on Immigration Practices and 
Procedures, which noted that there was no right to legal advice during the initial 
interview by the port of entry interviewing officer under the Canadian system at the 
time.489  This was considered to be detrimental to the applicant because anything that 
was said at the initial interview could later be used by the Refugee Status Advisory 
Committee.490   Statements that the applicant  made in ignorance of the applicant’s 
rights could thus be used against them.  The Task Force also alluded to the importance 
of having a legal representative available in order to avoid suggestions of official 
intimidation, including hostile interrogations and threats of deportation.491  The Task 
Force recommended that a ‘potential refugee claimant should have a right to counsel 
immediately upon indication of his intention to ask for refugee status and should be 
informed of this right.’492   
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The right to legal assistance and representation should apply to all stages of asylum 
adjudication.493  The notion that departmental and tribunal review processes can be set 
up so that applicants do not need legal advisers to prepare or pursue their claims494 
fails to acknowledge the legal complexity of the refugee definition and the associated 
procedural steps required to establish the merits of a claim.495   
An equally disingenuous notion is that because decision-makers bear the burden of 
ensuring that the state does not breach its international obligations, there is ‘no need 
for the applicant, either through advice or individually, to have a thorough knowledge 
of refugee case law …’496  This assertion fails to appreciate that the ‘particular 
vulnerability of some applicants and their language difficulties, combined with a lack 
of experience of [local] administrative processes make it difficult for them to lodge a 
high quality application.’497  It is naïve to believe that the lack of legal assistance will 
not adversely impact on the chances of a successful claim.498  People who are trying 
to prove that they are refugees ‘should not be required to compile supporting 
affidavits and make highly technical legal arguments without professional advocates, 
when the consequences of losing may be deportation in which they face 
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imprisonment, torture, and death.’499  Providing legal assistance can contribute to the 
initial determination stage and on appeal by ensuring that the relevant information is 
placed before the decision-maker in a timely and comprehensible fashion.500   
The claimant should also be given the opportunity to present his or her entire claim, 
including any relevant evidence and country background information.501  The 
claimant may well have country information that is not available to or known by the 
decision-maker.502  The claimant should be entitled to a personal interview based on a 
thorough assessment of the circumstances of his or her case.503   This should include a 
written decision deciding the claim so that the applicant knows why his or her claim 
has been rejected.504   Moreover, decision-makers should take into account all facets 
of the non-refoulement obligation, not only under the Refugee Convention, but also 
under the ICCPR and the CAT.505   
There should be a right of appeal to an authority different from and independent of 
that making the initial decision.506  This should be a tribunal or committee with the 
authority to engage in a full de novo hearing of the case.  Independent merits review 
ensures greater consistency and reliability in the determination process.507  The 
                                                          
499 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, Schrag, above n 69, 384. 
500 Senate, above n 74, [3.37]. 
501 Refugee Status Determination Process, above n 36, 28-29; UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and 
Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001 [43], [50]. 
502 Refugee Status Determination Process, above n 36, 28. 
503 UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001 
[50](h). 
504 Ibid [50](o). 
505 Ibid [50](e). 
506 Ibid [43]. 
507 Safeguarding Asylum – Sustaining Canada’s Commitments to Refugees, above n 483, n 17 – 31 and 
accompanying text (recommending immediate implementation of the Refugee Appeals Division as set 




importance of appeal on the merits to an independent body means that internal review 
before an officer of the same government department that made the original 
determination of refugee status is no longer satisfactory.508  For example, the UNHCR 
recently queried the lack of independent merits review under Australia’s offshore 
processing policy (as well as the access to legal advice and judicial review).509  
Canada’s Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration raised similar 
concerns in relation to the Canadian Government’s reluctance to implement the 
Refugee Appeals Division as provided for in the Immigration and Refugee Act 2002 
(Canada).510  An integral aspect of an appeal is that the applicant should be permitted 
to remain in the country until his or her claim is decided and the applicant has 
exhausted all avenues of appeal.511   
D Legislative mechanisms that ensure a fair and effective asylum process 
Since the 1980s, the UNHCR has recognized the importance of incorporation of the 
Refugee Convention into domestic law, particularly as regards asylum procedures, as 
a principal means of ensuring the Convention’s effectiveness.512  In most 
                                                          
508 Ibid. Cf EXCOM Conclusion No. 8 (XXVIII)-1977, (e)(vi) (‘If the applicant is not recognized, he 
should be given a reasonable time to appeal for a formal reconsideration of the decision, either to the 
same or to a different authority, whether administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system’ 
[emphasis added]). 
509 UNHCR, Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill, Submission of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Committee, 22 May 2006, [21]. 
510 Safeguarding Asylum – Sustaining Canada’s Commitments to Refugees, above n 483.  
511 EXCOM Conclusion No 8 (XXVIII)-1977, (e)(iv). 
512 EXCOM Conclusions No 29 (XXXIV) – 1983 (h) (‘Noted with satisfaction that further States have 
adopted national measures to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, particularly as regards procedures for the determination of refugee 
status, and stressed the importance for States to establish such procedures to ensure fair and equitable 
decision-making in line with the conclusions adopted by the Executive Committee at its twenty-eighth 
[No. 8] and thirty-third sessions [No. 28]’), No 46 (XXXVIII) – 1987 (r) (‘Welcomed the recent 
adoption by a number of States of national administrative and legislative measures to implement 
effectively the provisions of the international refugee instruments, including the establishment of 
appropriate procedures for the determination of refugee status.’) 
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jurisdictions, statutory measures are essential to the enforceability of the requirements 
guaranteeing a full and fair asylum hearing.  This is because they ensure the operation 
of the principle of legality of government action - the rule of law – in the asylum 
process.  The rule of law ‘requires that there be statutory authority for acts of the 
executive that impinge on citizens and other private persons.’513   
By incorporating the requirements for a fair and effective asylum process by way of 
legislation, there is more likelihood that the requirements will be observed by 
governments.  The existence of binding statutory duties to grant protection to a person 
who meets the definition of a refugee or some other form of complementary 
protection provides a legal and institutional framework for the exercise of 
administrative decision-making during the asylum process.  These legislative 
measures grant the courts the opportunity to step in to scrutinize the legality of asylum 
decision-making and procedures.514   
In the US, for example, the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 was intended to 
eliminate arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of asylum seekers based on race and 
nationality.515  This practice was evident in the INS’s use of summary administrative 
removal practices to effectively deny access to the asylum process to Salvadorans.516  
When granting an injunction to prohibit those practices, Judge Kenyon relied on the 
fact that ‘Congress passed the Refugee Act to rectify the discriminatory treatment of 
refugees under then-existing immigration law.’517  The passage of the Refugee Act 
                                                          
513 N MacCormick, Institutions of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 43. 
514 Harvey, above n 3, 151. 
515 Motomura, above n 442, 1674 n 259.   
516 Ibid 1672-1675. 
517 Orantes-Hernandez v Smith, 541 F Supp 351, 376 (CD Cal 1982) (citing S.Rep. No. 256, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141) cited in Motomura, above n 442, 1674 n 259.  
See also: Nunez v Boldin 537 F Supp 578 (SD Tex), appeal dismissed, 692 F 2d 755 (5th Cir 1982); 
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was also interpreted by the courts as giving rise to other substantive and procedural 
rights as part of the asylum process,518 eg stowaways being granted access to an 
exclusion hearing where they could make asylum claims,519 or asylum claimants 
having access to adequate translation facilities.520 
The significance of statutory protections is further apparent on the facts of the 
Australian High Court case of Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v 
Mayer.521  That case concerned the then recently introduced s 6A of the Migration Act 
1958 (Cth), which incorporated the refugee definition found in the Refugee 
Convention into Australian law for the first time. 522  Mayer was from the Indonesian 
province of Irian Jaya.  It was accepted by the Australian authorities at the time that 
he had been imprisoned for a period of time by the Indonesian authorities due to his 
opposition to Indonesian control of Irian Jaya.  He fled to Papua New Guinea but was 
unable to obtain citizenship of that country.  Arriving in Australia, Mayer made an 
application for refugee status to the Minister under the then s 6A of the Migration Act 
1958 (Cth).  The Minister rejected the application without providing reasons for his 
decision contrary to recently introduced legislation in Australia that required, amongst 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Fernandez-Roque v Smith 567 F Supp 1115 (ND Ga 1983) (INS in violation of due process clause by 
not providing detained excludable Cuban aliens with a fair hearing). 
518 Haitian Refugee Center v Smith 676 F 2d 1023 (5th Cir 1982) (alien seeking political asylum may 
invoke due process guarantees). 
519 Chun v Sava 708 F 2d 869 (2d Cir 1983) (Refugee Act requires INS to provide an asylum hearing 
to stowaways denied an exclusion hearing under 8 U.S.C. s1182(a)(18)(1982).  See generally, H 
Motomura, ‘Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation’ (1990) Yale Law Journal 545, 595-6. 
520 Augustin v Sava 735 F 2d 32 (2d Cir 1984).  See generally: Legomsky, 1987, above n 221, 212 
(observing that then recent asylum and immigration cases, including Augustin v Sava and Chun v Sava, 
were making inroads into the traditional plenary power doctrine that marked judicial deference to the 
executive in immigration matters).    
521 (1985) 157 CLR 290. 
522 That section provided that an entry permit would not be granted to a non-citizen after his or her 
entry into Australia unless stipulated conditions were fulfilled.  One condition (para (c)) was that the 
non-citizen held a current temporary entry permit ‘and the Minister has determined, by instrument in 
writing, that he has the status of refugee’ within the meaning of the Refugee Convention.   
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other things, that government officers must provide reasons for a decision made under 
an enactment.523   
The High Court held that the fact that the power to determine refugee status was 
exercised pursuant to statutory authority ensured the Minister’s power to determine 
refugee status was reviewable by a court of law, and consequently, that the Minister’s 
international obligation to determine refugee status was compellable in a court of 
law.524   Thus, the incorporation of the definition of refugee under the Refugee 
Convention into Australian law (via s 6A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)) was 
instrumental in ensuring that Mayer was entitled to reasons for the decision denying 
his claim to protection.  The act of incorporation overcame the Minister’s argument – 
reflecting the orthodox view discussed in chapter 1 - that ‘[a]ny determination made 
by the Minister is not made under the Act or given any efficacy by it.  It is entirely a 
matter of domestic administrative procedure, the international Convention being silent 
as to how refugee status is to be declared’.525   
Since the decision in Mayer, the Australian Parliament has passed legislation that 
establishes a ‘code of procedure’ for dealing with protection visa applications (along 
with applications for visas of other classes and subclasses) ‘fairly, efficiently and 
quickly’. 526  These set out steps that the Minister and a visa applicant must follow.527  
They include a number of basic procedural rights: the right to make written or oral 
                                                          
523 As part of the general trend toward more accountable administrative decision-making, the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act (Cth) (AD(JR) Act) had been enacted in 1977.  Section 
13(1) of the AD(JR) Act entitled persons affected by a decision which could be reviewed under the 
grounds set out in s 5 of the Act to seek reasons for that decision.  The effect of the wording in s 13(1) 
was that the decision had to be under the enactment.   
524 (1985) 157 CLR 290, 301 (Mason, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
525 The Commonwealth argued that s 6A(1) did not confer power on the Minister to determine refugee 
status, but merely referred to an existing system devised by the executive: (1985) 157 CLR 290, 300. 
526 Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth); Subdivision AB of Pt 2, Div 3 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). 
527 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v A (1999) 91 FCR 435, 441 (Merkel J). 
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submissions to the decision-maker;528 the right to have all submitted material 
considered by the decision-maker;529 the right to provide additional information 
before the making of a decision;530 and the right to comment on relevant information 
held by the decision-maker if the information was not provided to the decision-maker 
by the applicant.531   
It is relevant to note at this point that the importance of statutory protections is further 
apparent when we consider the results of government attempts to circumvent them.  
The ongoing discriminatory treatment of Haitian refugees in the 1980s and 1990s 
under the US interdiction policy, discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis, occurred 
intentionally outside the territorial scope of the US asylum statutes and regulations.  
As further elaborated in chapter 6, this seriously undermined one of the benefits of 
statutory protection - the elimination of the prejudgment of asylum claims based on 
nationality.532  Similarly, chapter 6 records that the Australian interdiction and 
extraterritorial processing policy that operated between 2001-2008 also effectively 
prevented many asylum seekers from accessing and enjoying the procedural 
safeguards found under Australian law – leading to asylum procedures that were 
arbitrary, unreliable and non-transparent. 
                                                          
528 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 54(3). 
529 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 54. 
530 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 55.  The Minister is however not required to delay making a decision 
because the applicant might give, or has told the Minister of an intention to give, further information. 
531 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 57.  Section 65 provides that, after considering a visa application, if the 
Minister is satisfied that the criteria for the visa are satisfied, the Minister is to grant the visa, and if not 
so satisfied, the Minister is to refuse the visa.  Section 69 provides that non-compliance by the Minister 
with subdivision AB does not mean that a decision to grant or refuse a visa is not a valid decision but 
only means that the decision might have been the wrong one and might be set aside if reviewed.   
532 Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 380 n 37 (C.D.Cal.1982) (‘it is this prejudgment of 
the claims based on nationality which Congress specifically intended to eliminate by passing the 
Refugee Act’) cited in Motomura, above n 442, 1674 n 259.   
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There is also growing recognition of the need for states to incorporate international 
obligations under the CAT and ICCPR into domestic law where that is necessary for 
the effective enforcement of those obligations.533  A Senate inquiry into Australia’s 
asylum process shared the concern of submissions that argued that the failure to 
incorporate the non-refoulement obligation under the ICCPR and the CAT into 
Australian law meant that there was ‘no mechanism that is subject to the rule of law, 
which provides a safeguard against people being returned to countries in 
circumstances which are contrary to Australia’s obligations under treaties other than 
the Refugee Convention.’534  The Senate inquiry recommended that the relevant 
government departments ‘examine the most appropriate means by which Australia’s 
laws could be amended so as to explicitly incorporate the non-refoulement obligations 
of the CAT and ICCPR into domestic law.’535   
D Effective judicial remedies  
The involvement of the judiciary in asylum adjudication is a fundamental safeguard.  
Judicial review injects substantive and procedural principles into the asylum process.  
Ultimately, the need for an independent judiciary to enforce a state’s protection 
obligations rests ‘upon pragmatic recognition that the effective protection of rights 
commonly requires that judicial intervention resolve conflicts of interests, or set limits 
to the scope of discretionary power, in accordance with the rule of law’.536   
Appropriate legislative and administrative measures are important to the effective 
involvement of the courts in asylum adjudication.  The provision of legal assistance, 
                                                          
533 See generally, Tomuschat, above n 275, 98.     
534 Senate, above n 74, [2.64]. 
535 Ibid [2.65]. 
536 Goodwin-Gill, above n 344, 145.   
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for example, often determines whether an asylum claimant can access judicial 
proceedings in a meaningful way.537  Time limits on appeals should be reasonable and 
where enforced courts should have a discretionary power to waive time limits in 
exceptional circumstances, e.g. the negligence of legal advisers.  Interpreter and 
translation services are also essential to the effective enjoyment of judicial remedies.  
As noted previously, appeals should also have suspensive effect.538   
One of the principal benefits to asylum adjudication from court involvement is that it 
assists in the effective identification of persons entitled to protection.  Effective 
identification depends on an inclusive approach to interpretation of key eligibility 
criteria.  Not only are courts able to remedy defective interpretations in individual 
cases, but they can also develop a body of international jurisprudence that guides 
asylum decision-making by officials.  The courts (as well as other asylum decision-
makers) have displayed an increasing willingness to engage with jurisprudence on the 
refugee definition from other jurisdictions.539  This encourages a rights-focused 
interpretation in keeping with the broad and inclusive humanitarian object and 
purpose of the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR, CAT and other rights instruments.540   
This consequence of judicial involvement was not necessarily a given.  As a matter of 
strict common law orthodoxy, for instance, it was open to the courts in common law 
jurisdictions to view the various terms constituting the definition of refugee as matters 
                                                          
537 HRC, General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a 
fair trial, CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, [10]. 
538 See above n 399 – and 429 – and accompanying notes. 
539 Rawlings, above n 41, 391; Crock, above n 41, 57-58; Thomas, above n 250, 485; Foster, above n 
116, 22.  
540 See, eg, cases expanding the meaning of a ‘particular social group’, such as Chen Shi Hai v 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293 (the High Court of Australia 
recognized that second children born in contravention of China’s one child policy were a ‘particular 
social group’ for the purposes of the refugee definition; R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department ex p Shah and Islam [1999] 2 AC 629 (the UK House of Lords held that women from 
Pakistan constituted a ‘particular social group’). 
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of fact that were not subject to judicial review.541  However, because the purpose and 
scope of the definition is to protect appellants from human rights abuses, the courts 
strained ‘to extend the Convention’s shield to offer succour.’542  The courts have 
generally done this by carefully constructing the interpretation of the refugee 
definition as an instance of their traditional interpretative function.543 
Furthermore, judicial decisions can extend the refugee definition to capture a range of 
persecutory conduct not contemplated fifty, twenty or even ten years ago.  An 
inclusive approach to the definition of refugee ensures the contemporary relevance 
and effectiveness of the Refugee Convention.544  In this way, judicial involvement can 
help avoid ‘[a] technical consideration of the elements of the Convention definition of 
refugee, [that] can rapidly turn an examination of a living instrument into an 
anatomical dissection of a dead one.’545  The courts are ideally placed ‘to join the 
elements together to achieve the purposes envisaged by the Convention’s drafters; not 
to find technical reasons for refusal.’546 
A second major benefit of judicial scrutiny is that it ensures that asylum processes are 
fair.547  In common law countries, the courts’ heightened scrutiny of refugee status 
processing is based on a potent connection between traditional modes of judicial 
                                                          
541 J Laws, ‘Law and Fact’ (1999) 3 British Tax Review 159-162, 160. 
542 Ibid. 
543 Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, 412 (Gaudron J) (‘In the 
exercise of judicial power there is a natural tendency to invest an expression such as “well-founded 
fear” with some degree of specificity.  And it is inevitable that a court, in considering the exercise of 
administrative powers involving the application of that expression, will seek to invest the expression 
with some specific content.’) 
544 N Blake, ‘Entitlement to Protection: A Human Rights-based Approach to Refugee Protection in the 
United Kingdom,’ in F Nicholson and P Twomey, Current Issues of UK Asylum Law and Policy 
(Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998) 234-259, 241. 
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review and human rights.548  As stated in the House of Lords’ decision in 
Bugdaycay,549 the common law courts subject refugee status determinations to a 
‘differing intensity of review’ because such decisions involve ‘situations where what 
are at stake are fundamental rights of the individual’.550  In the words of Bridge LJ in 
Bugdaycay, courts should subject refugee status decisions involving threats to human 
rights to ‘the most anxious scrutiny.’ 551  In a series of decisions after Bugdaycay the 
courts in the UK intervened to impose procedural fairness requirements on Home 
Office asylum decision-making.552  The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) subsequently 
entrenched the rigour of judicial review of asylum decisions.553 
Other common law jurisdictions have in the main followed this trend.  In Canada, a 
watershed decision in 1985 of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the failure to 
afford an asylum claimant a hearing before deportation was in breach of the right to 
‘life, liberty and security of the person’ set forth in section 7 of the Canadian Charter 
                                                          
548 A Lester and J Jowell, ‘Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative Law’ (1987) 
Public Law 368-382; Rawlings, above n 41, 390. 
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[1987] AC 514, 531 (Bridge LJ); Chan v The Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 
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requirement for reasons of a decision to refuse refugee status, as well as exposing decision-makers to 
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551 Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, 531 (Bridge LJ).  See 
generally, Harvey, above n 3, chapter 4 (highlighting the heritage of the Bugdaycay decision in recent 
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application of Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 840, [2001] 
Imm AR 229, CA, modified by R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home 
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Department [2001] EWCA Civ 1139; cf for statutory appeals B v Secretary of State for the Home 
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of Rights and Freedoms and the right to a fair hearing found in section 2(e) of the Bill 
of Rights.554  At around the same time, the High Court of New Zealand similarly 
found that failure to provide an oral hearing prior to removal of an asylum seeker 
constituted a breach of the rules of natural justice.555  As noted above, decisions of the 
High Court of Australia in the 1980s extended the procedural rights of asylum seekers 
in Australia.556  More recently, the Australian High Court has upheld the right to a fair 
hearing in a series of asylum cases.557   
In performing this function, the courts can ameliorate and supplement statutory or 
administrative procedural codes to ensure that the idiosyncracies of individual asylum 
cases are acknowledged.  For example, in the High Court case of Miah558 the 
applicant for a protection visa successfully argued that the decision-maker failed to 
invite the applicant to provide additional information or comment on a change in 
circumstance of the country of origin - the elections in Bangladesh - that the decision-
maker considered materially affected (adversely) the applicant's claim to protection.  
In coming to this decision, the High Court found that the procedural ‘codes’ in the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) did not exclude the particular requirement of procedural 
fairness to offer the applicant an opportunity to respond to material that came into 
                                                          
554 Re Singh and the Minister for Employment and Immigration [1985] 1 SCR 177.  See generally, 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, above n 433, 5; J Hathaway, ‘Selective Concern: An 
Overview of Refugee Law in Canada’ (1988) 33 McGill Law Journal 676, 683-687, 703-708.  
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existence after the date of the application and which the decision-maker believed was 
adverse to the applicant's claim.559   
The High Court also considered in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs; Ex parte Epeabaka560 whether Part 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 
(dealing with merits review by the Refugee Review Tribunal) amounted to a code 
excluding further considerations of procedural fairness.  In Epeabaka, a decision of a 
member of the Refugee Review Tribunal was challenged on the grounds of denial of 
procedural fairness because the member had published a provocative discussion of his 
work on his home page on the Internet.   Although the challenge failed on the merits, 
the High Court rejected the Minister's submission that Part 7 excluded requirements 
of procedural fairness, in particular, the requirements concerning bias.561   
As in the Australian case of Miah, in R v Special Adjudicator ex parte S the UK courts 
were willing to imply fairness where there was a shortfall in the protection offered by 
the procedural rules.562  In contrast, the majority of the House of Lords in R v 
Secretary of State, ex parte Abdi and Gawe563 held that the Home Office was under no 
duty to disclose information to an applicant that was contrary to its case that a 
particular third country was safe.  A principal consideration in the decision of the 
                                                          
559 As held by Gleeson CJ and Hayne J in Miah: ‘[T]here is a difference between a code of procedure 
for dealing with visa applications and a comprehensive statement of the requirements of natural justice. 
For example, the requirements of natural justice include absence of bias, actual or apparent, on the part 
of the decision-maker. Subdivision AB says nothing about that subject. It does not contain "plain words 
of necessary intendment" which exclude the rule against bias. It is improbable in the extreme that 
Parliament intended that bias on the part of a delegate would not vitiate the delegate's decisions. The 
description of the provisions as a code of procedure is significant, but its significance should not be 
overstated (footnotes omitted)’: (2001) 206 CLR 57, [46].   
560 (2001) 179 ALR 296 (‘Epeabaka’). 
561 See also, Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 (in H the applicant 
successfully sought relief from the High Court where the Refugee Review Tribunal member did not 
give the applicants an opportunity to present their claims without repeated interruptions from the 
Tribunal affirming its lack of belief in the applicant’s claims, signifying apprehended bias).  
562 [1998] INLR 168. 
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majority was the fact that 1993 Procedure Rules did not contain any requirement to 
serve an explanatory statement of facts in such cases.  However, later cases recognize 
significant qualifications to the decision in Abdi and Gawe.564  Commentators have 
also suggested that the House of Lords decision in Abdi and Gawe may be decided 
differently today in light of developments in the common law, most notably in ex 
parte Simms, and cases on art 6 of the ECHR, that suggest that ‘where a state without 
good cause prevents an applicant from gaining access to materials helpful to the 
Applicant, a right to a fair hearing will be violated’.565   
In summary, there a range of administrative, judicial, legislative and practical 
measures that states should employ to ensure the fairness and effectiveness of their 
asylum processes.  The next part of this chapter introduces some of the restrictive 
asylum policies examined in more detail in chapters 5-7 of this thesis, which 
undermine the engagement of these ‘effective measures’. 
                                                          
564 On the basis of these later decisions it has been stated that breach of the Secretary of State’s 
obligation to not knowingly mislead in the material he places before the Adjudicator or the IAT would 
found judicial review on the basis of denial of procedural fairness: Cindo, R (on the application of) v 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2002] EWHC 246 (Admin) (14th February, 2002) [11] (Kay J); R v 
Special Adjudicator, ex parte Kerrouche [1998] INLR 88 (CA), 95 (Lord Woolf MR) (‘While [that] 
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565 N Blake QC and R Husain, Immigration, Asylum & Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2003), 226-27. 
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V RESTRICTIVE ASYLUM POLICIES – DIVORCING THE 
ASYLUM PROCESS FROM NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS   
Commentators have documented the recent emergence of restrictive measures 
employed by states to limit the access of asylum seekers to protection.566  Measures 
examined in this thesis include: the imposition of carrier sanctions and visa 
requirements; the use of naval and coast guard vessels to interdict refugees on the 
high seas and then remove them to another country for processing; and limitations on 
judicial review.   
The rise of restrictive asylum policies is largely testament to the fact that governments 
have been willing to ignore the importance of the rule of law to the realization of 
human rights within their jurisdictions, including protection against refoulement.  As 
will be seen from the discussion in this section, a common effect of these measures is 
to deter, restrict, or deny asylum seekers access to the protection of national laws and 
institutions in destination states.  This has involved denial of access to legislation 
setting out the duties of executive officers when determining the grant of asylum and 
measures intended to substitute administrative discretion for normal asylum 
procedures.   
Scholars have referred to the general trend in immigration law as a ‘denationalization’ 
– not a loss of state (government) control, but of meaningful administrative, judicial 
and legislative intervention.567  In Colin Harvey’s words, ‘there is a “de-
formalisation” process in operation in refugee and asylum law’ whereby states are 
‘making use of questionable concepts with the aim of undermining legality as it 
                                                          
566 Gibney, above n 1, 19-21; Helton, above n 1, 213;  Hathaway, above n 1, 998; J Hathaway and R 
Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-
oriented Protection’ (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 115-211, 122; Loescher, above n 1, 7-8. 
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applies in this area.’568  As a result, there has been a substantial regression in access 
to, and enjoyment of, fair and effective asylum procedures in developed states. 
This trend runs counter to the progressive obligation on Contracting States, discussed 
in chapter 3, to interpret and apply the Refugee Convention and cognate rights 
instruments in a way that ensures the effective implementation of their protection 
obligations.569  More broadly, the restrictive asylum policies increasingly employed 
by states contradict the underlying normative basis of the progressive obligation to 
ensure the effectiveness of international rights within the domestic legal order.570 
A Carrier sanctions and visa requirements 
Most ubiquitously, carrier sanctions and visa requirements prevent many asylum 
seekers reaching the territory of destination states because of the obvious fact that 
refugees are unlikely to be able to obtain valid travel documents from their country of 
origin.571  Although visa requirements and carrier sanctions have legitimate objectives 
of immigration control and civil aviation security,572 they have all too often been 
introduced and implemented for the purpose of preventing asylum seekers from 
arriving in the territory of destination States.573  If putative refugees cannot make it to 
destination states then ‘this avoids concerns about the procedures of the determination 
process.’574   
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573 R (On the Application of European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer, Prague Airport 
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The rise of external migration control measures is a threat to effective protection.  
Carrier sanctions and visa requirements deny many asylum seekers protection under 
the national laws and institutions of destination States by extending and privatising 
the State’s ‘virtual’ or ‘exported’ border.   The UNHCR’s view is that ‘[i]nternational 
protection can only be provided if individuals have access to the territory of States 
where their protection needs can be assessed properly.’575  The basis of the UNHCR’s 
concern is quite rightly that there is little point in constructing a high quality asylum 
system within States if putative refugees do not have access to it.576 
Most recently, the European Commission’s Green Paper on the Future Common 
European Asylum System flagged the issue of access measures as an important area 
for further study and consideration in the lead up to the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS): 
What further measures could be taken to ensure that protection obligations arising out 
of the EU acquis and international refugee and human rights law form an integral part 
of external border management? 
How might national capacities to establish effective protection-sensitive entry 
management systems be increased …?577 
In response to these issues posed in the Green Paper, the UNHCR called for access to 
protection to be made an essential part of the CEAS.578  In particular, the UNHCR 
enjoined States to commit to the UNHCR’s ’10 Point-Plan’, which sets out protection 
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safeguards in the migration regulatory context.579  These and other proposals are 
considered in more detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
B Interdiction and offshore processing 
The interdiction programs employed by the US and Australia (and mooted in the EU) 
are further examples of the trend to downplay the importance of a range of national 
safeguards to the effective enjoyment of Convention rights.  The US interdiction 
program began in the 1980s to deter the arrival of Cuban and Haitian refugees by 
boat.580  Following the US pattern, the Australian interdiction program began in 2001 
with the arrival of Iraqi and Afghan asylum seekers by boat from Indonesia.581  Both 
interdiction schemes involve the use of naval or Coast Guard vessels to intercept 
refugees at sea and then to transfer those asylum seekers to a place purportedly 
outside the physical and ‘legal’ jurisdiction of the destination state where they are 
processed for refugee status and or repatriated or resettled.  In 2003, the UK and 
Denmark unsuccessfully proposed that the EU embrace an interdiction program 
containing essentially the same elements.582   
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The key rationale of interdiction is to deter asylum seekers from travelling to 
destination states by denying them direct access to the onshore refugee status 
determination process in the destination State/s.  Instead, asylum seekers are 
repatriated to their country of origin or a transit state (eg Indonesia, where they are 
processed by UNHCR under the Australia-Indonesia MOU).  Alternatively, they are 
transferred to a third country for processing by officers from the sending state.   
To date, the processing undertaken offshore has applied procedural standards devoid 
of statutory conditions or judicial or tribunal remedies.  Both the US and Australia 
have at time sought to satisfy their non-refoulement obligation under the Refugee 
Convention and cognate rights instruments by employing an ‘international’ standard 
of protection – that used by the UNHCR to process claims under its mandate when a 
country cannot or will not undertake processing.583   
The UNHCR has expressed the view to the Australian Parliament that its own 
processes are a poor substitute for an asylum process embedded in national laws and 
institutions and opposed the Australian Government’s adoption of an ‘international’ 
standard.584  In particular, the UNHCR expressed the view that Australia’s offshore 
processing increased the risk of refoulement by removing the important safeguards 
provided by the courts (and one could add, legislative conditions).585  Moreover, the 
UNHCR suggests that Australia’s offshore processing policy discriminated against 
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offshore asylum seekers who were processed against lower procedural standards than 
used to process asylum seekers given access to Australia’s onshore asylum process.586 
UNHCR’s views on Australia’s scheme are included in the indepth discussion of 
extraterritorial processing in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
C Restricting access to the courts 
A key feature of the Australian and US interdiction programs is that they remove the 
ability of asylum seekers to access meaningful judicial remedies in national courts.587  
Both schemes rely upon the traditional unwillingness of the courts to entertain actions 
on behalf of aliens outside the territorial jurisdiction, while simultaneously relying on 
doctrines of sovereign state immunity to circumvent the courts in the third countries 
that host their respective offshore processing centres.  In this way, interdiction is 
characteristic of earlier attempts by governments to exclude the courts from the 
onshore asylum process.   
Western governments have persistently sought ways of preventing asylum seekers 
from accessing the courts since the courts first became involved in reviewing refugee 
status determinations in the 1980s.588  The UK and Australian governments have 
taken the lead, introducing repeated amendments to their migration legislation aimed 
at reducing or removing the available grounds for judicial review of asylum decision-
making, eg excluding common law grounds of natural justice or unreasonableness or 
the use of a privative or ouster clause.589   
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Restrictions on judicial review have been driven by the executive’s perception that 
there had been an unwarranted judicial innovation and intrusion into the traditional 
administrative function of determining the grant of asylum.590   Limitations on judicial 
review have gone hand in hand with legislative amendments designed to expand the 
non-reviewable scope or subject matter of administrative decision-making in the 
asylum arena.  These developments threaten to rob putative refugees of the checks 
and balances placed by the courts and Parliament on the procedural aspects of the 
administrative decision-making process in the asylum arena, including the evolving 
transnational judicial expertise on the scope of the refugee definition.591  
The erosion of judicial review rights has also occurred as a consequence of the 
practice of classifying asylum claims according to whether the claimant is from a safe 
third country or safe country, or whether an asylum claim is ‘manifestly unfounded.’  
Where the claim is determined to fall within a particular class, the applicant is subject 
to an abbreviated asylum procedure involving, in most instances, no independent 
review of the decision to classify the claim as ‘manifestly unfounded’ etc.592   
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In the EU, the Asylum Procedures Directive593 marks the entrenchment of the lack of 
appeal rights for asylum seekers arriving in Europe according to this classification 
approach.594  While the Directive recognizes a general right to an effective remedy for 
asylum seekers in art 39, the Directive allows the denial of an appeal with suspensive 
effect where an asylum claim is determined by administrative decision-makers to be 
‘manifestly unfounded.’595  At the same time, the Directive adopts an expansive view 
of what amounts to ‘manifestly unfounded’ thereby greatly extending the potential 
scope of abbreviated procedures.596   
Rosemary Byrne links the erosion of appeal rights under the Asylum Procedures 
Directive to EXCOM’s Conclusion No 30 (XXXIV) – 1983, ‘The Problem of 
Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum’.597  
EXCOM Conclusion No 30 sanctioned the abbreviation of appeal rights where claims 
were determined to be ‘manifestly unfounded’ (defined in the Conclusion as ‘those 
which are clearly fraudulent or not related to the criteria for the granting of refugee 
status.’)598   
While not sanctioning no review of manifestly unfounded decisions, the problem with 
EXCOM Conclusion No 30 says Byrne is that it has been the thin edge of the wedge 
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for the abbreviation or denial of procedural rights to asylum seekers where their 
claims are classified as belonging to a particular ‘class’.599  As Byrne points out, this 
classification approach effectively leaves it to the discretion of immigration officers 
and border staff whether a claim can access full asylum procedures.600   According to 
Byrne, this ‘presumes that legal criteria can be faithfully and uniformly interpreted by 
first instance decision makers, and moreover, accurately applied to all asylum claims, 
hence eliminating the risk of refoulement that accompanies a deportation prior to an 
appeal determination.’601  Byrne further argues that this classification approach is 
fundamentally at odds with ECtHR jurisprudence recognizing the right to an effective 
remedy with suspensive effect for persons facing deportation in circumstances where 
they are at risk of torture etc.602  The same could be said for the EU member states’ 
equivalent obligation under the ICCPR and CAT.603 
Byrne’s concerns have been vindicated in part by the 2007 decision of the ECtHR in 
Gebremedhin v. France.604  The ECtHR in that case decided that France’s practice of 
denying an appeal with suspensive effect from a decision that an asylum claim is 
‘manifestly unfounded’ constituted a breach of art 13 of the ECHR.605  In a recent 
report commissioned by the European Parliament’s committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs, Professor Hailbronner concludes that Gebremedhin v. 
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France ‘requires … a suspensive effect until a judge has passed a decision on the 
lawfulness of the authorities’ decision to execute a decision due to its manifest 
unfoundedness in a preliminary protection procedure.’606  Hailbronner proposes a 
redrafting of art 39 to make it compatible with the case.607 
Despite this, Gebremedhin left untouched the basic classification approach by which 
the French administrative authorities had almost unfettered discretion to determine 
whether a claim was ‘manifestly unfounded’ and thereby denied access to the 
comprehensive asylum procedure found in the code de l'entrée et du séjour des 
étrangers et du droit d'asile.608  The decision thus leaves open the discriminatory 
practice of treating asylum seekers arriving at the border differently according to the 
classification of the merits of their claim.609 
Chapter 7 of this thesis examines in greater depth the role of judicial scrutiny in the 
asylum arena.  It examines judicial review in the context of scrutiny by all organs of 
the state – the courts, parliament and administrative agencies. 
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The increasing involvement of the courts and legislatures has led to conflict with the 
pragmatic political, economic and social rationales underlying restrictive asylum 
policies.  It was no coincidence that in states like the US, UK and Australia, restrictive 
asylum policies followed hard on the heels of the extension of legislative and judicial 
protections to refugees.  Administrative law reforms secured a greater role for the 
legislature and judiciary in asylum matters – the legislature in imposing statutory 
conditions on the executive’s determination of refugee status, and the judiciary in 
reviewing refugee status determinations.  In part, the controls imposed on 
governments in the asylum area were internal to individual states, involving a 
‘transfer among institutions of the state – from the executive towards the judiciary’ 
rather than a ‘transfer from the state to the transnational arena.’610 
Governments responded to the loss of control over the asylum process engendered by 
increasing legislative and judicial incursion into a traditionally executive-dominated 
forum by taking steps to lessen the impact of legislation on executive decision-
making.  As we have seen, this involved excluding the courts from reviewing refugee 
status determinations, circumventing legislative conditions or restrictions on 
discretion, and employing mechanisms to prevent asylum seekers from reaching the 
‘zone’ of protection afforded by legislative and judicial guarantees of due process.   
However, this has not been the end of the story.  As the following chapters show, the 
courts, and increasingly legislatures, have responded in many cases with a clearer 
articulation of state obligations than that found in government policy.  A few key 
examples bear this out.  In the UK, leading figures in the judiciary, civil society, and 
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Parliament successfully contested the Government’s intention to introduce an ouster 
clause removing judicial review of asylum decisions on the basis that the clause 
breached common law liberties and human rights.611  Similar recourse to human rights 
and the rule of law characterized the Australian High Court’s reading down of a 
similar privative clause designed to remove the courts’ jurisdiction over immigration 
decisions, including refugee eligibility determinations.612   
The courts and Parliament have also emerged as forums for the contestation of key 
features of the US and Australian interdiction regimes.613  In the Australian case this 
actually led to Government MPs crossing the floor to vote against Government 
introduced legislation that sought to extend the geographic reach of the Australian 
scheme – a precursor of the newly elected Labor Government’s disbandment of 
offshore processing in third countries.  There is therefore hope that the courts and 
legislatures themselves will take up the challenge of ensuring that protection 
applicants receive a full and fair hearing of their asylum claim, irrespective of the 
government’s immigration control imperative.
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 5  REMOVING BARRIERS TO PROTECTION AT THE 





The following chapters of this thesis critically examine key restrictive asylum policies 
in light of the obligations identified in chapters 3 and 4.  It becomes clear from the 
discussion in these chapters that asylum is being gradually denuded of the national 
institutional mechanisms (judicial, legislative and administrative) that provide the 
framework for a fair and effective asylum hearing.  In this sense, there is an ongoing 
‘denationalization’614 or ‘deformalization’615 of the asylum process.  This chapter 
critically examines one of the linchpins of this trend: the erection of pre-entry 
measures at ports of embarkation in order to prevent asylum seekers from physically 
accessing the territory of the state.616   
Pre-entry measures comprise the core requirement that foreigners possess an entry 
visa granting permission to enter the state of destination.  Visa requirements are 
                                                          
614 See above n 2 – and accompanying text. 
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increasingly implemented by immigration officials posted abroad or by officials of 
transit countries pursuant to bilateral agreements (so-called ‘juxtaposed’ immigration 
controls).  Private carriers, which are subject to sanctions if they bring persons to a 
country who do not have permission to enter, also engage in a form of de facto 
immigration control on behalf of states.  These measures constitute a type of 
‘externalized’617 or ‘exported’618 border that pushes the immigration boundaries of the 
state as far from its physical boundaries as possible.619   
Pre-entry measures have a crippling impact on the ability of asylum seekers to access 
the territory of states to claim asylum.  In effect, states have ‘externalized’ asylum by 
replacing the legal obligation on states to protect refugees arriving at ports of entry 
with what are perceived to be no more than moral obligations towards asylum seekers 
arriving at the external border of the state.  Simultaneously, states are shifting the 
emphasis from in-country asylum processing to measures designed to deal with 
refugees in their regions of origin or in transit (eg extraterritorial or transit processing 
schemes, third country agreements, and resettlement quotas).  In short, states seek to 
extert control over the access of refugees to their territory, while denying legal 
responsibility for protecting refugees subject to their jurisdiction.   
This chapter proposes that new methods and measures must be sought to alleviate the 
adverse impact that pre-entry measures have on the ability of asylum seekers to access 
protection.  It begins, in section II, with a discussion of the general nature and effect 
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of external boundaries.  Section III then analyzes the rationale of pre-entry measures 
in order to understand why states are reluctant to acknowledge the application of their 
international legal obligations at the exported border.  The remaining sections argue 
for greater efforts to remove barriers to asylum seekers seeking to negotiate 
ubiquitous immigration controls, while also highlighting the practical difficulties 
faced when devising effective protection safeguards operable outside the territory of 
the state of asylum.  
II THE EXPORTED BORDER 
Pre-entry measures threaten to leave the international refugee protection regime 
behind at the border post.  Proponents of pre-entry measures argue that states’ 
international legal obligations to refugees do not follow these external forms of 
immigration control620 – a position that has potentially devastating consequences for 
the institution of asylum given the pervasive quality of pre-entry measures today.  
Consequently, state responsibility and obligation are chained to the physical border, 
while unfettered experimentation with new techniques of control occurs abroad.   
Such an approach arguably turns a blind eye to the new realities of externalized 
immigration control.  As Kesby points out, ‘[a]ccompanying the geographical or 
territorial border are invisible borders which reflect policy decisions and distinguish 
between people, whether on the grounds of race, class or nationality.’621  There are, in 
short, ‘multiple’ borders.622  The function, effect, and location of the modern border is 
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different from group to group and individual to individual.623  The border for some 
may be experienced within a foreign state’s territory at the port of entry, whereas for 
others it may be experienced in a transit country or even within the individual’s own 
country.624 
Increasingly, states officially endorse the traditional territorial definition of external 
borders while operating outside those borders to prevent the arrival of unwanted 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants.  In the EU context, for example, the Schengen 
Borders Code defines external borders as the ‘Member States’ land borders, including 
river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake 
ports, provided that they are not internal borders.’625  A similar definition is found in 
the regulations establishing FRONTEX, the European agency charged with the 
management of the operational cooperation at the external borders of EU Member 
States.626   
Yet despite the territorial definition of its external borders, a recent ECRE study on 
the access of asylum seekers to the EU noted that FRONTEX was active in ‘extending 
controls from the external borders outwards towards the high seas and onto the 
territory of third countries.’627  At the same time, the report observed that the 
‘projection of the EU’s border controls away from the EU’s physical borders does not 
have any clear legal basis and seriously obstructs the creation of a consistent 
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understanding of what the EU external borders are.’628  In practice, FRONTEX acts 
outside those borders beyond any effective modes of accountability and transparency 
in the way it exercises its immigration functions, especially with respect to asylum 
seekers.629   
EU Member States make full use of this new immigration control artifice.  Although 
not a formal member of the Schengen Framework, the UK government for example 
readily co-operates with FRONTEX in order to facilitate the exportation of its border.  
As stated recently by the Home Office’s Director of Border and Visa Policy before 
the House of Lords EU Select Committee’s inquiry into FRONTEX, ‘one of the 
guiding lights of our philosophy of border control generally is to export the border as 
far away from the UK as possible and hence FRONTEX is part of that process.’630   
Thus, on the one hand, states formally adhere to the traditional territorial conception 
of the border in international law,631 while allowing their authorities and agents to act 
beyond the physical border to exercise the power of admission and exclusion.  
Simultaneously, they implicitly deny that their international legal obligations to 
refugees – that traditionally restrained the exercise of the state’s right of immigration 
control at the physical border – have any relevance to new techniques of externalized 
control.  In order to appreciate this last point fully, we need to understand the nature 
and rationale of pre-entry measures.   
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III GOVERNMENT ‘REMOTE CONTROL’632 OVER THE ARRIVAL 
AND ENTRY OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 
States are attracted to pre-entry measures because of their capacity to control the 
arrival of asylum seekers without (it is erroneously assumed)633 engaging international 
legal obligations.  Paradoxically, ‘exporting the border as far away as possible’ does 
not entail the relinquishment of state control over asylum.   The ‘denationalization’634 
phenomenon that lies at the heart of restrictive asylum policies maintains state control 
while seeking to deny state responsibility.  This rationale of pre-entry measures 
becomes abundantly clear in the following discussion of visa requirements and carrier 
sanctions. 
Visa requirements imposed on the nationals of refugee-producing states and enforced 
by carrier sanctions are the classic tool of so-called non-arrival or non-entrée 
policies.635  The requirement that a person has a valid visa before boarding a boat or 
plane, when enforced by the carriers responsible for bringing the person to the 
destination state, makes it almost impossible for asylum seekers to seek protection in 
a destination state without false travel documents.636  A typical example of this tool is 
found in s 229(1)(a) of the Australian Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which provides that 
‘[t]he master, owner, agent, charterer and operator of a vessel on which a non-citizen 
                                                          
632 A Zolberg, ‘The Archeology of “Remote Control”’ in A Fahrmeir, O Faron, and P Weil (eds) 
Migration Control in the North Atlantic World (2003), cited in S Lavenex, ‘Shifting up and out: The 
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633 See the argument in support of the imposition of international obligations at the exported border, 
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immigration regulation in Europe. 
635 Hathaway, above n 1, 291. 
636 EXCOM, Note on International Protection, UN GAOR, 48th Session, UN Doc A/AC.96/882 
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is brought into Australia … are each guilty of an offence against this section unless 
the non-citizen, when entering Australia is in possession of evidence of a visa that is 
in effect and that permits him or her to travel to and enter Australia.’   
Visa requirements and carrier sanctions ostensibly pursue legitimate objectives of 
general immigration control and civil aviation security.637  Looking more closely, the 
true purpose of such measures in many instances is simply to prevent asylum seekers 
from arriving in the territory of destination states.638  Preventing the arrival of putative 
refugees in destination states ‘avoids concerns about the procedures of the 
determination process.’639   
Rather than seek to explain or justify such measures by reference to the origins (and 
supposed economic motives) of asylum seekers from the global ‘south’,640  recent 
scholarship views non-entrée policies as primarily a response to the increasing 
internal constraints placed on government treatment of asylum seekers.641  In 
particular, scholars observe that the evolution of constitutional and administrative 
justice principles in liberal-democratic states led to the reduction of the arbitrary and 
discretionary powers of immigration bureaucracies.642  Restraints on discretionary 
                                                          
637 Feller, above n 370, 50. 
638 R (On the Application of European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer, Prague Airport 
[2005] 2 AC 1, [28] (Lord Bingham); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
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639 Harvey, above n 3, 155. 
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powers also derived from the gradual development of a human rights culture within 
destination states that has had important ‘spill over effects for non-citizens.’643 
Paradoxically, it has also been observed that the development of the administrative 
apparatus supporting the modern liberal-democratic state spawned greater and more 
sophisticated tools to prevent asylum seekers from accessing its benefits, including 
enhanced data processing and sharing capacities and visa control mechanisms.644  
Moreover, the bureaucratisation of the modern state, with its concentration on proper 
and orderly processes and results, has fostered an immigration control ethos within 
government departments seeking to deliver an immigration programme that achieves 
clearly quantified targets.645   
The ‘primacy of the bureaucracy’ has been extenuated in Europe through the 
Schengen framework,646 which has led to diminished parliamentary and judicial 
scrutiny of refugee and immigration policies in favour of inter-ministerial agreements 
that codified key non-entrée policies.647  Since the Schengen framework emerged in 
1985, the use of visa requirements and carrier sanctions (required by art 26 of the 
Schengen Agreement) has increased significantly.  Today, the EU has a common list 
of over a 120 countries whose nationals are subject to a visa requirement for entry 
                                                          
643 Gibney, above n 1, 33.  Cf: C Joppke, ‘Asylum and State Sovereignty: A Comparison of the United 
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645 Ibid 522. 
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into EU countries, including many refugee-producing countries, including 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and the Sudan.648 
The same trend toward inter-governmental policy development is also apparent 
among other destination states, eg the activities of the Inter-Governmental 
Consultations on Asylum, Refugees and Migration Policies in Europe, North America 
and Australia (IGC).  The IGC has played host to officials sharing ideas on the 
development of non-entrée policies – a process that occurs with little transparency 
and beyond domestic scrutiny.  Rather than breakdown borders, internationalisation in 
this context has had the opposite effect of strengthening the autonomy of governments 
by establishing an immigration control arena ‘shielded from the pluralistic domestic 
arena’, including different sections of the bureaucracy, parliament, and the courts.649   
Visa requirements and carrier sanctions allow governments to control the numbers of 
asylum seekers arriving in the state.  They place asylum seekers within the paradigm 
of irregular migration as part of an ‘official drive to rein in, to control, to constrain, to 
render orderly and hence manageable’ their arrival.650  Armed with new and 
sophisticated means of border control and a control ethos to match, immigration 
officials have insisted on instigating and maintaining a form of ‘remote control’ over 
the entry of asylum seekers.651  By employing visa requirements to ‘export the 
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border’652 states pre-empt arrival and access to national asylum procedures by 
‘shifting the locus of control further afield.’653  These measures have been given 
added energy by multilateral anti-trafficking initiatives requiring states to apply 
carrier sanctions.654 
From this discussion it becomes clear that non-entrée policies in many instances are 
designed to circumvent access to in-country asylum procedures in destination states.  
This is profoundly threatening to the rights of refugees in light of the discussion in 
chapter 4 of this thesis, which highlighted the essential contribution in-country 
administrative, statutory and judicial mechanisms make to the operation of a fair and 
effective asylum process.  By creating a zone of arbitrariness outside the state, 
governments frustrate the potential contribution of these institutional safeguards 
inside the state.  The remaining sections of this chapter present a case for bringing 
pre-entry measures within the fold of international legal obligation and the rule of 
law, while also highlighting the practical challenges faced in ensuring the effective 
implementation of international obligations at the exported border. 
IV RECOGNIZING THE APPLICATION OF KEY PROTECTION 
OBLIGATIONS AT THE EXPORTED BORDER 
The non-refoulement obligation is the core international obligation at issue at the 
exported border.  As observed in chapter 4 of this thesis, the non-refoulement 
obligation requires that states ensure that individuals are not expelled or returned to 
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territories in which they face (or are at risk of removal to) persecution on account of 
their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social 
group, or torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.655  The 
following discussion examines the relevance of the non-refoulement obligation in the 
context of pre-entry measures. 
Implicit in the following discussion is the view that a good faith reading of the 
Refugee Convention and cognate rights instruments requires that states take positive 
steps to ensure the effective application of their protection obligations.656   The notion 
that states are under no obligation to take positive steps to exempt asylum seekers 
from general immigration controls,657 and are thus free to fence off their territory so 
that no foreigner, refugee or not, can set foot on it,658 contradicts the central purpose 
of protection, which is to act as an exception to the immigration control norm. 
A Recognizing the extraterritorial reach of the non-refoulement obligation in art 33 
of the Refugee Convention 
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An underlying justification for targeting non-entrée measures at asylum seekers is that 
the non-refoulement obligation does not apply to such measures because they are 
enforced against refugees abroad.   This rationale has the support of the traditional 
position in the scholarship that the non-refoulement obligation does not apply to 
refugees who are outside the physical territory of the state.659  This view also has the 
support of the US Supreme Court in Sale, which held that the non-refoulement 
obligation did not apply to Haitian refugees interdicted on the high seas.660  
The preferable position, as expressed by the UNHCR661 (and supported by modern 
commentators),662 is that the non-refoulement obligation prevents states from reaching 
beyond their borders to return a refugee, directly or indirectly, to a place where he or 
she has a well-founded fear of persecution.  Compelling arguments are put forward to 
support the extraterritorial reach of the non-refoulement obligation based on an 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention that accords with ‘the object and purpose 
appearing in the preamble and the operative text and by reference to the history of the 
negotiation of the Convention.’663  
Beginning with the ordinary meaning of ‘refouler’, the English translations of 
‘refouler’ include to ‘repulse’, ‘repel’ and ‘drive back’ - indicating that the term is not 
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limited to expulsion from within the territory of a Contracting State.664  A contextual 
reading of art 33 also supports its extraterritorial reach given that surrounding 
Convention obligations explicitly require a territorial nexus between the refugee and 
the country of refuge.665  The drafting history of the Convention confirms this 
reading.666   
Most importantly, the extraterritorial reach of the non-refoulement obligation in the 
Refugee Convention is consistent with the Convention’s humanitarian object and 
purpose.  Domestic courts have stressed the importance of adopting an evolving and 
humanitarian interpretation of the Refugee Convention.667  The overarching aim must 
be to ensure the continued effectiveness of the Refugee Convention in achieving its 
humanitarian object and purpose, as expressed in the Preamble, of assuring to 
refugees ‘the widest possible exercise’ of fundamental rights and freedoms.668   
Recognition of the extraterritorial operation of the non-refoulement obligation ensures 
its continued relevance in the context of novel and sophisticated tools of immigration 
control that we have begun to examine in this chapter.  The Convention must be able 
to effectively perform its task by preventing states operating beyond their borders to 
force refugees back to a place of persecution.669  In light of the current trend toward 
pre-entry measures and other non-entrée practices, recognition of the extraterritorial 
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reach of the non-refoulement obligation is essential to safeguard refugees’ access to 
fair and effective in-country asylum procedures.670    
The wider human rights context of the Refugee Convention – discussed further below 
in the context of the scope of the non-refoulement obligation under general 
international rights instruments - also supports the extraterritorial application of the 
non-refoulement obligation.  The Refugee Convention’s Preamble places it in the 
context of international instruments designed to protect the equal enjoyment by every 
person of fundamental human rights.671  This calls for an interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention that takes account of the evolving understanding of the extraterritorial 
application of human rights instruments. 
B The extraterritorial reach of the non-refoulement obligation under international 
and regional human rights treaties 
An extraterritorial application of the non-refoulement obligation is also demanded 
where it is found in general international rights treaties.672  In order to ensure the 
effective implementation of the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee has 
recognized that the ICCPR imposes obligations upon states to respect and ensure 
Covenant rights to anyone ‘within the power or effective control of that State Party, 
even if not situated within the territory of the State Party’.673  The extraterritorial 
applicability of the ICCPR was confirmed by the International Court of Justice 
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(ICJ).674  The Committee against Torture has similarly expressed the view that the 
non-refoulement obligation found in art 3 of the Convention against Torture applies 
outside the territory of the state to persons under the ‘effective control’ of the state 
party.675 
It follows that the non-refoulement obligation in the CAT and the implied non-
refoulement obligation found in the ICCPR are engaged where a person falls within 
the power or effective control of a state.  This is confirmed by the fact that the Human 
Rights Committee expressly mentions refugees and asylum seekers when defining the 
extraterritorial application of the ICCPR.676  Given the similar nature of the non-
refoulement obligations and the object and purpose of human treaties and the Refugee 
Convention, it also follows that the non-refoulement obligation found in the Refugee 
Convention is similarly concomitant with the exercise of extraterritorial authority and 
control.677  Similar reasoning should be applied to the implied non-refoulement 
obligation in the ECHR, which adopts the same concept of ‘jurisdiction’ found in 
public international law.678   
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C Applying the non-refoulement obligation to immigration controls outside the 
territory of the state 
It is evident from this discussion that the application of the non-refoulement 
obligation to immigration controls outside the territory of the state will depend on 
whether a person subject to those controls falls within the effective control or 
authority of the state responsible for those controls.  In order to determine whether 
this is the case, the guiding principles should be the notions of ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘competence’ that underpin the extraterritorial scope of human rights treaties.   
The notion of ‘effectiveness’ is implicit in the Human Rights Committee’s general 
comment on the extraterritorial reach of ICCPR rights.  The Committee expressly 
bases the extraterritorial reach of the ICCPR upon art 2,679 which imposes a duty to 
respect and ensure the rights found in the ICCPR.680  Article 2 requires states to 
refrain from conduct that would breach ICCPR rights and to engage in positive 
conduct in order to ensure the effective and practical enjoyment of ICCPR rights.681  
Acknowledging the first component of art 2, the Human Rights Committee expresses 
the view that allowing a state to commit violations on the territory of another state 
that it could not perpetrate on its own territory would be unconscionable. 682  By 
relying on art 2, the Committee’s position also demands that states should take 
positive steps to ensure the effective enjoyment of rights to individuals outside their 
territory where it is within their power to offer protection. 
                                                          
679 UN Committee on Human Rights, General Comment No 31: The nature of the general obligation 
imposed on states parties to the Covenant (2004) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 7, 12 May 2004, 192, [10] 
680 Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, UN Doc CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, 29 July 1981, [12.3]; Celiberti de 
Casariego v Uruguay, UN Doc CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979, 29 July 1981, [10.3].  
681 Tomuschat, above n 275, 96; Nowak, above n 126, 38. 
682 Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, UN Doc CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, 29 July 1981, [12.3]; Celiberti de 
Casariego v Uruguay, UN Doc CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979, 29 July 1981, [10.3].  See also, in the context 
of the ECHR, Issa v Turkey, application no 31821/96, Judgment, Strasbourg, 16 November 2004, [71]. 
  
173
This reasoning is supported by the ICJ’s discussion of the extraterritorial application 
of the ICCPR.  The ICJ observes that the ICCPR’s object and purpose and drafting 
history supported the Human Rights Committee’s view that the treaty applies to 
persons outside the state who are within the jurisdiction of the state.683  Implicit in the 
ICJ’s discussion of the drafting history is that individuals should not be prevented 
from asserting ICCPR rights against a state where those rights fall within that state’s 
competence.684   
It follows that a state’s obligation to protect will engage where it possesses the power 
and competence to ensure to an individual the practical and effective enjoyment of a 
particular right.  A state should therefore take steps to ensure that its external 
immigration controls do not result in the refoulement of an individual where this is 
within its power and competence.  Where the state has the power to ensure that its 
immigration officials or agents acting abroad do not commit acts of refoulement, it 
should do so.   The very existence and implementation of externalized border controls 
provides evidence of that capacity. 
This approach is at odds with the view that derives ‘effective control’ from the nexus 
between the immigration official posted abroad and the location in which a person 
seeks protection.685  By focusing on the destination state’s sovereign control over that 
locality, this view ignores the same state’s obvious power to change their own 
domestic laws and policies that direct the official’s conduct.  The immigration 
official’s authority to issue a visa or entry clearance is clearly within the jurisdiction 
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of the destination state in the same way that the issue of a passport by the Uruguayan 
consulate in Germany was within the jurisdiction of Uruguay.686  Thus, generally the 
non-refoulement obligation will apply whether an immigration official is stationed at 
a consulate or embassy, posted to a port of embarkation, acting at a point in transit, or 
intercepting boats on the high seas.   
D The applicability of the non-refoulement obligation to immigration controls within 
the country of origin  
An exception is where the asylum seeker confronts the exported border within their 
own state.  Increasing use of the exported border makes it more likely that asylum 
seekers will confront a foreign border before ever leaving their country of origin.  In 
those circumstances, governments may seek to deny that asylum seekers are entitled 
to protection under the Refugee Convention as they are not outside their country of 
nationality, and therefore do not satisfy the ‘alienage’ requirement of the refugee 
definition in art 1A(2).687   
While in accordance with the text of the Convention, this approach is at odds with the 
true rationale of the alienage requirement.  The alienage requirement is not a means of 
limiting a state’s obligations under the Refugee Convention to the situation where a 
refugee is within the territory of the destination country; rather, it signifies the 
capacity of the international community to offer protection to refugees outside their 
country of origin.  This understanding is in keeping with the fact that territorial 
sovereignty historically was the premise for the state’s right to grant asylum, not a 
reason to deny obligations.  As observed by Hathaway, the alienage requirement 
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recognizes the intersection between the ‘ought’ and the ‘can’ of international refugee 
protection: the international community should offer protection to refugees outside the 
borders of their country of nationality because it can.688  Thus, the alienage 
requirement represents a duty and capacity to protect, rather than an excuse to erect 
barriers to protection.   
Nevertheless, in the face of the express wording of the Refugee Convention, 
Hathaway argues that this shortfall in protection is best remedied by recourse to the 
right of emigration found in art 12(2) of the ICCPR.689  The right of emigration, or ius 
emigrandi as it was traditionally known, is the other side of the asylum coin - 
allowing asylum seekers to leave their country in search of protection.  In accordance 
with the right of emigration, destination states are under an obligation not to prevent 
asylum seekers leaving their country of nationality.  The right to leave any country, 
including one’s own, may only be subject to restrictions necessary to protect national 
security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.690   
Where the restrictive measure is not in conformity with these permissible limitations 
on the right to leave, then it will be in breach of art 12(2).691  It is unlikely that the 
control of illegal immigration is in conformity with these permissible limitations.692  
In support of these observations, the UN Human Rights Committee has expressed its 
concern that asylum laws and procedures that impose carrier sanctions and other pre-
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frontier arrangements may affect the right of a person to leave a country, including his 
or her own, in violation of art 12(2).693   
In addition, other rights can be employed to restrain the use of immigration control 
measures designed to prevent a certain group from seeking asylum.  In particular, 
asylum seekers within their country of origin who are subject to immigration controls 
that are targeted at their race, ethnicity or nationality also have recourse to the 
prohibition against non-discrimination found in art 26 of the ICCPR.  Article 26 
guarantees to all persons ‘equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, culture, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’  In support of this analysis, 
the UK House of Lords held that the use of immigration officials posted at Prague 
airport to prevent the travel of Roma asylum seekers to the UK breached art 26 of the 
ICCPR and the racial non-discrimination prohibitions found in the Race Relations Act 
1976 (UK).694    
V OUTSOURCING OF THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL FUNCTION 
TO PRIVATE CARRIERS 
Assuming that states are under an obligation to ensure their external immigration 
controls do not result in refoulement, shifting the locus and function of immigration 
control places significant barriers in front of asylum seekers wanting to enforce this 
obligation.  Before considering this issue in section VI, it is first necessary to 
highlight the role of private carriers.  As Guiraudon has identified, ‘denationalization’ 
of migration control not only embraces extraterritoriality, but also the use of private 
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carriers to perform traditional state functions.695  Carrier sanctions, by stipulating that 
sea, air or land carriers must not permit a person without valid travel documents to 
travel to the destination state, effectively enable a state to control immigration into its 
territory without establishing a physical presence in the states of embarkation.696   
A State responsibility for a carrier’s enforcement of visa requirements 
The strategic use of private enterprises to perform key governmental functions outside 
the borders of the state is not unique to the asylum context.  ‘Privatization … has gone 
global.’697  International law has struggled to keep pace with this trend.  The 
International Law Commission has taken decades to codify the rules on state 
responsibility governing, inter alia, the devolution of state functions to ‘parastatal’ 
entities.698  However, it is now clear from art 5 of the articles on the Responsibility of 
States for internationally wrongful acts that international law recognizes that the 
‘conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State … but which is 
empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental 
authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law …’699   
In the present context, a key issue is whether destination states are responsible for the 
actions of private carriers charged with administering their visa requirements.  The 
International Law Commission’s commentary on the articles on the Responsibility of 
States for internationally wrongful acts expressly provides that art 5 extends to the 
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situation where ‘private or state-owned airlines may have delegated to them certain 
powers in relation to immigration control …’700  The justification for attributing to the 
destination state the conduct of private carriers is the fact that the law of the 
destination state has conferred on the carrier the exercise of an element of 
governmental authority.701  As there is no need under art 5 to demonstrate that the 
carrier’s conduct was in fact carried out under the control of the state, state 
responsibility attaches to the carrier’s conduct irrespective of the level of independent 
discretion or power to act enjoyed by the carrier.702   
Consistent with this position, scholars have reasoned that the non-refoulement 
obligation applies ‘to circumstances in which organs of other States, private 
undertakings (such as carriers, agents responsible for checking documentation in 
transit, etc) or other persons act on behalf of a Contracting State or in exercise of the 
governmental activity of that State.’703  An act of refoulement undertaken by a private 
carrier will therefore engage the responsibility of the relevant state.704  This is in 
keeping with jurisprudence on art 2 of the ICCPR, which clarifies that a state bears 
responsibility for violations of rights committed by its agents in the territory of 
another state.705   
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B The role and responsibility of carriers 
There is much sense in holding states solely accountable for the abuses of human 
rights that flow from their extraterritorial immigration controls.  States create visa 
controls; they should therefore be responsible for preventing any abuses of human 
rights that flow from their enforcement.  Any talk of assigning accountability to other 
entities or agencies, it might be argued, merely detracts from what is a failure of state 
protection, creating a ‘diversion for States to avoid their own responsibilities’.706   
Pursuing this line of argument, the enforcement of visa controls should be one case 
where corporations are not called upon to replace governments in their legitimate and 
primary responsibility for the protection of human rights.  This point of view accords 
with the typical NGO position on carrier sanctions, namely that ‘[a]irline employees 
should not be expected to act as an immigration police force, making decisions which 
put people’s lives in danger; that is the duty of governments.’707  It also reflects the 
position of civil aviation staff, who object to being the state’s frontline against 
unwanted asylum seekers.708   
Moreover, the view that states alone should bear responsibility for ensuring that 
immigration controls do not impact adversely on asylum seekers also fits with the 
orthodox vision of international human rights law, namely that it ‘generally binds 
only states because it is principally designed to protect individuals from the excesses 
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of state power.’709  As a result, ‘where infringements are caused by abuse of private 
power, it is still the state that will be held vicariously liable at international law, if any 
legal entity is to be held liable at all.’710  In accordance with the orthodox position, 
transnational corporations do not have direct responsibilities under international 
human rights instruments.711 
Granted that states bear responsibility for human rights violations flowing from 
immigration controls, the issue remains whether carriers should be involved in 
ensuring that human rights breaches do not occur.  As a pragmatic matter, this may be 
unavoidable.  Carriers occupy a unique position with respect to asylum seekers, often 
being the only means of escape or rescue for asylum seekers stranded within their 
country of origin or floundering in an unseaworthy boat.  While a private institution, 
the carrier role is a conduit for the enjoyment of a number of public international law 
rights.  Thus, it may be necessary to involve carriers to ensure the effectiveness of any 
extraterritorial protection safeguards.   
The special position of private carriers has been at least implicitly recognized by 
states through EXCOM (the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme).  In the context of interception measures generally, EXCOM has 
expressed the view that ‘State authorities and agents acting on behalf of the 
intercepting State should take, consistent with their obligations under international 
law, all appropriate steps in the implementation of interception measures …[emphasis 
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added].’712  Specifically, EXCOM has called on both states and carriers to be alert to 
the human rights implications of the visa enforcement function.713   
While perhaps stopping short of imposing a direct protection responsibility on 
carriers, these developments are in keeping with a growing expectation that 
transnational corporations will take steps to ensure the protection of human rights 
within their spheres of activity and influence.714  Transnational corporations are 
increasingly expected ‘to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of 
and protect human rights’, including ‘the rights recognized by … international refugee 
law …’.715  In accordance with the general principles of the UN Global Compact, 
corporations are called upon to ‘make sure their own corporations are not complicit in 
human rights abuses’.716  Thus, while states bear responsibility for their immigration 
controls, there is also an expectation that private carriers will be alive to the impact of 
immigration controls on the human rights of their passengers. 
VI THE PRACTICALITY OF EXTERNAL ‘SAFEGUARDS’ 
So far this chapter has proposed that states should ensure that immigration controls 
operating at the exported border do not lead to direct or indirect refoulement.  
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Moreover, as the vehicle for seeking protection, carriers should be sensitive to 
protection issues.   That said, the current framework of externalized and devolved 
immigration controls places major obstacles in the face of asylum seekers wanting to 
enforce the obligations of destination states outside that state.  This is evident from 
the following discussion of current safeguards implemented or mooted at the exported 
border. 
A The inadequacy of current protection safeguards at the exported border 
The protection safeguards used or proposed to date in the immigration control context 
are underdeveloped and underutilised.  The principal safeguard (where any at all) is 
the exculpatory provision that exempts carriers from fines where a carrier has reason 
to believe that a passenger without proper documentation is a refugee.717  The idea of 
an exculpatory provision is that states should not sanction carriers that have 
‘knowingly brought into the State a person who does not possess a valid entry 
document but who has a plausible claim for refugee status or otherwise needs 
international protection.’718   
In conjunction with exculpatory provisions, proposals have called for greater training 
of official and private border staff in protection matters.  EXCOM requires that ‘[a]ll 
persons, including officials of a State, and employees of a commercial entity, 
implementing interception measures should receive specialized training, including 
available means to direct intercepted persons expressing international protection 
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needs to the appropriate authorities in the State where the interception has taken place, 
or, where appropriate, to UNHCR [emphasis added].’719  
In the EU context, ECRE has called for a portion of the expanding EU External 
Borders Fund (1.82 billion Euros) to be employed to help Member States incorporate 
‘protection-sensitive’ measures into the regulation of the EU’s external borders.720  As 
part of this, ECRE calls for training of staff involved in border control activities ‘on 
the refugee and human rights implications of preventing access to the territory’, and 
raising the awareness of carriers on protection issues.721  There is already a precedent 
in the high level of training provided by states to carrier personnel in relation to the 
recognition of fraudulent travel documents.722   
While these initiatives are a welcome move in the right direction, arguably it is not 
enough to rely solely on exculpatory provisions and the goodwill of private carrier 
personnel.  The practice of waiving a carrier sanction for a passenger later recognized 
as a refugee may waive the carrier’s financial burden, but this is little comfort to 
refugees who fail to reach the destination state because their papers are not in order or 
because they are relying on forgeries that are not sufficiently expert to evade detection 
by the carrier.723   
Over reliance on private carrier personnel also raises the issue of the respective roles 
of immigration officials and carrier personnel.  Further moves toward the use of 
exculpatory provisions and the training of carrier personnel only reinforces a 
fundamental problem underlying carrier sanctions, namely, that they oblige carriers to 
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take on greater discretionary immigration powers.724  As Frances Nicholson has 
remarked, ‘the act of making the imposition of a fine dependent or even discretionary 
on the basis of the outcome of an asylum application has the effect of making carriers 
assess the validity of a potential asylum application as well as the validity of that 
person’s papers.’725 
While some level of engagement between carriers and asylum seekers would appear 
inevitable given the unique position of carriers, carrier personnel will likely remain 
resistant to protection issues.  While training would potentially boost the ‘protection 
sensitivity’ of carrier personnel, they are still likely to be comparatively inexperienced 
in protection matters and not necessarily motivated by humanitarian considerations.726  
Carrier personnel ‘are not and will never become competent immigration officers nor, 
even, refugee sympathisers.’727  Carriers have a powerful economic incentive to avoid 
the risk of sanctions on bringing an asylum seeker to the destination state where they 
are determined not to have protection needs.728  Problems may further arise from the 
fact that carrier personnel often act as agents for other carriers. 
B Greater state and international agency involvement 
These criticisms point to the need for greater state and international agency 
involvement in the protection afforded to asylum seekers at the exported border.  Yet 
it is difficult to forsee how this can occur within the current carrier sanction regime, 
which even with exculpatory provisions in place inevitably shifts the protection 
obligations of states onto private carriers.  Greater state and agency involvement 
                                                          
724 Ibid 606. 
725 Ibid 601. 
726 Feller, above n 370, 57. 
727 Cruz, above n 717, 79. 
728 Ibid 66-68, 79; Nicholson, above n 677, 601. 
  
185
would require new levels of co-ordination between private carriers, destination and 
transit states, and international agencies, including the creation of independent 
mechanisms for the monitoring and supervision of official and carrier personnel.729  
The growing role of FRONTEX in coordinating the immigration operations of EU 
Member States would also need to be taken into account in the European theatre.730 
In a recent move, the European Commission established a ‘Forum on Carrier 
Liability,’ made up of carriers, officials and humanitarian groups, to consider ways to 
safeguard protection.731  Yet while recognizing that protection is an issue, dialogue is 
premised on the continuation of the carrier sanction regime.732  On the other hand, a 
more positive development is the recent initiative between states, international 
agencies, and sea carriers, involving the rescue of asylum seekers at sea.733  The 
initiative aims at ensuring that asylum seekers rescued at sea without proper 
documentation are disembarked at a place of protection.734  These efforts perhaps 
provide a precedent for further co-ordinated efforts to make explicit the roles and 
responsibilities of destination states, transit states, and carriers with respect to the 
protection of asylum seekers at the exported border.   
UNHCR is the logical agency to lead this dialogue given its supervisory role under art 
35(1) of the Refugee Convention.735  While the UNHCR’s ’10 Point-Plan of Action’ 
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highlights the need for greater co-operation and co-ordination between ‘key actors’ in 
addressing protection within mixed migratory flows, 736 it not clear whether the 
safeguards contained in it apply to the exported and privatized border.  Notably, it is 
silent on the question of the role of states vis-à-vis private carriers, referring to the 
‘key actors’ only as the ‘affected states, governmental bodies, regional and 
international organizations with relevant mandates’ and NGOs.737   
C Preserving access to internal protection safeguards 
Extraterritorial safeguards should be concerned solely with ensuring access to fair and 
effective eligibility procedures.738  Where necessary this should involve the waiver of 
carrier sanctions and the referral of asylum claimants to the central authority in the 
country of destination.  Officers or agents at the port of embarkation should be 
obligated to permit putative refugees and other persons in need of protection access to 
the asylum application procedures at the port of entry (the current position in most 
states is that asylum claims can be made only at the port of entry – thereby denying 
any duty on officers to identify potential protection claims739).  Meanwhile, eligibility 
determination should take place onshore by the central authority charged with this 
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function.  This suggestion is in keeping with other observers who have proposed that 
the assessments of asylum claims should take place at the port of entry (rather than 
the port of embarkation),740 and that there should be a right of appeal to an 
independent tribunals or court in the destination state.741   
At the same time, the difficulty of ensuring that officers and agents of the destination 
state exercise their discretion in an appropriate manner must be acknowledged.  As it 
stands, the UNHCR’s 10-Point Plan is unclear on the extraterritorial operation of 
protection safeguards at ports of embarkation.  Its ‘protection-sensitive entry systems’ 
simply apply ‘in-country, at borders and at sea’.742  Consequently, the 10-Point Plan 
does not explicitly address the issue of whether protection safeguards are practicable 
in the context of immigration controls administered outside the territory of destination 
states and with private carrier assistance.  The Plan largely falls back on the notion of 
improved training and ‘clear instructions’ in protection matters for border guards and 
immigration officials without any indication whether carrier personnel are included in 
this reference.743   
The 10-Point Plan also does not address the question of what accountability and 
enforceability mechanisms are available at the exported border to provide a 
framework for the exercise of discretion by fully trained and instructed officers.   
Awareness raising and information sharing are welcome.  However, they must also be 
accompanied by mechanisms to ensure such training and instructions are in fact 
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exercised in a manner beneficial to asylum seekers, including ensuring them access to 
fair and effective in-country asylum procedures in destination states.    
VII RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGNTY  
A Circumventing international obligations by avoiding internal constraints 
This chapter has observed that visa requirements and carrier sanctions seek to 
‘denationalize’ asylum control by denying persons access to in-country asylum 
procedures.  The effect of such non-entrée policies is to circumvent the state’s 
protection obligations by avoiding internal constraints on government authority.  Non-
entrée measures extend the reach of arbitrary government power beyond the state, 
effectively dividing and circumventing the effective operation of external and internal 
restraints on the state’s traditional unfettered authority over immigration control.   
By re-instigating a form of unfettered government ‘remote’ control over the asylum 
process – that prevents access to in-country asylum procedures and the associated 
legislative and judicial safeguards that remove government control – states seek to re-
instigate their traditionally unfettered right of immigration control through the 
circumvention of the domestic enforceability of protection obligations.  European 
confederation adds another layer between the person seeking protection and the in-
country asylum procedures essential to their enjoyment of protection in the territory of 
EU Member States.    
B Disingenous appeals to external sovereignty  
This analysis makes appeals to the state’s traditional sovereign right to control 
immigration as a justification for externalizing asylum appear disingenuous.  Appeals 
to sovereignty in this context have an empirical and legal element.  Empirically, it is 
claimed that the state’s ‘[e]ffective control of admission requires general restrictions 
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on access.’744  Underlying this is the belief that today’s asylum seekers are largely the 
new ‘economic’ refugees from the developing world who pursue asylum as a path of 
irregular migration and are difficult to deport when determined not to be entitled to 
protection.745   
These empirical observations conveniently slip into a normative legal justification for 
the application of remote control policies to asylum seekers: better to prevent arrival 
of asylum seekers, than deal with the social and economic costs of processing and 
deportation.  In the UK, for instance, the initial extension of visa controls to refugee 
producing countries and the imposition of liability on carriers in 1987 were clearly 
‘complementary measures intended to stem the flow of applicants for asylum.’746  The 
then UK Home Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, made it clear in his second reading 
speech to the bill introducing carrier sanctions in 1987 that it was ‘intended to stop 
abuse of asylum procedures by preventing people travelling here without valid 
documents and then claiming asylum before they can be returned.’747   
Yet even if the above empirical claims are correct, they do not sustain the normative 
conclusion urged by some states and commentators, namely, that the Refugee 
Convention and cognate rights instruments are not applicable where it would mean 
sacrificing the state’s right to control immigration.  An example of this approach is 
found in Hailbronner’s argument that the non-refoulement obligation found in art 33 
of the Refugee Convention is not applicable in the context of entry and transport 
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regulations because it would have far-reaching consequences for immigration 
control.748  In this respect, Hailbronner’s analysis evidences a worrying trend to 
conflate refugee flows with ‘large migration movements’, providing states with a 
justification for the unfettered restriction of the ‘uncontrolled access of foreigners to 
their territory.’749   
The response of the EU’s new migration agency, FRONTEX, to the arrival without 
proper documentation of Iraqi asylum seekers, is typical of this trend.750  Between 
January and September 2007, 18.4% of asylum applications in Europe were lodged by 
Iraqis.  The fact that there was a 90% success rate in Sweden and a 74% success rate 
in Austria suggests that most of the protection claims were genuine.  Yet rather than 
ensure Iraqi asylum seekers continued to enjoy access to protection, FRONTEX’s 
response was to view the ‘illegal’ immigration of Iraqi nationals as a potential threat 
to Member States of the EU.751  Consequently, FRONTEX engaged in a risk analysis 
of the ‘illegal’ arrival of Iraqis, focusing solely on ‘threats of human trafficking, 
forgery of travel documents and possible abuse of asylum seeking procedure.’752 
C A higher right? 
Ultimately, this type of practice rests on the belief that the sovereign right to exclude 
‘irregular’ migrants is a ‘higher’ right than the right to protection from refoulement.753  
The core non-refoulement obligation is read down according to an ‘overriding’ state 
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prerogative to control immigration.  This reasoning fails to grapple with the fact that 
states accepted an intrusion into their traditional sovereign right to control 
immigration when they agreed to the binding provisions of the Refugee Convention 
and cognate rights instruments.  While there is no obligation on a Contracting State 
under the Refugee Convention or cognate rights instruments not to introduce or 
continue a system of immigration control,754 the limits that the state may pursue its 
own interests at the expense of the rights of refugees are clearly set out in the 
Convention.755  None of them refers to ‘general immigration control’.   
Second, this reasoning effectively entertains the circumvention of national protection 
safeguards.  As this thesis has sought to establish, a number of the core obligations in 
these instruments, especially the non-refoulement obligation, depend for their 
effectiveness upon a tapestry of national institutions, laws and principles.  Non-entrée 
policies unravel this. There is no point in states endorsing rights that refugees cannot 
access or enjoy. 
Thus, while the UNHCR recognizes that states have a right to control irregular 
immigration into their territory,756 immigration controls should not interfere with the 
ability of persons at risk of persecution ‘to gain access to safety and obtain asylum in 
other countries.’757  As stated by the European Commission on Human Rights, 
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immigration controls must be exercised in accordance with a state’s human rights 
obligations.758   
Refugee status, by its very nature, is a ‘”trump card” that can be played in order to 
avoid the usual rules of migration control.’759   It ‘is a needs-based recognition of the 
inherent implausibility of managed migration in circumstances where the need to flee 
is both ethically and pragmatically more powerful than the usual rules of immigration 
control.’760  Non-entrée policies fail to acknowledge this fundamental premise of 
international protection. 
The ‘migration management’ paradigm currently gripping inter-governmental 
dialogue does not alter this fact: 
[M]igration management must take due account of international refugee 
protection obligations, including the importance of identifying people in need of 
international protection and determining appropriate solutions for them … 
[M]easures taken to curb irregular migration, whether by land, sea, or air must 
not prevent persons who are seeking international protection from gaining 
access to the territory and asylum procedure of countries where protection can 
be found.761 
In particular, immigration control must cater for the non-refoulement obligation.  It is 
not enough to argue, as Hailbronner does, that applying the non-refoulement 
obligation ‘to facilitate access to the territory and to grant exemptions from generally 
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applicable entry and transport regulations means a completely new dimension’.762  It 
is inadequate to discount the application of the non-refoulement obligation to 
immigration controls on this basis.  The need to extend the non-refoulement 
obligation to these measures is new because the sophisticated and targeted application 
of them to asylum seekers is new.763  To permit states to erect a novel and complex 
exported border, then disown its adverse consequences for refugees, is inconsistent 
with the obligation to ensure the Refugee Convention, as well as other international 
rights treaties, operate effectively in today’s legal and social environment.764  The 
exported border must bend to a state’s international protection obligations, not vice 
versa.   
While states may not be under an obligation to seek out refugees, it does not follow 
that states are not under an obligation to remove barriers to refugees accessing 
protection.  The non-refoulement obligation, as argued in chapter 4 of this thesis, does 
not simply impose negative restrictions on a state.765  The non-refoulement obligation 
also requires states to take positive steps to prevent refoulement, eg the obligation to 
ensure that refugee determination processes are fair and effective.766  The positive 
obligations imposed by the non-refoulement principle should also extend to the 
removal of barriers to accessing those procedures if the non-refoulement obligation is 
to have any relevance in an age of ubiquitous immigration controls.   
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Hence, visa requirements and carrier sanctions legislation must be re-examined in 
light of the general obligation to interpret treaties in good faith and the Refugee 
Convention’s object of assuring refugees the widest possible exercise of their 
rights.767  In accordance with this overarching obligation, Feller concludes that a 
Contracting State which ‘legislates for carrier sanctions limiting the access of 
refugees to status determination procedures, as well as to the rights and protections of 
the [Refugee Convention] is … broadly in breach of its Convention obligations.’768  It 
follows that ‘a State wishing to obstruct the movement of those who seek asylum are 
thus limited by specific rules of international law and by the State’s obligation to fulfil 
its international commitments in good faith; and that in pursuing the “legitimate 
purpose” of immigration control a State must act within the law.’769   
VIII CONCLUSION 
Visa requirements, carrier sanctions and other non-entrée policies divide external 
obligations and the internal mechanisms necessary for their successful 
implementation and enforcement, disempowering both.  In this way, non-entrée 
policies signify an assertion of unlimited sovereignty of the state in international law 
and the unfettered exercise of internal sovereignty (or public power) within the state.  
In the process, states undermine the necessary interdependence between international 
and national constraints on the traditionally unfettered authority of the state and 
government in the asylum arena.  Practical protection safeguards should be instigated 
in the visa requirement and carrier sanction context that aim at ‘renationalizing’ the 
                                                          
767 Feller, above n 370, 66, 59. 
768 Ibid 59. 
769 UNHCR, Amicus curiae brief in R (ex parte European Roma Rights Centre et al) v Immigration 
Officer at Prague Airport and another (UNHCR intervening) 17 IJRL 427 (2005), 436. 
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international refugee protection regime by facilitating the access of asylum seekers to 
fair and effective eligibility procedures.
  




The previous chapter of this thesis argued that a good faith reading of key protection 
obligations required states to ensure that asylum seekers had access to an equivalent 
level of protection at the exported border or, if this was not practicable, access to the 
asylum process in the state of destination.  This chapter examines the scope of a good 
faith reading of key international obligations in the context of another manifestation 
of the ‘exported border’: extraterritorial processing schemes.   
Extraterritorial processing schemes generally comprise the interception and transfer of 
asylum seekers to a third country where the intercepting state retains exclusive or 
principal control over the asylum process.  Such schemes have been employed by 
Australia,770 the US,771 and are under consideration in the EU as part of the Hague 
                                                          
770 Australia-Nauru 2001 etc agreement, above n 581; Australia-Nauru 2005 agreement, above n 581; 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Relating to the Processing of Certain Persons, and Related 
Issues dated 11 October 2001.   
771 Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government 
of the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the Government of the United States  to establish in the Turks and 
Caicos Islands a processing facility to determine the refugee status of boat people from Haiti, entered 
into force 18 June 1994, KAV 3906, Temp State Dept No 94-158 (Turks and Caicos Islands 
agreement); Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the United States and the 
Government of Jamaica for the establishment within the Jamaican territorial sea and internal waters 
of a facility to process nationals of Haiti seeking refuge within or entry to the United States of America, 
entered into force 2 June 1994, KAV 3901, Temp State Dept No 94-153 (US-Jamaica agreement).   
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Programme adopted by the European Council.772  Extraterritorial processing schemes 
and proposals have come under increasing scrutiny by the UNHCR773 and 
commentators.774  Most recently, in a major policy reversal, the newly elected 
Australian Government disbanded the country’s offshore processing facilities and 
announced the end of the practice of transferring asylum seekers arriving in Australia 
to a third country for processing.775  In this period of uncertainty over the future of 
extraterritorial processing, the operation of the US and Australian extraterritorial 
processing schemes call for close examination and analysis.   
Section II of this chapter begins by recapping the key international obligations (non-
refoulement, access to the courts, non-discrimination, non-penalization, safe third 
country safeguards) that require states to make use of an array of legislative, judicial 
and administrative measures in order to ensure a fair and effective asylum process.  In 
light of this discussion, sections III and IV identify the flaws in the protection offered 
under the US and Australian extraterritorial processing schemes both during the 
interception and transfer processes and after transfer of an asylum seeker to an 
extraterritorial processing centre (EPC).  Finally, section V examines the reasons for 
                                                          
772 The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union [2005] 
OJ No C53/4; Council and Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on 
strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union 2005-2010 [2005] OJ No C198/5; 
Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum 
System, Brussels, 6 June 2007, COM (2007) 301 final, 4; Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly, 
Resolution 1569 (2007) on Assessment of Transit and Processing Centres as a Response to Mixed 
Flows of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, 1 October 2007, Res. 1569 (2007), 2.   
773 UNHCR, above n 584; UNHCR, Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection) 
Bill 2002, Response of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the 
Senate, Legal and Constitutional Committee request for comments, 2002.  
774 Legomsky, above n 587; G Neuman, ‘Closing The Guantanamo Loophole’ (2004) 50 Loyola Law 
Review 1-66 at 3-4;  S Legomsky, ‘An Asylum Seeker’s Bill of Rights in a Non-Utopian World’ 
(2000) Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 619-641 at 626-627; S Kneebone, ‘The Pacific Plan: The 
Provision of ‘Effective Protection’?’ 18 IJRL 696 (2006);  Noll, above n 582. 
775 Senator Chris Evans, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, ‘Last refugees leave Nauru’ (Press 
Release, 8 February 2008).  
  
198
Australia’s recent disbandment of its EPCs and the lessons this may have for other 
jurisdictions. 
In brief, the chapter observes that extraterritorial processing schemes are designed to 
prevent and deter access to statutory, administrative, and judicial measures that 
guarantee a fair and effective asylum process in the country responsible for the 
interception and transfer of asylum seekers to a third country.  In line with this 
objective, the US and Australian governments have adopted interdiction practices, and 
a supposed ‘international’ standard of processing at EPCs, that are deliberately 
isolated from the national legal and institutional protections within either the 
intercepting state or the third country where processing occurs.   
The impetus for the disbandment of Australia’s EPCs was the effective realisation that 
the processing of claims at EPCs negated national safeguards fundamental to the 
satisfaction of Australia’s international obligations.  Australia’s policy reversal sends 
a timely message to other countries who may be considering implementing such 
practices that extraterritorial processing schemes have proven unworkable as a matter 
of international law. 
II RECAPPING THE KEY OBLIGATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERDICTION AND EXTRATERRITORIAL PROCESSING 
A The good faith principle 
It is useful at this point in this thesis to recap the core legal argument that informs the 
following critique of extraterritorial processing.  The starting point is art 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,776 which confirms the principle that a 
                                                          
776 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 22 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980). 
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treaty should be interpreted in ‘good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.’  In the case of the Refugee Convention, as expressed in its preamble,777 this 
overarching obligation means interpreting and applying the Convention by reference 
to the object and purpose of assuring to ‘refugees the widest possible exercise’ of 
fundamental rights and freedoms.  The Refugee Convention’s preamble affirms the 
principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, making 
clear that the Convention should be interpreted and applied in light of its place 
‘among the international instruments that have as their object and purpose the 
protection of the equal enjoyment by every person of fundamental rights and 
freedoms.’778   
The overarching obligation to interpret a treaty in good faith in light of its object and 
purpose should also incorporate the duty to interpret and apply a treaty so as to ensure 
its effectiveness.779  Applied to the Refugee Convention, the duty to ensure the 
effectiveness of the Convention requires that states ensure that the rights and 
obligations set out in the Convention operate effectively within their evolving legal, 
political and social environment.780   
Thus, the duty to ensure the effectiveness of a treaty simply represents the basic rule 
of pacta sunt servanda that, when applied to human rights treaties, requires proactive 
                                                          
777 A treaty’s preamble is the key indicator of its object and purpose: Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 
(Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) [1991] ICJ Rep 53, 142 (Weeramantry J). 
778 Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs  (1996) 190 CLR 225, 231 
(Brennan CJ). 
779 H Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (London: Stevens 
& Sons Ltd, 1958), 304.  See, above n 267-  and accompanying text. 
780 Hathaway, above n 1, 63-67. 
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steps to protect rights.781   Human rights treaties not only impose negative prohibitions 
on states, but also impose a duty on states to fulfil their obligations by means of 
‘positive legislative, administrative, judicial and practical measures necessary to 
ensure that the rights in question are implemented to the greatest extent possible.’782   
Underlying this duty is the understanding that international human rights law 
‘parallels and supplements national law … but it does not replace, and indeed depends 
on, national institutions.’783   
B The non-refoulement obligation 
This thesis argues that when interpreted and applied in good faith, key international 
protection obligations require states to exploit statutory, judicial or administrative 
protection measures and safeguards in order to ensure persons enjoy a full and fair 
asylum hearing.  The most important of these obligations is the non-refoulement 
principle.   
The non-refoulement obligation in art 33 of the Refugee Convention, which is 
described as the cornerstone of the Convention,784 imposes an obligation on states not 
to expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or 
her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.  Non-refoulement obligations, complementing the non-refoulement 
                                                          
781 Tomuschat, above n 275, 104. 
782 Nowak, above n 126, xxi. 
783 L Henkin, ‘Introduction’ in L Henkin (ed), The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 7. 
784 Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, Supreme Court of the United States, Ahmed Ali v. Deborah Achim, Michael 
Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and Michael Mukasey, United States 
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obligation in art 33 of the Refugee Convention, are also found in other international 
human rights instruments.785   
Chapter 4 of this thesis argued that the non-refoulement obligation is in essence a 
negative prohibition guaranteed by positive measures.786  Those measures, it is 
argued, should be directed at reducing the risk of refoulement to the greatest extent 
possible.  States should employ those legislative, judicial and administrative measures 
that best reduce the risk of refoulement by ensuring the effective and practical 
enjoyment of those substantive and procedural requirements that are recognized as 
constituting a fair and effective asylum process.787   
A central observation of this thesis, based on an historical analysis of the development 
of asylum policies in a number of states, is that practical enjoyment of those 
requirements will be best assured by well-resourced administrative procedures 
guaranteed by statutory rights, e.g. a statutory right to legal assistance or to reasons 
for a decision refusing asylum status.  A further requirement is that those statutory 
rights and procedures must be capable of enforcement in a court of law.   
                                                          
785 Art 3 of the CAT contains an express prohibition against the expulsion, return or extradition of a 
person to a place where they would be in danger of being subject to torture: Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 
December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987).  The ICCPR contains an implied 
prohibition against the expulsion or return of a person to a territory where they face a real risk of 
irreparable harm, such as a threat to the right to life (art 6) or torture or other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment (art 7): UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 20: 
Article 7 (Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), UN 
Doc HRI/ GEN/1/Rev.7, 10 March 1992, [9]; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31: 
Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, [12]; ARJ v Australia (Communication No. 692/1996, 11 
August 1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996), [6.8]-[6.9]; R (on the application of Ullah) v Special 
Adjudicator [2004] All ER 153, [21]-[24] (Lord Bingham). 
786  See, above n 396 -  and accompanying text. 
787 The UNHCR has identified certain core processing requirements, including: a right of review 
before an independent body, a right to legal assistance and representation, access to independent 
interpreters, a personal interview, an opportunity to present a case, reasons for the decision, and 
consideration of whether any claim to protection is warranted under the ICCPR or other rights 
instrument: UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 
May 2001, [43], [50].  See, above n 464 -  and accompanying text. 
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In addition, the duty to ensure the effectiveness of the non-refoulement obligation 
means that a state cannot avoid its obligation not to refoule by attaching a legal 
designation to a place or person.  Domestic categorizations will not change the nature 
and scope of the state’s obligations under international law to an individual falling 
within its jurisdiction.788  Thus, Australia’s creation of ‘excised areas’ as part of its 
extraterritorial processing scheme cannot circumvent its international obligations. 
The duty to ensure the effectiveness of the non-refoulement obligation also demands 
its extraterritorial operation, which is of crucial concern in the context of 
extraterritorial processing schemes.789  These, by definition, operate outside the 
territory of the state responsible for the interception and transfer of asylum seekers.  
Although the US Supreme Court in Sale v Haitian Centers Council held that the non-
refoulement obligation only applies to a refugee in the territory or territorial waters of 
a state,790 the better view as expressed by the UNHCR’s amicus brief in Sale791 and by 
leading commentators,792 is that the non-refoulement obligation applies wherever a 
state acts.793   
A compelling argument in favour of this construction is the fact that art 33 of the 
Refugee Convention, unlike other obligations found in the Convention, is not subject 
to any requirement of territorial attachment.  The extraterritorial application of art 33, 
                                                          
788 Goodwin-Gill, above n 7, 89. 
789 See above n 660 – and accompanying text. 
790 Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc, 509 US 155, 163, 179-187, 113 S Ct 2549, 125 L Ed 2d 128 
(1993).  See also: Haitian Refugee Center, Inc  v Gracey, 809 F 2d 794, 841 (DC Cir 1987). 
791 Reproduced at 6 IJRL 85 (1994), 100-02.  See also: UNHCR, above n 661.  
792 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 117, 244-53; Hathaway, above n 1, 335-342; Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem, above n 662, [67]. 
793 When considering the US Haitian interdiction scheme, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights expressly endorsed the UNHCR’s position that the non-refoulement obligation applied 
extraterritorially - rejecting the approach of the US Supreme Court in Sale:  Haitian Interdiction, Case 




as well as the non-refoulement obligations under other rights instruments, is also 
consistent with the views and decisions of international and regional human rights 
bodies recognizing a state's responsibility for violations of rights wherever individuals 
are under their jurisdiction and control.794   
C Access to the courts, non-discrimination, non-penalization   
Other relevant obligations include access to the courts, the obligation not to 
discriminate between refugees, and the obligation not to penalize refugees due to their 
mode of arrival.  Article 16(1) of the Refugee Convention and article 14 of the ICCPR 
ensure that asylum seekers have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all 
contracting states, including legal representation, interpretation and translation 
facilities, waiver of costs and fees, and due process.795  Article 16(1) is not limited to 
private civil law proceedings, but recognizes the right of refugees to enforce their 
rights under the Refugee Convention in the courts of any contracting state.796   
When article 16(1) is read together with article 14 of the ICCPR it guarantees asylum 
seekers a right of judicial appeal to challenge the legality of a decision determining 
their entitlement to protection.797  Judicial oversight of the asylum process strengthens 
compliance with the Refugee Convention ‘by establishing, through considered 
interpretation of the Convention’s terms, the parameters of [a state’s] international 
                                                          
794 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31: the Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, [10] 
and the cases discussed in Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 662, 110-111 and UNHCR, Advisory 
Opinion, above n 661, 16-18.   
795 UNHCR, Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Inquiry into 
the Migration Litigation Reform Bill 2005, [6]. 
796 Hathaway, above n 1, 644-647.  
797 Ibid 647-656.  
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obligations.’798  Similarly, the procedural safeguards elaborated by the courts enhance 
and help ensure the fairness of asylum processes.799    
The non-discrimination provision also requires that states provide all asylum seekers 
with access to the same protection measures.  The non-discrimination provision in art 
3 of the Refugee Convention applies to procedural matters not expressly dealt with in 
the Convention if it can be shown that the lesser standards heighten the risk of 
rejection.800  When read in light of the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose, art 3 
affirms the principle of non-discrimination in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights801 and therefore should be read together with article 26 of the ICCPR.802  Read 
together, article 3 and article 26 prohibit discrimination in law or in fact in any field 
regulated and protected by public authorities,803 including arguably the discriminatory 
application of different processing standards between asylum seekers.   
Furthermore, denying asylum seekers access to statutory or judicial protection 
measures because they arrive without authorization will amount to an imposition of 
penalties in contravention of art 31 of the Refugee Convention.804  This is reading 
‘penalties’ in art 31 in a way that ‘takes into account the [humanitarian] object and 
                                                          
798 UNHCR, 2005 Reform Bill submission, above n 795, [8]. 
799 Ibid. 
800 Hathaway, above n 1, 252-253. 
801 Grahl-Madsen, above n 10,  8. 
802 Hathaway, above n 1, 257. 
803 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 18: Non-discrimination (1989), UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, 12 May 2004, [12]; Hathaway, above n 1, 254. 
804 UNHCR, above n 584, [25].   
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purpose of the [Refugee Convention], as well as the interpretation of the term 
‘penalties’ incorporated in other human rights treaties.’805 
D Safe third country safeguards 
Extraterritorial processing schemes also trigger a discussion of safe third country 
safeguards designed to protect asylum seekers transferred between states.  While 
transfer to a safe third country is not prohibited under the Refugee Convention or 
related rights instruments, the transferring state must take steps to ensure that an 
asylum seeker transferred to another state will in practice not be deprived of the rights 
found in the Convention and cognate rights instruments.  This includes all art 2-34 
rights in the Refugee Convention.806  The transferring state must also ensure the 
satisfaction of its obligations under other rights instruments.807   
The reason for this requirement is that refugees transferred to a third state have come 
under the jurisdiction of a state party and hence have acquired a number of core rights 
under the Convention, including the right to access the courts to remedy a denial of a 
right.808  States should therefore assess whether transfer to a third country deprives a 
refugee of a right under the Convention, including a means of enforcing that right.809  
This assessment should include whether the third state offers an equivalent or 
comparative level of processing of asylum claims.  This necessitates not only an 
assessment of that jurisdiction’s interpretation of the refugee definition, but also a 
                                                          
805 G Goodwin-Gill, ‘Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: non-
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in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 185, 189, 209. 
806 Hathaway, above n 1, 331-2. 
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practical appraisal of the effectiveness of legislative, judicial and administrative 
measures that constitute the asylum process in that country.  States should not transfer 
a person to a third state where the risk of refoulement is increased due to the lack or 
weakness of such measures.  Australia’s transfer of asylum seekers to Nauru and the 
US transfer of asylum seekers to Caribbean states for processing raise the question 
whether states have taken adequate steps to protect against such a deprivation of 
rights.    
In light of these obligations, the next two sections of this article examine the operation 
of the US and Australian extraterritorial processing schemes.  As a necessary starting 
point, section III considers the protection of asylum seekers during the interdiction 
and transfer processes, which are the precursor to the processing of claims outside the 
territory of the interdicting or intercepting state. 
III FAILURE OF PROTECTION DURING THE INTERDICTION AND 
TRANSFER PROCESSES 
A preliminary component of extraterritorial processing schemes is the interdiction or 
interception of asylum seekers and their transfer to a third country.  Contrary to their 
international obligations, the following discussion highlights that in order to deter 
future arrivals the US and Australian governments have sought to assert exclusive 
executive discretion over the interdiction and transfer of asylum seekers so as to 
exclude access to statutory and judicial safeguards that enable asylum seekers to 
enforce and enjoy their right to a fair and effective asylum process.   
A Obstruction and deterrence 
  
207
The US extraterritorial processing scheme has its roots in the interdiction of Haitian 
asylum seekers under a 1981 bilateral agreement between the US and Haiti.810  
Haitian asylum seekers were interdicted on the high seas, subject to a rudimentary 
screening process on the high seas to determine whether they should be given access 
to the statutory asylum process on the mainland, and then either brought to the 
mainland or repatriated directly to Haiti depending on the outcome of the screening 
process.811  
The various guises of the US extraterritorial processing scheme since that time have 
retained the basic deterrence objective of its early policy.  It is clear from the policy 
pronouncements of the day that the objective of interdiction and screening on the high 
seas was to prevent and deter unauthorized asylum seekers from gaining direct access 
to the statutory and judicial processes offered on the US mainland.812  As observed by 
Justice Stevens in the US Supreme Court, ‘the interdiction program … has prevented 
[asylum seekers] … from reaching our shores and invoking … [statutory] 
protections.’813   
Similarly, the Australian Government’s extraterritorial processing scheme, which 
operated between 2001 and February 2008, and which witnessed the transfer of over 
1600 asylum seekers to the Republic of Nauru and Papua New Guinea for processing, 
was also promoted as a deterrent to future unauthorized asylum seekers because it 
                                                          
810 Haiti-US, Migrants-Interdiction, TIAS No 10241, 33 UST 3559 (23 September 1981); President 
Proclamation No 4865, 46 FR. 48, 107 (29 September 1981); EO 12324, 46 FR 48109 (29 September 
1981) (revoked by EO 12807, 57 FR 23134 (24 May 1992)). 
811 Ibid; Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc, 509 US 155, 161-2, 113 S Ct 2549, 125 L Ed 2d 128 
(1993). 
812 66 No 23 Interpreter Releases 649 (19 June 1989), 650 (‘James L. Buck, INS Deputy 
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denied asylum seekers direct access to the onshore refugee determination process.814  
The same deterrence objective drove the British and Danish governments’ proposals 
in 2003 and 2004 to instigate an EU extraterritorial processing scheme in line with the 
US and Australian ‘models’.815   
The symmetry between the deterrence objectives of the US, Australian, UK and 
Danish examples derives from the contemporary and historical influence of the US 
scheme.  An informal arrangement entered into in April 2007 between the US and 
Australian governments to exchange asylum seekers held at each other’s EPCs 
signalled the depth of similarities between the two operations.816  Furthermore, while 
the UK and Danish proposals are generally traced back to similar proposals put 
forward in the mid-1990s,817 the genesis of the UK’s robust support for extraterritorial 
processing can also be traced to its 1994 agreement to permit the US to establish an 
EPC in the Turks and Caicos Islands, a UK dependency.818  The similarity between 
proposals in the EU context and the Australian and US schemes is explored further in 
section 5. 
B Exclusive government discretion as a means of controlling access 
In line with the deterrence objective, both the US and Australian governments have 
insisted on asserting their exclusive executive discretion to determine whether an 
interdictee may access onshore asylum procedures.  In the 1980s, the US Government 
                                                          
814 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001, Explanatory Memorandum, 2;  
Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006, Explanatory Memorandum, [21]. 
815 Noll, above n 582, 304, 320, 324, 329; UK Government, New Vision for Refugees, March 2003, 
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816 Commonwealth of Australia, Official Committee Hansard, Senate, Standing Committee on Legal 
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asserted its exclusive discretion to determine access to the onshore asylum process 
through screening on the high seas.819  This was made possible by a Presidential 
Executive Order that authorized the Attorney-General to exercise sole discretion as to 
the manner in which the US would satisfy its international obligations, including 
whether interdictees were to have access to the onshore asylum process.820  Before the 
courts, the US Government successfully resisted challenges to its exclusive authority 
to determine whether an interdicted asylum seeker was permitted access to in-country 
processes.821    
The decision to screen asylum seekers at Guantanamo Bay following increases in the 
number of illegal boats from Haiti in the early 1990s822 ensured that the deterrence 
objective of the US interdiction policy remained intact by preventing direct access to 
the mainland asylum process.823  The use of Guantanamo Naval Base for screening 
was an ‘administrative convenience’ designed to bolster an overburdened system of 
extraterritorial screening on the high seas.824  As with the screening process on the 
high seas, only asylum seekers who satisfied the ‘threshold standard’ for protection 
                                                          
819 Haiti-US, Migrants-Interdiction, TIAS No 10241, 33 UST 3559 (23 September 1981); President 
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were to be brought to the US so that they could file an application for asylum under 
US statute.825  
In a similar way, the Australian Government asserted its exclusive discretion over 
interdiction as a means of controlling access to the onshore asylum process.826  It 
entrenched this authority by attaching legal designations to places and persons that 
assigned certain asylum seekers fewer rights than others.827  As illustrated further 
below, this component of the Australian scheme seeks to circumvent international 
obligations by domestic categorisations.  In doing so, it ignores the general principle 
of international law that imposes state responsibility for all individuals falling within a 
state’s jurisdiction.828 
Thus, new provisions introduced in 2001 at the commencement of the Australian 
scheme gave the executive government wide powers of interception, detention, 
removal and expulsion largely free from substantive statutory conditions or judicial 
interference.829  The Immigration Minister also was granted the exclusive discretion to 
decide whether an intercepted asylum seeker was granted access to the in-country 
statutory asylum processes830 or instead faced transfer to an EPC situated in a third 
country.831  The amendments furthermore included a bar on legal proceedings 
                                                          
825 Haitian Centers Council, Inc v McNary, 969 F 2d 1326, 1335 (2nd Cir 1992). 
826 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491.   
827 The legislation prohibits an ‘offshore entry person’ (a non-citizen arriving at an ‘excised offshore 
place’ without a valid visa) from making a valid application for a visa unless the Minister determines 
that it is in the public interest that such a person should be able to make a valid visa application: 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 46A(1), (2), s 5(1).  Since 2005, an ‘excised offshore place’ includes all 
islands north of Carnarvon, Mackay and Darwin, i.e. all islands off Australia’s vast northern coastline: 
Migration Amendment Regulations 2005 (No 6) SLI 171.          
828 Goodwin-Gill, above n 7, 89. 
829 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 189(3), (4), s 198A(1)-(3), s 245F(9), (9A), (9B), s 245FA, s 245FB, s 
7A.   
830 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 46A(1), (2), s 5(1).   
831 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 198A(1), (2), (3). 
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challenging the exercise of powers in relation to asylum seekers intercepted under the 
provisions.832   
At the time of writing, the 2001 amendments remain in force.  However, as discussed 
further in section V, there is cause for their repeal following the Australian 
Government’s recent disbandment of its offshore processing policy.  
C No fair and effective protection determination before direct repatriation to country 
of origin 
The exclusivity of executive authority under the US interdiction scheme resulted in 
rudimentary asylum screening on the high seas during the 1980s that failed to satisfy 
the US’s international obligations.  Under the 1981 Haiti-US agreement, which 
expressed the US Government’s intention not to return Haitians who were found to be 
refugees,833 immigration officials assigned to Coast Guard vessels were merely 
instructed to be ‘watchful’ for any indication that a passenger on an interdicted vessel 
may qualify for refugee status.834  If the official discerned an indication, an additional 
interview was held.  If the interviewee indicated bona fide claims to refugee status, 
then the official was required to take the person to the US to present his or her 
claim.835   
Screening on the high seas, which effectively supplanted the onshore asylum process, 
failed to satisfy the requirements of a fair and effective determination process.  
                                                          
832 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 494AA. 
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Contrary to those requirements,836 there was no right of review before an independent 
body, no right to legal assistance and representation, no opportunity to present a case, 
and no reasons given for the decision to deny access to the onshore asylum process.  
There was also no right of judicial appeal to challenge the legality of the decision.837 
The critical shortcomings in the process was reflected by the fact that of the 1800 or 
more Haitians interdicted from 1981 to 1986 the Government reported that none had 
presented a bona fide claim to refugee status.838  All were returned directly to Haiti 
with no opportunity to seek a review of their decision.839  Denying interdicted 
Haitians access to the rights, processes and remedies available to asylum seekers on 
the US mainland840 was clearly discriminatory,841 imposed a penalty on Haitians due 
to the unauthorized mode of their arrival contrary to art 31(1) of the Refugee 
Convention, breached the right to resort to the courts,842 and substantially increased 
the risk of refoulement.843   
                                                          
836 UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001, 
[50]. 
837 Haitian Refugee Center, Inc v Gracey, 600 F Supp 1396 (DDC 1985); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc 
v Gracey, 809 F 2d 794 (DCCir 1987). 
838 Haitian Refugee Center, Inc v Gracey, 809 F 2d 794, 797 (DC Cir 1987). 
839 Ibid. 
840 Haitian Refugee Center, Inc v Gracey, 600 F Supp 1396 (DDC 1985); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc 
v Gracey, 809 F 2d 794 (DCCir 1987). 
841 Refugee Convention, art 3; ICCPR, art 26; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
art II.  Haitian Interdiction, Case 10.675, Report No 51/96 [United States], IACHR 1996 Annual 
Report 550 (March 13, 1997), ¶ ¶ 183-188, [177].  See generally, Legomsky, above n 587, 693. 
842 Refugee Convention, art 16; ICCPR, art 14; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man, art XVIII.  Haitian Interdiction, Case 10.675, Report No 51/96 [United States], IACHR 1996 
Annual Report 550 (March 13, 1997), ¶ ¶ 183-188, [180] (the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights found that the Haitian interdictees ‘were unable to resort to the courts in the United States to 
vindicate their rights because they were summarily interdicted and repatriated to Haiti without being 
given an opportunity to exercise their rights’). 
843 Haitian Interdiction, Case 10.675, Report No 51/96 [United States], IACHR 1996 Annual Report 
550 (March 13, 1997), ¶ ¶ 183-188, [168]. 
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In 1992, screening was done away with altogether.  In that year, President Bush 
authorized the direct repatriation without screening of Haitian asylum seekers.844  The 
Clinton Administration continued the policy of direct repatriations without screening, 
arguing successfully before the US Supreme Court in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 
Inc that neither international law nor domestic law placed any limit on the President’s 
authority to repatriate without hearings aliens interdicted beyond US territorial 
waters.845   
The Government’s argument in Sale contradicted the Government’s earlier (and later) 
policy of extraterritorial screening for asylum claims.  In particular, given the Clinton 
Administration’s subsequent acceptance of its obligation to process the asylum claims 
of those interdictees it transferred to a third country under bilateral agreements,846 the 
Government’s argument in Sale appears less like a statement of principle, and more 
like a convenient and strategic move to bolster its own discretion to deal with 
interdictees independent of statutory or judicial constraints. 
In pursuing this line, the US Government also went against the widely accepted view 
that the non-refoulement obligation has extraterritorial operation, noted in section 2 
above.847  Most importantly, the extraterritorial reach of the non-refoulement 
obligation is required by an interpretation and application of the Refugee Convention 
that guarantees its overall effectiveness as an instrument intended to assure to 
                                                          
844 EO 12807, 57 FR 23134 (24 May 1992) (as amended by EO 13286, 68 FR 10619  (28 February 
2003)). 
845 Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc, 509 US 155, 113 S Ct 2549, 125 L Ed 2d 128 (1993). 
846 Turks and Caicos Islands agreement, above n 771, art II.1 (iii); US-Jamaica agreement, above n 
771, art 3(A). 
847 UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, above n 661; Hathaway, above n 1, 335-342; Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem, above n 662, [67]; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 117, 244-53. 
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refugees the widest possible exercise of their rights.848  The US Government’s 
exercise of its extraterritorial executive authority while denying any obligations 
attaching to its actions, contravened its overarching obligation to ensure the effective 
operation of the non-refoulement obligation.  
In further contravention of its non-refoulement obligation, US officials extended the 
automatic repatriation policy to aliens interdicted within US territorial waters as a 
matter of policy.849  The direct return policy ended only when Haiti’s president-in-
exile, President Aristide, announced his intention to abrogate the 1981 readmission 
agreement in light of the practice.850  The Clinton Administration subsequently 
announced in May 1994 that it would grant interviews at sea on board naval vessels to 
interdicted Haitians.851   
D Lack of safeguards before transfer to a third country under the US scheme 
Following the change in policy, the US Government began using EPCs situated in 
other third countries in the Caribbean.  In the mid-1990s, the Clinton Administration 
concluded an agreement with Jamaica that allowed the US Government to anchor a 
ship in Kingston Harbor in order to process interdicted Haitians.852  At the same time, 
the US Government also entered an agreement with the UK and its dependency, the 
                                                          
848 EXCOM, ‘Interception of Asylum-seekers and Refugees: the International Framework and 
Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach,’ UN Doc EC/50/SC/CRP.17, 9 June 2000, 
reproduced at 12 IJRL 488 (2000), 494.  
849 71 No 11 Interpreter Releases 381 (21 March 1994). 
850 71 No 14 Interpreter Releases 481 (25 April 1994). 
851 71 No 18 Interpreter Releases 627 (9 May 1994). 
852 US-Jamaica agreement, above n 771, arts 3(A), 4 and 5. 
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Turks and Caicos Islands, permitting the US Government to establish and operate an 
EPC on Grand Turk Island.853 
Yet despite clear international standards for the protection of asylum seekers 
transferred to third countries, the US Government failed to provide any protection 
safeguards to asylum seekers before their transfer to EPCs.  In particular, there was no 
good faith empirical assessment of whether transferees would in practice enjoy the 
rights found in the Refugee Convention and related rights instruments in the third 
country.854  This included no individualized assessment of whether it was safe to 
transfer an asylum seeker to the third country, which commentators regard as an 
essential safeguard under safe third country practices.855  As a result, there was no 
assessment of whether the third country was likely to provide a fair and effective 
asylum process. 
Presumably, the US Government considered that providing interdictees with a right to 
an individualized assessment of whether a third country was ‘safe’ before transfer 
would create direct access to statutory and judicial processes that interdiction and 
offshore processing were designed to circumvent.  Yet this position turns a blind eye 
to the lower processing standards enjoyed by asylum seekers processed at EPCs, 
identified in section IV below.  It also failed to apply (perhaps intentionally in light of 
the poor processing standards at EPCs) protection criteria for third countries that 
                                                          
853 Turks and Caicos Islands agreement, above n 771, art II.1(i); United Kingdom, Hansard, House of 
Commons, Written Answers to Questions, 20 June 1994, Column 10. 
854 Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere, above n 807, 2. 
855 UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001, 
[13]-[14]; S Legomsky, ‘Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third 
Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection’ 15 IJRL 567 (2003), 669-672;  A Shacknove and R 
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185-228, 217;  S Taylor, ‘Protection Elsewhere/Nowhere’ 18 IJRL 283 (2006), 292-293;  P Mathew, 
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emerged soon after in the US safe third country provision, especially its requirement 
that a third country provide a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to 
asylum.856 
The shortcomings in the US Haitian interdiction scheme were exposed by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights in the Haitian Interdiction Case.857  The 
Commission found the US Haitian interdiction policy in violation of art I of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in relation to those ‘unnamed 
Haitian refugees identified by the petitioners in its submissions who were interdicted 
by the United States, repatriated to Haiti, and later lost their lives after being 
identified as “repatriates”’.858  In reaching this conclusion, the Commission followed 
the international jurisprudence recognizing that a state who sends a person within its 
jurisdiction to another state where there is a real risk that his or her rights will be 
violated, that state is in violation of the relevant right (the implied non-refoulement 
obligation).859  The Commission further found interdiction to amount to a breach of 
the following rights: the right to liberty, the right to security of person, the right to 
equality before the law, the right to resort to the courts, and the right to seek and 
receive asylum.860 
E No individual assessment of ‘safety’ of third country – Australia’s exterritorial 
processing regime 
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The Australian scheme also did not provide for any individualized assessments of 
whether Nauru or Papua New Guinea were in fact ‘safe’, instead relying on a veneer 
of ineffectual safeguards.  The Australian Government introduced these safeguards 
into legislation at the outset of the offshore processing scheme in 2001.861  From their 
form, it is clear that they owe their origins specifically to safe third country provisions 
introduced in response to the arrival of Sino-Vietnamese refugees from China in the 
early 1990s.862   As a consequence, the 2001 amendments inherited a number of 
defects evident in the earlier safe third country provisions, including that they fail to 
guarantee a case-by-case consideration of whether the state hosting the EPC (Nauru or 
Papua New Guinea) is ‘safe’ for the individual asylum seeker.863 
As noted above in section III.B, the 2001 amendments prevent an asylum seeker 
arriving without a valid visa on islands off Australia’s northern coastline from making 
a valid application for a visa, including a protection (refugee) visa.864  By denying 
access to individualized determination of protection entitlements status, including 
eventual Ministerial consideration of claims to protection under the ICCPR and the 
CAT, the 2001 amendments effectively denied the only opportunity for case-by-case 
consideration of whether Nauru or Papua New Guinea was ‘safe’. 
                                                          
861 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth); Migration Amendment 
(Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth). 
862 Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 4) 1994 (Cth); Memorandum of Understanding between 
Australia and PRC (dated 25 January 1995).   
863 The earlier safe country provisions stymied an individualized assessment of whether China was a 
‘safe’ country for a Sino-Vietnamese asylum seeker by stipulating that any unlawful non-citizen who 
comes from a safe third country is not permitted to apply for a protection visa: Migration Legislation 
Amendment Act (No 4) 1994 (Cth), Schedule 1; Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 91E.  Instead, the safe 
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In addition, like the earlier safe third country provisions, a Ministerial designation that 
a third country is ‘safe’ replaces the provisions that seek to implement Australia’s 
non-refoulement obligations through an individualized asylum process.865  The 
Immigration Minister may declare that a third country is a country to which an 
intercepted asylum seeker866 may be removed.867  Once the Minister makes the 
declaration, the legislation confers wide powers on Australian officials to take an 
intercepted asylum seeker to such a country free of any duty to consider individual 
claims to protection, including whether it is in fact safe to transfer them to that 
country.868   
Once again, the essential reason for the lack of an individualized assessment before 
transfer under the Australian regime would appear to be the scheme’s deterrence 
rationale.  Given that the Australian Government promoted extraterritorial processing 
on the basis that it deterred future asylum seekers by denying access to Australia’s 
onshore asylum process,869 legislating for an individualized assessment before transfer 
would presumably have undermined this objective.  In this way, the deterrence 
objective led to a failure to implement effectively a key protection safeguard.  
F Problems with the Ministerial declarations of ‘safety’ – Australia   
To make matters worse, the Ministerial declaration that Nauru and Papua New Guinea 
were ‘safe’ was inherently unreliable.  The 2001 amendments facilitating Australia’s 
                                                          
865 Ibid s 36, s 417.  
866 Referred to as an ‘offshore entry person’: Ibid s 198A(1), (3), s 5(1). 
867 Ibid s 198A(1), (3). 
868 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 198A(1), (2). 
869 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001, Explanatory Memorandum, 2; 
Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006, Explanatory Memorandum, [21].  
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offshore processing scheme set out statutory criteria for a declared country.870  
Specifically, the criteria include that the declared country provides access to effective 
procedures for assessing protection, and provides protection, including the meeting of 
human rights standards, during the determination process and up to voluntary 
repatriation or resettlement.871   
In safe third country cases generally, if a declaration of ‘safety’ is to be of any utility 
the Minister responsible for making the designation must make an empirical 
assessment of whether a third country in practice complies with criteria for a safe 
third country.  This requires that the Minister go further than simply ticking off that 
the third country complies with formal criteria, eg whether a third country is a party to 
the Refugee Convention.872  Importantly, the Minister must be satisfied that the third 
country implements ‘appropriate asylum procedures and systems fairly.’873  Failure to 
do so increases the risk of refoulement.874  The Minister should therefore assess the 
third country’s actual practices, decision-making procedures, and court judgments.875    
In addition, the Minister’s assessment must also be objective.  Commentators have 
long observed that safe third country provisions, which rely on a ministerial 
declaration of safety, run an increased risk of being subject to foreign policy 
considerations876 or overrun by the objective of maintaining immigration control.877  
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The state’s elaboration of formal safe country criteria does not itself lessen the risk 
that political considerations will outweigh protection obligations.878  Thus, the 
Ministerial investigation must not only be empirical, but also immune to arbitrary 
factors that might influence his or her decision that a country complies with safe third 
country criteria. 
A fundamental problem, however, with the Australian scheme was that the Minister’s 
use of the declaration power was tainted by the fact of the Australian Government’s 
delivery of substandard processing at EPCs, as noted in section IV below.  The 
declaration was further tainted by the fact that the Australian Government’s 
processing of claims on Nauru and Papua New Guinea largely formed the basis for 
the satisfaction of the criteria for the Ministerial declaration.  In the case of Nauru, for 
instance, it is not a party to the Refugee Convention879 and lacks asylum procedures 
of its own. 
The Australian Government acknowledged, not surprisingly, that the ‘[p]ractical 
arrangements in place in Offshore Processing Centres supported by agreements with 
relevant host country Governments provide the basis for the Minister’s declaration of 
a country’.880  The Minister’s decision not to revoke the declarations was in effect 
justified by an ongoing favourable assessment of ‘the effectiveness of these 
arrangements for ensuring protection and access to durable solutions for persons 
found to be refugees.’881  When making or allowing the continuation of the 
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declarations, the Minister was therefore assessing the effectiveness of the ‘practical 
arrangements’ that his or her department designed and implemented at the EPCs on 
Nauru and Papua New Guinea.   
This was hardly an assessment likely to inspire confidence in the objectivity of the 
Minister.  As discussed in section 4 below, the Australian Government’s deliberate 
use of extraterritorial processing as a deterrent also saw substandard processing at 
EPCs.  An asylum seeker transferred to an EPC was therefore entitled to be sceptical 
concerning the degree of ministerial scrutiny of processing standards prior to the 
making of a declaration.  Consider, for instance, that the then Immigration Minister 
designated Nauru a safe country 13 days after asylum seekers were first sent there in 
September 2001.882   
The obscurity of the offshore arrangements also did not inspire confidence that the 
Minister based an ongoing declaration on country information that was accessible and 
verifiable.883  Lastly, Nauru’s assurance not to refoule asylum seekers transferred 
under its earlier agreements with Australia884 was of doubtful efficacy because it was 
necessarily based on Australia’s processing arrangements.  Perhaps in recognition of 
this fact there is no such assurance in the 2005 agreement between Australia and 
Nauru.885  As a result of these factors, the Australian Government’s objective of 
                                                          
882 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the Migration Amendment 
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sanctioning its extraterritorial processing negated any benefits to be derived from the 
Ministerial declaration.  
G No independent review before transfer to an EPC 
Commentators argue that failure to provide for independent review increases the risk 
of arbitrariness and bias in the making of ministerial determinations that a third 
country is ‘safe’.886  They further observe that the number of successful appeals from 
safe third country determinations attest to the fact that the elaboration of formal safe 
country criteria does not substitute for independent and impartial review.887  The 
UNHCR and most observers view an appeal with suspensive effect as an essential 
requirement before transfer in safe third country cases.888  The Michigan Guidelines 
on Protection Elsewhere call for states to accord asylum seekers a right to challenge 
the legality of a proposed transfer in all ‘protection elsewhere’ policies, including 
extraterritorial processing.889   
However, contrary to this requirement, any chance of an appeal against a transfer to a 
third country under the US scheme was negated by the Government’s position that the 
statutory review provisions found in its immigration laws890 did not apply to 
interdicted refugees.891  Furthermore, as already noted, interdictees were unable to 
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seek judicial review based on a breach of the Refugee Convention following the US 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sale, which, it is submitted, incorrectly upheld the 
Government’s argument that the Refugee Convention does not apply 
extraterritorially.892   
In comparison, the Australian Government frustrated independent review of the 
decisions leading up to and including transfer to an EPC by exploiting the ‘fault line’ 
between executive discretion and judicial review under the Australian Constitution.  
First, the Australian Government framed the Minister’s discretion to permit an 
intercepted asylum seeker to apply for a visa in such a way that no court can order 
him or her to exercise it.893  Put simply, Australian courts can only order a 
government officer to do what the law demands of him or her.894  The 2001 
amendments stipulate that the Minister is under no duty even to consider whether to 
exercise his or her discretion to permit offshore entry persons to apply for a visa.895   
As a result, the courts cannot order the Minister to consider exercising his or her 
discretion to permit an asylum seeker to apply for a visa, including a protection 
(refugee) visa.  Second, the declaration power is subject to a bar on legal 
proceedings.896  The declaration power is also expressed in general terms that have 
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posed difficulties for an Australian court reviewing the Minister’s declaration that a 
third country satisfies the criteria.897   
Third, the final act of removal or transfer to the declared country under the Australian 
scheme is framed in such a way that it does not attract judicial scrutiny.898  The 
normal statutory removal powers under the Australian legislation assume, sometimes 
wrongly, that an asylum seeker has had the opportunity to apply for a visa and 
consequently gone through the onshore refugee determination process.899  The 
reasoning that follows is that an officer exercising the normal removal powers does 
not need to take into account whether removal will result in refoulement because the 
asylum seeker has been determined not to require Australia’s protection.900   Applying 
this reasoning, the powers introduced in 2001 that authorize removal to a third 
country for processing follow on from the Minister’s declaration.  Because there is no 
judicial review of the Ministerial declaration, there is little or no opportunity to seek 
judicial scrutiny of the ensuing power to remove an asylum seeker to an EPC.   
H Summary: failure to provide protection during interdiction and transfer 
Collectively, these elements of the US and Australian schemes indicate the deliberate 
construction of laws and policies designed to entrench exclusive government authority 
over interdiction and transfer as a way of preventing and deterring asylum seekers 
from gaining direct access to in-country statutory and judicial protection measures.  In 
doing so, governments effectively remove key safeguards designed to protect against 
refoulement, including access to the courts, while also penalizing asylum seekers 
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because of the mode of their arrival.  In the case of the US interdiction, there is also 
clear discrimination against Haitian refugees.   
The obstructionist and deterrence rationale of extraterritorial processing schemes has 
also undermined states’ compliance with their obligation to ensure access to a fair and 
effective asylum process after transfer.  This is evident from the substandard 
processing standards – characterized by a dearth of legislative or judicial mechanisms 
to guarantee the enforceability and enjoyment of a fair asylum hearing - provided at 
EPCs operated by the US and Australia respectively, discussed in the next section. 
IV THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE A FULL AND FAIR ASYLUM 
PROCESS AT EPCS 
This section identifies that the Australian and US governments put in place asylum 
procedures at their EPCs that were of a lower standard than those offered within 
Australia and the US respectively.  In particular, as with the interdiction and transfer 
processes that brought asylum seekers to EPCs, the processes for determining their 
entitlement to protection at such centres were deliberately isolated from legal and 
institutional safeguards either in the territory of the intercepting state or in the third 
country.    
A State responsibility 
A preliminary issue is the state responsibility of the US and Australia for asylum 
processing at EPCs situated within third countries.  As observed in chapter 5 and in 
section II.B above, a state retains responsibility for violations of rights wherever 
individuals are under their jurisdiction and control.901  In third country transfers, the 
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transferring state’s protection obligations under the Refugee Convention engage 
irrespective of the fact that protection can be sought ‘elsewhere’902 and regardless of 
bilateral agreements seeking to delegate, assign or transfer responsibility to another 
country.903   Extraterritorial processing will not divest the intercepting state of its 
responsibility under the Refugee Convention until a durable solution is found.904    
The jurisdiction and control of the US and Australian governments over the 
processing of asylum claims at EPCs clearly supports the continued engagement of 
their protection obligations.  Most clearly, the US exercises effective control over 
Guantanamo Bay.  While remaining under the ‘ultimate sovereignty’ of Cuba, the 
obvious truth as stated by Justice Kennedy in concurrence in Rasul v. Bush is that 
‘Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory.’905  As a 
result, ‘[a]t Guantanamo, the United States is accountable only to itself.’906  The 
extent of US Government authority over asylum seekers is plainly evident from the 
fact that the US, and not Cuba, entered into recent agreements with Canada907 and 
Australia908 for the resettlement of refugees from Guantanamo. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the cases discussed in Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 662, 110-111; UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, 
above n 661, 16-18. 
902 UNHCR, Considerations on the “Safe Third Country” Concept, EU Seminar on the Associated 
States as Safe Third Countries in Asylum Legislation, Vienna, 8-11 July 1996, 2; UNHCR Position on 
Readmission Agreements, ‘Protection Elsewhere’ and Asylum Policy, 1 August 1994, [3]; NAGV v 
Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 222 CLR 161, [79]-[81] (Kirby 
J).  
903 International Law Commission, Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 47, UNGA res. 56/83, UN 
doc A/RES/56/83, annex, 28 January 2002; Hyndman, above n 21, 251-52; Foster, above n 855, 262.  
Cf: Legomsky, above n 855, 620-621 (reaching a similar conclusion, but based on a broader 
‘complicity principle’).   
904 UNHCR, 2002, above n 773, [22]. 
905 Rasul v Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487, 124 S Ct 2686, 159 L Ed 2d 548 (2004). 
906 Neuman, above n 774, 39. 
907 In 2005, the Canadian Government received 14 Haitian refugee resettlement cases from 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, at the request of the US Government pursuant to Article 9 of the Agreement 
between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for 
Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries (signed 5 
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It is clear that despite its argument in Sale, the US Government also accepted that it 
owed obligations to asylum seekers outside its territory when it undertook 
responsibility for asylum processing under agreements with third countries.  The US 
agreement with the UK and its dependency, the Turks and Caicos Islands, gave the 
US Government permission to establish and operate the EPC on Grand Turk Island,909 
and to process interdicted Haitians for refugee status there.910  The US was also 
responsible for a range of other matters, including: resettling or repatriating 
interdictees;911 ensuring ‘security, good order and discipline, health and welfare’ of 
interdicted Haitians;912 and meeting the costs of the EPC.913  
In comparison, under the agreement the Turks and Caicos Islands’s role was to be 
mainly facilitative: providing the site on Grand Turk Island;914 permitting the transit 
of US personnel, vessels and aircraft;915 assisting in obtaining public and private 
utilities;916 and permitting the transit of interdicted Haitians, including their 
repatriation or resettlement following the US determination of their status.917  The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Dec 2002): UNHCR, Monitoring Report, Canada-United States “Safe Third Country” Agreement, 29 
December 2004-28 December 2005, June 2006, 9. 
908 Commonwealth of Australia, Official Committee Hansard, Senate, Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs, Estimates, 21 May 2007, 98-111. 
909 Turks and Caicos Islands agreement, above n 771, art II.1(i); United Kingdom, Hansard, House of 
Commons, Written Answers to Questions, 20 June 1994, Column 10. 
910 Turks and Caicos Islands agreement, above n 771, art II.1 (iii). 
911 Ibid art II.1 (iv)-(v). 
912 Turks and Caicos Islands agreement, above n 771, art II.1 (vi). 
913 Ibid art II.1 (vii). 
914 Turks and Caicos Islands agreement, above n 771, art II.2 (i). 
915 Ibid art II.2 (ii) and (iii). 
916 Turks and Caicos Islands agreement, above n 771, art II.2 (x). 
917 Ibid art II.2 (xii)(b)-(c). 
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UK’s role in the meantime was supervisory at best.918  A similar regime of rights and 
responsibilities existed under the US agreement with Jamaica.919   
The Australian Government also retained a high degree of control over activities at its 
EPCS.  Importantly, in accordance with its agreement with Nauru, Australia 
undertook responsibility for processing.920  In this endeavour, the Australian 
Government received the initial assistance of the UNHCR who processed some 
claims on Nauru.921   Shortly thereafter, due to dissatisfaction with the protection 
standards offered under the scheme, the UNHCR withdrew and distanced itself from 
Australia’s offshore processing.922  Following the UNHCR’s withdrawal, Australian 
officials processed all claims at the EPCs on Nauru.923   
Yet the clearest indication of the degree of continued jurisdiction and control of 
Australia over asylum seekers taken to EPCs on Nauru is again the fact that it was 
Australia, and not Nauru, that recently entered into a bilateral agreement with the US 
to ‘swap’ asylum seekers held at the EPCs at Nauru and Guantanamo Bay.924  This 
agreement reflected the fact that Australia had responsibility for day-to-day 
management of the centres on Nauru (exercised by Australia through the International 
                                                          
918 Turks and Caicos Islands agreement, above n 771, art II.3. 
919 US-Jamaica agreement, above n 771, arts 3(A), 4 and 5. 
920 Australia-Nauru 2005 agreement, above n 581, [3]. The Australian Government quickly mothballed 
the EPC on PNG due to falls in the number of unauthorized arrivals.    
921 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Migration Zone Excision: An examination 
of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002 and related 
matters (October 2002), [5.34] – [5.40]. 
922 UNHCR, above n 584, [24]. 
923 Senate Excision Report, above n 921, [5.34] – [5.40].  
924 Commonwealth of Australia, Official Committee Hansard, Senate, Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs, Estimates, 21 May 2007, 98-111. 
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Organization for Migration),925 security personnel,926 removal after processing,927 
durable solutions,928 and handling of ‘transitory persons’ (persons brought to 
Australia for health care and then returned to Nauru).929   
In the meantime, Nauru’s role was mainly facilitative: permitting the entry and 
temporary residence of asylum seekers in its territory through the issue of a special 
purpose visa to the asylum seekers;930 providing the Facilities’ sites;931 ensuring the 
assistance of Nauru’s Health Service;932 guaranteeing the co-operation of the Nauruan 
                                                          
925 Australia-Nauru 2005 agreement, above n 581, Schedule A.1.  The Australian Government retained 
IOM to maintain the EPCs on Nauru through an exchange of letters: Questions Taken on Notice, 
Budget Estimates Hearing: 22 May 2006, Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Portfolio, (246) 
Output 1.5: Offshore Asylum Seeker Management, 1-2; Mr W Farmer, Secretary, Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Letter to Mr D Nihill, Chief of Mission, 
Regional Office for Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific, International 
Organization for Migration, December 2002, 2; Mr D Nihill, Regional Representative, International 
Organization for Migration, Letter to Mr W Farmer, Secretary, Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 27 February 2003, 1.     
926 Australia-Nauru 2005 agreement, above n 581, Schedule A.6.  As a part of its management role, the 
IOM had a protocol with the Nauru Police Force and the Australian Protective Service that governed 
their roles and responsibilities in respect of the security at the EPCs: Protocol Between the Nauru 
Police Force, the International Organization for Migration and the Australian Protective Service dated 
15 October 2001.  IOM had a contract with Chubb Protective Services, a private security firm, to 
provide ‘an escort and safekeeping function’ at the EPC: Mr Martin Studdert, Director, APS, Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Consideration of Additional Estimates, Official 
Committee Hansard (19 February 2002), 303-304.    
927 Australia-Nauru 2005 agreement, above n 581, [3]. The Australian Government engaged IOM to 
deliver ‘management of the Reintegration Package and returns’ of asylum seekers to their countries of 
origin: Farmer, above n 925, 2. 
928 IOM was also engaged to manage resettlement transfers to Australia and other countries: Ibid.   
929 Australia-Nauru 2005 agreement, above n 581, Schedule A.9.  Migration Legislation Amendment 
(Transitional Movement) Act 2002 (Cth), Schedule 1; Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 198A(1A) and s 
198B. 
930 Abbas Al Sayed Mahdi and others v. Director of Police, Steve Hamilton, Manager, IOM, Officer in 
Charge,  Australian Protective Services, Supreme Court of Nauru, Civil Action No. 10/2003 (27 May 
2003), [18] (Connell CJ). 
931 Australia-Nauru 2005 agreement, above n 581, Schedule A.2.   
932 Ibid Schedule A.4. 
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Police Force;933 and issuing visas and assisting in securing accommodation for 
persons travelling to Nauru for the purpose of the management of asylum seekers.934   
B Control as a precondition of denying access to national safeguards 
The remainder of this section identifies that the US and Australian governments’ 
jurisdiction and control over extraterritorial processing, besides evidencing the 
continued engagement of the their protection obligations, also has had significant 
adverse implications for an asylum seeker’s right to a fair and effective asylum 
process in the third country.  In addition, it is argued that the Australian and US 
governments exploited their principal or exclusive control over processing at EPCs in 
third countries in order to circumvent access to effective remedies as required by 
international law.  
At the outset, it must be kept in mind that extraterritorial processing originated in the 
US as an ‘administrative convenience’,935 which sustained the deterrence objective of 
interdiction and screening on the high seas, rather than a principled search for some 
alternative form of protection under the Refugee Convention.  To this end, the US 
Government was sure to assert and retain exclusive authority - outside prescribed 
statutory processes on the mainland - to determine whether an asylum seeker 
processed at Guantanamo met the ‘threshold standard’ for access to the mainland 
asylum process.936  This authority was confirmed by the President’s Executive Order 
                                                          
933 Ibid Schedule A.7. 
934 Ibid Schedule A.10 and A.11. 
935 P Virtue, INS General Counsel, Legal Opinion: INS Authority to Operate an Overseas Facility to 
Maintain Interdicted Aliens, 1 September 1998, reproduced in 76 No. 13 Interpreter Releases 529 (2 
April 1999), Appendix III, 5. 
936 Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc, 509 US 155, 173, 113 S Ct 2549, 125 L Ed 2d 128 (1993).  
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in 2002.937  In this regard, the US Government could also obviously rely on the lack 
of any Cuban statutory or judicial constraints due to its effective control over 
Guantanamo Bay.   
The original administrative control and deterrence ethos of extraterritorial processing 
also became a feature of the US and Australian processing arrangements with third 
countries.  The next part highlights that a result has been substandard asylum 
processing at EPCs largely devoid of any statutory or judicial constraints either in the 
third country or derived from the US and Australia’s respective domestic 
jurisdictions.  As a consequence, both the US and Australian schemes have failed to 
ensure fair and effective asylum processes as required under international law.  
C Failure to provide fair and effective asylum processing at EPCs 
Access to a fair and effective asylum process in the third country is a fundamental 
safe third country safeguard.938  As set out in section II above, a fair and effective 
determination procedure requires: fair decision-making, including access to legal 
representation; an impartial and qualified interpreter; a personal interview based on a 
thorough assessment of the circumstances of each case; an opportunity to present 
evidence of personal circumstances and country of origin information; a reasoned, 
written decision deciding the claim; and review by an independent body.  In 
accordance with art 16(1) of the Refugee Convention and art 14 of the ICCPR, there 
                                                          
937 Executive Order 13276, issued in 2002, confirmed the authority of the Attorney-General (and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security since 2003) to act extraterritorially in relation to interdicted asylum 
seekers, including exercising authority over their screening: EO 13276, 67 FR 69985 (15 November 
2002) (as amended by EO 13286, 68 FR 10619  (28 February 2003)), s 1(a)(i) and (ii). 
938 UNHCR Position on Readmission Agreements, ‘Protection Elsewhere’ and Asylum Policy, 1 
August 1994, [5]; UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 
31 May 2001, [15]; EXCOM Conclusion No 85 (XLIX) - 1998, [(aa)]; Convention Plus Issues paper 
submitted by UNHCR on Addressing irregular secondary movements of refugees and asylum-seekers, 
FORUM/CG/SM/03, 11 March 2004, [31]; Lisbon Expert Roundtable, Summary Conclusions on the 
Concept of “Effective Protection” in the Context of Secondary Movements of Refugees and Asylum-
Seekers, Lisbon, 9 and 10 December 2002, [15(f)]. 
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should also be access to effective remedies, including a right to challenge the legality 
of the decision in the courts.  
The US agreements with Jamaica and the Turks and Caicos Islands expressed the 
intention to deliver a ‘fair’ hearing and determination as to whether asylum seekers 
qualified for refugee status under the Refugee Convention.939  The agreements and the 
US Government’s public comments at the time relied upon the fact of UNHCR 
involvement, guidance and monitoring to claim that the appropriate international 
processing standards were observed.940  Similarly, despite lacking UNHCR 
endorsement of its scheme,941 the Australian Government likewise asserted that its 
offshore processing standards complied with international standards under the 
Refugee Convention because they were modelled on the ‘refugee determination 
process of the UNHCR’942 – although the UNHCR questioned whether the processes 
on Nauru did in fact meet its guidelines.943 
Despite claiming to implement international or UNHCR standards, it is apparent that 
both the US and Australian schemes failed to satisfy the essential requirements of fair 
and effective processing under the Refugee Convention.  The US administrative 
guidelines for offshore processing, either on the high seas or at Guantanamo Bay, 
                                                          
939 US-Jamaica agreement, above n 771, 2;  Turks and Caicos Islands agreement, above n 771, 1.  See 
also: US-Jamaica agreement, above n 771, art 3A; Turks and Caicos Islands agreement, above n 771, 
art II.1 (ii). 
940 US-Jamaica agreement, above n 771, art 7; Turks and Caicos Islands agreement, above n 771, art 
III.1 (i); Agreement amending the memorandum of understanding of June 18, 1994 (KAV3906), to 
establish in the Turks and Caicos Islands a processing facility to determine the refugee status of boat 
people from Haiti, entered into force July 13, 1994, KAV3949, Temp State Dept No 94-189, Annex, 3; 
Press Briefing by William Gray, Special Advisor to the President on Haiti, 5 July 1994, The American 
Presidency Project.  See also: Establishing the basis for a successful conclusion to the crisis in Haiti, 
US Dept. of State Dispatch, 27 June 1994, 6. 
941 UNHCR, above n 584, [24]. 
942 Onshore Protection Interim Procedures Advice, above n 583, [10]; Migration Amendment 
(Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006, Explanatory Memorandum, 15-16; Senate Designated 
Unauthorised Arrivals Bill Report, above n 883, 43. 
943 UNHCR, above n 584, 6. 
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have typically provided for a rudimentary and purely administrative screening 
process, other than under the policy between 1992 and 1994 when no screening at all 
took place prior to repatriation.944  Under the non-binding screening guidelines, there 
is no right to counsel and no right of appeal from an adverse determination to an 
independent tribunal.945  The US agreements with the Turks and Caicos Islands and 
Jamaica also contained no detailed processing requirements.  US officials or UNHCR 
staff undertook processing946 but without any right of appeal or review other than by a 
US official.947  Despite improvements to the screening that took place on the high 
seas, Congressional hearings highlighted a lack of procedural safeguards aboard the 
US naval processing vessels in Jamaica under the US-Jamaica agreement.948   
Similarly, under Australia’s scheme, in contrast to its onshore asylum process,949 there 
were no statutorily prescribed procedures for the asylum process on Nauru, which 
instead took place predominantly under administrative policy.950   Transferees had no 
right to request legal representation as guaranteed (upon request) to asylum seekers 
granted access to Australia’s onshore refugee determination process.951  Furthermore, 
                                                          
944 69 No 14 Interpreter Releases 449 (13 April 1992); Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc, 509 US 
155, 164, 165, 113 S Ct 2549, 125 L Ed 2d 128 (1993). 
945 Cuban American Bar Assoc v Christopher, 43 F 3d 1412 (11th Cir 1995), cert denied, 515 US 
1142, 115 S Ct 2578, 132 L Ed 2d 828 (1995), Haitian Refugee Center, Inc v Baker, 953 F 2d 1498 
(11th Cir 1992), cf Haitian Centers Council, Inc v McNary, 969 F 2d 1326 (2nd Cir 1992), vacated as 
moot sub nom Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc, 509 US 918, 113 S Ct 3028, 125 L Ed 2d 716 
(1993). 
946 71 No 28 Interpreter Releases 966 (25 July 1994). 
947 Ibid. 
948 71 No 26 Interpreter Releases 885 (11 July 1994). 
949 The process for determining the grant of a Protection Visa is subject to subdivision AB of Pt 2, Div 
3 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).   
950 Onshore Protection Interim Procedures Advice, above n 583.  Although, lawyers for asylum seekers 
held at the EPC on Nauru have had more success recently in pushing for consideration of their clients’ 
cases under the Australian Migration Act 1958 (Cth), discussed further below: M57A v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCATrans 330 (27 June 2007). 
951 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 256. 
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as noted by the UNHCR, asylum seekers on Nauru did not have access to merits 
review before the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal or to judicial review.952  
D Severing international obligations from national safeguards 
Thus, the effect of extraterritorial processing schemes is that they not only exclude 
intercepted asylum seekers from the in-country asylum process in the intercepting 
state,953 but also impose a much lower standard of processing in the third country.  
Critically, extraterritorial processing breaks the nexus between international standards 
and the national laws and institutions that the UNHCR acknowledges remain essential 
to an effective asylum process.954   
Extraterritorial processing is therefore objectionable on the grounds that an imposition 
of different standards between asylum seekers who are in-country and those at EPCs 
equates to penalisation,955 a discriminatory deprivation of rights,956 and leads to an 
increased risk of refoulement by denying due process and access to tribunals and 
courts that scrutinize asylum decision-making.957  Consequently, while states may 
defend the quality of their extraterritorial processing by appeals to ‘international’ or 
                                                          
952 UNHCR, above n 584, [2]. 
953 Legomsky, above n 587, 686; UNHCR, above n 584, [2].  
954 UNHCR, Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Inquiry into 
the Migration Litigation Reform Bill 2005, [8]. 
955 Refugee Convention, art 31.  The UNHCR expressed the view before the Australian Senate in 2006 
that ‘[s]ubjecting all unauthorized arrivals by sea to differential treatment which abides by lesser 
standards as a deterrent measure is arguably an imposition of penalties on this category of persons’ and 
thereby a breach of art 31 of the Refugee Convention: UNHCR, above n 584, [25].     
956 UNHCR, above n 584, [22]; J McAdam, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 
Inquiry into the provisions of the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006, 
Submission No 64, 11; Amnesty International, UK/EU/UNHCR, Unlawful and Unworkable – Amnesty 
International’s views on proposals for extraterritorial processing of asylum claims, AI Index IOR 
61/004/2003, June 2003, [6.2.2.5].  See also: Memorandum by Amnesty International UK & Amnesty 
International, International Secretariat, House of Lords, European Union Committee, 11 September 
2003. 
957 UNHCR, above n 584, [19]. 
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‘UNHCR’ standards it is apparent that they in fact fail to fulfil their international 
obligations.   
It is unclear that those who appear to accept out-of-country processing for onshore 
arrivals sufficiently acknowledge this fundamental defect.  Stephen Legomsky, for 
example, despite noting the lack of procedural safeguards in offshore processing 
undertaken under the US policy, concludes that ‘[u]ltimately, the solution almost 
certainly lies in some form of orderly out-of-country processing’.958  Legomsky does 
not, however, go on to spell out how such a process would operate given that the 
fundamental defect of extraterritorial processing is that it denies access to the in-
country processes that provide the basis for fair and effective or ‘orderly’ processing.   
In contrast, as discussed further in section V below, the adverse impact of 
extraterritorial processing on national safeguards has been an urgent issue for many 
legislators in Australia and the US.  Most momentously, in 2006, legislators from the 
Australian Parliament, including members of the Government’s own party, rejected 
the Government’s attempts to extend the extraterritorial processing scheme on the 
grounds that it violated key provisions of the Refugee Convention by excluding 
refugees from national legal and institutional protections.959  Finally, in February 
2008 a new Federal Government moved to quickly abolish extraterritorial processing 
in third countries under the Australian scheme.960   
                                                          
958 Legomsky, above n 587, 695.   
959 Senate, Designated Unauthorised Arrivals Bill Report, above n 883, 60, 65, 74, 75-76; 
Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Official Hansard, No. 
10 2006, Wednesday 9 August 2006, 42-44 (Mr Georgiou), 50-52 (Mr Broadbent) and 57 and 59 (Mrs 
Moylan).   
960 Prior to the 2007 election of the new Government, eight Rohingyan Burmese and 83 Sri Lankans 
were held at the EPC on Nauru: C Hart, ‘Nauru More Likely for Sri Lankans,’ The Australian, 6 March 
2007;  C Hart, ‘Sri Lanka detainees to be sent to Nauru,’ The Australian, 16 March 2007.  By 8 
February 2008, all Rohingyan Burmese and Sri Lankans had been brought to Australia: Senator Chris 
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The absence of domestic constitutional and statutory rights under the US scheme has 
also been a long-standing concern of US legislators.961  Similar concerns have been 
expressed by parliamentarians in the EU in reaction to proposals to establish joint 
processing centres outside the EU.962  Before examining the significance of these 
developments in more detail in section 5 below, it is worthwhile understanding the 
full nature and extent of the schism created by extraterritorial processing between 
international processing standards and the institution that should provide the principal 
means for their enforceability: the courts. 
E Failure to guarantee access to the courts in the host country or in the intercepting 
state after transfer 
1 The right to an effective remedy after transfer  
In safe third country cases, an asylum seeker should be able to pursue remedies 
against the third country in the third country’s courts for any failure by the third 
country to satisfy its obligations under the Refugee Convention.  States who transfer 
an asylum seeker to a third country must therefore be satisfied that in practice the 
asylum seeker has access to the courts under art 16(1) of the Refugee Convention in 
order to challenge, for instance, the legality of his or her asylum determination.963  
Article 16(1), when read with art 14(1) of the ICCPR, requires not only access, but 
also access to an effective means to vindicate rights that overcomes any jurisdictional 
barriers to the courts deciding a matter.964   
                                                                                                                                                                      
Evans, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, ‘Last refugees leave Nauru’ (Press Release, 8 
February 2008).  
961 69 No 21 Interpreter Releases 672 (1 June 1992). 
962 House of Lords, above n 582, [97]. 
963 Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere, above n 807, [8]. 
964 Hathaway, above n 1, 647-50. 
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However, under extraterritorial processing, the fact that asylum seekers are processed 
in the territory of a third country by government officials from the intercepting state 
has raised serious domestic jurisdictional obstacles in front of asylum seekers wanting 
to access judicial remedies in either the third country or in the intercepting state.  It is 
apparent from the following discussion that neither the US or Australian governments 
have done anything to alleviate these problems.  On the contrary, both the US and 
Australian governments have taken pains to entrench the legal and practical barriers to 
accessing effective remedies under their schemes. 
2 Proceeding against the intercepting state in the intercepting state’s courts after 
transfer 
Article 16 of the Refugee Convention effectively ensures that an asylum seeker may 
take the intercepting state to task in its own courts for any failure by the intercepting 
state to provide for protection under the Convention even where the act or omission is 
in another jurisdiction.  Moreover, since the intercepting state’s obligations under the 
Refugee Convention remain engaged despite transfer of an asylum seeker to a third 
country, as noted in section IV above, a transferee should be able to bring an action 
against the intercepting state in the intercepting state’s courts for any deprivation of 
his or her rights after transfer.  Instead, the US and Australian governments have 
sought to entrench jurisdictional and legal barriers that prevent asylum seekers 
accessing the courts in their respective jurisdictions. 
(a) Excluding the jurisdiction of the intercepting state’s courts 
Both the US and Australian governments have attempted to exclude their courts from 
deciding matters involving the processing of asylum claims (or the detention of 
asylum seekers) at EPCs.  They have particularly exploited the fact that the arena of 
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foreign relations has traditionally been the responsibility of executive government.  In 
the US, the political question doctrine has traditionally meant that challenges to the 
executive’s conduct of foreign relations are non-justiciable on the ground that the 
formulation of foreign policy is constitutionally the purview of the political or 
executive branch.965   
At the inception of the US interdiction program, the US Government pleaded the 
political question doctrine in an attempt to deny the jurisdiction of the courts to 
review the executive’s interdiction of Haitian refugees on the high seas.966  The courts 
rejected the application of the defence to the US high seas interdiction policy on the 
ground that ‘the appellants here do not challenge a determination left exclusively to 
executive discretion, but a procedure utilized by the executive pursuant to his 
constitutional and statutory authority.’967  However, the executive’s traditional 
authority over foreign affairs (including aliens) appeared to still influence judicial 
willingness to entertain the executive’s broad authority over interdicted Haitians, 
adversely impacting on Haitians’ access to US courts.968   
Where the decision or action challenged is at an EPC established under a bilateral 
agreement, there may be greater scope for the US Government to plead the political 
question doctrine.  If such a case were brought, based on past experience, an applicant 
might find the Government all too willing to argue that a US court should not accept 
jurisdiction where to do so would require it to inquire into the validity of acts of a 
                                                          
965 Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 US 763, 789, 70 S Ct 936, 94 L Ed 1255 (1950). 
966 Haitian Refugee Center, Inc v Gracey, 809 F 2d 794, 837 (DC Cir 1987); Haitian Refugee Center, 
Inc v Baker, 789 F Supp 1552, 1565-1566 (S D Fla 1991). 
967 Haitian Refugee Center, Inc v Gracey, 809 F 2d 794, 837 (DC Cir 1987). 
968 Haitian Refugee Center, Inc v Gracey, 600 F Supp 1396, 1400 (DDC 1985). 
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sovereign state in its own territory, thereby potentially encroaching on that state’s 
sovereignty.969   
In Australia, the potential force of such arguments have come to the fore through the 
Australian Government’s use of the ‘act of state’ doctrine to argue for the exclusion of  
asylum seekers transferred to EPCs from the jurisdiction of Australian courts.970  As 
explained by the common law courts, ‘[a]n act of state is essentially an exercise of 
sovereign power, and hence cannot be challenged, controlled, or interfered with by 
municipal courts.’971  The effect of the act of state doctrine is to isolate acts between 
governments from judicial scrutiny.972   
In 2004, the Australian Government argued that the act of state doctrine precluded the 
Supreme Court of the State of Victoria, in Australia, from entertaining applications by 
326 asylum seekers detained on Nauru who claimed that the Australian Government 
was guilty of the tort of false imprisonment.973  The trial judge accepted that a court 
would be precluded from determining the lawfulness, amongst other things, of acts or 
decisions of the Australian Government which involved the Court inquiring into the 
meaning or validity of agreements and other transactions between sovereign States. 974  
Whether this might exclude judicial consideration of the lawfulness of the asylum 
process at the EPCs on Nauru is unclear, although there can be little doubt that the 
                                                          
969 Underhill v Hernandez 168 US 250, 252 (1897). 
970 Ali v The Commonwealth [2004] VSC 6 (Unreported, Bongiorno J, 23 January 2004). 
971 Salaman v Secretary of State for India [1906] 1 KB 613, 639 (Fletcher Moulton LJ); Buttes Gas & 
Oil Co Ltd v Hammer (No 3) [1982] AC 888, 938 (Lord Wilberforce). 
972 W Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. XIV (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1964), 35-36. 
973 Ali v The Commonwealth [2004] VSC 6 (Unreported, Bongiorno J, 23 January 2004).  Tortious 
claims are not caught by the same presumption of territoriality that applies to statutory actions: Al-
Skeini and others v Secretary of State for Defence [2008] 1 AC 153, [26] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
974 Ibid [16] (Bongiorno J). 
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Government would have argued so if the issue had ever come before an Australian 
court. 
(b) Establishing the extraterritorial application of the laws of the intercepting state 
Both the US and Australian governments have also made use of the inherent 
territoriality of their onshore asylum processes in an attempt to exclude judicial 
intervention in the asylum process at EPCs.  It is a traditional principle that an alien 
has the protection of the laws of a state when he or she comes within its territory.975  
Conversely, when the alien is not within the territory of the state there is a 
presumption that the state’s laws do not apply to them because ‘[i]t would usually be 
both objectionable in terms of international comity and futile in practice for 
Parliament to assert its authority over the subjects of another sovereign who are not 
within the [state].’976  The so-called ‘presumption of territoriality’ can however be 
rebutted where contrary indications are evident in legislation.977  
The US scheme displays the most obvious impact of the presumption of territoriality 
(or ‘presumption against extraterritoriality’) on the ability of asylum seekers to access 
US courts after transfer to Guantanamo Bay or some other EPC.  Rather than 
dismantle problems of access to its courts, as required under article 16 of the Refugee 
Convention, the Government instead successfully argued that the provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requiring the Attorney-General to consider 
asylum claims made during exclusion or deportation proceedings did not apply 
                                                          






extraterritorially to refugees intercepted on the high seas.978  At the same time, the 
Government also successfully maintained, contrary to the accepted extraterritorial 
reach of the non-refoulement obligation, that nothing in the INA precluded US 
officials from acting extraterritorially to repatriate asylum seekers without first 
undertaking a screening process.979   
This effectively meant that asylum seekers transferred to Guantanamo Bay (or some 
other EPC) faced an uphill battle trying to establish breach of any rights under US law 
that could justify judicial interference in the administrative asylum processes that 
prevailed offshore.  In 1995, the Government successfully argued against claims 
brought on behalf of asylum seekers detained at Guantanamo Bay that alleged that the 
base was functionally equivalent to a port of entry or land border to the US for the 
purposes of the application of provisions of the INA.980  As a result, asylum seekers 
detained at Guantanamo Bay had to establish the extraterritorial application of the 
INA.981  The INA claims failed because of the Government’s successful reliance on 
the presumption against extraterritoriality of the relevant provisions.982  
The Government also successfully argued that asylum seekers had no constitutional 
rights under US law.983  As Gerald Neuman notes, this ‘encouraged the government to 
treat Guantanamo as an “anomalous zone,” a geographical enclave in which 
                                                          
978 Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc, 509 US 155, 171-177, 113 S Ct 2549, 125 L Ed 2d 128 (1993). 
Despite acknowledging the fact that the application of the INA to the extraterritorial acts of the 
Attorney-General on the high seas could have no adverse impact on the sovereignty of another country, 
the Supreme Court was willing to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality in any event: Sale v 
Haitian Centers Council, Inc, 509 US 155, 173-174, 113 S Ct 2549, 125 L Ed 2d 128 (1993). 
979 Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc, 509 US 155, 173, 113 S Ct 2549, 125 L Ed 2d 128 (1993). 
980 Cuban American Bar Assoc v Christopher, 43 F 3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir 1995), cert denied, 515 
US 1142, 115 S Ct 2578, 132 L Ed 2d 828 (1995). 
981 Ibid.  
982 Ibid 1426. 
983 Ibid 1425. 
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fundamental legal norms do not apply’.984  Neuman further notes that this fact 
influenced the Government’s decision to select Guantanamo as a detention site for 
suspects arrested abroad in the “war on terrorism.”985   
Against this background, it should come as no surprise that the US Government has 
strenuously resisted the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v. Bush, which 
countenanced the possibility of the extraterritorial application of US laws to cover 
‘enemy combatant’ detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.986  In a rejection of the US 
Government’s attempts to exercise executive authority over ‘enemy combatants’ 
beyond the reach of US law, the Supreme Court recognized in Rasul v. Bush that the 
habeas corpus jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute extended to ‘enemy 
combatants’ held at Guantanamo Bay.987   
In contravention of its non-refoulement obligations, the US Government has since 
relied on ouster clauses to resist judicial review of not only detention, but also the 
transfer of detainees held at Guantanamo to countries where they fear persecution or 
torture.988  The Government’s position with respect to its military detainees sends a 
clear message that it will continue to resist scrutiny of its asylum process (or lack 
thereof) at Guantanamo in contravention of its international obligations. 
Turning to Australia, representatives for Rohingyan Burmese asylum seekers held at 
the EPCs on Nauru attempted to get around the problem of the limited territoriality of 
                                                          
984 Neuman, above n 774, 4. 
985 Ibid. 
986 Rasul v Bush, 542 U S 466, 483, 484, 122 S Ct 2686 (2004). 
987 Ibid.  See also, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 126 S Ct 2749 (2006). 
988 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-366, §5(a), 120 Stat 2600, 2631 (2006), s 7; 
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are in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v Bush, cert. denied, 127 S Ct 
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Australia’s onshore visa process by lodging an application for an Australian offshore 
visa.989  The intention was to force the Australian Government to consider and decide 
the visa application under the express provisions in Australia’s immigration laws for 
the grant of offshore refugee and humanitarian visas, which obviously have 
extraterritorial effect,990 rather than rely on the purely administrative processes that 
applied to the decision-making of Australian officials processing claims to asylum on 
Nauru.991   
Yet the Australian Government refused to consider their statutory visa applications 
and instead progressed with the non-statutory determination process.  The legal 
representatives subsequently brought an action in the Australian High Court seeking 
an order that the Australian Government consider the visa application under statute.992   
The legal representatives claimed that the Government’s refusal to consider the visa 
applications amounted to an attempt to avoid the possibility that the asylum seekers 
might seek judicial review of the rejected visa claim, and to pressure them to accept a 
non-statutory alternative with no legally enforceable rights. 
The Australian Government conceded before it made any substantive submissions, 
leaving a number of legal issues unresolved.  Even after conceding the case, the 
Australian Government refused to expedite the decision-making process, exploiting 
the fact that Australia’s offshore refugee and humanitarian visa application process is 
notoriously slow and non-transparent.  The full significance of the case was still 
unfolding when the change of government saw the disbandment of extraterritorial 
                                                          
989 M57A v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCATrans 330 (27 June 2007). 
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processing and the Burmese were brought to Australia.  As a result, it remains unclear 
whether this route offered a viable and effective means of circumventing the 
territoriality of onshore asylum processes and a means of accessing the courts in 
Australia, or whether (as appears to be the case) it simply replaced the onshore 
asylum process, with its prescribed decision-making steps and judicial scrutiny, with 
the non-transparent and non-reviewed offshore programme.   
In summary, the US and Australian governments have sought to exploit, rather than 
remove, domestic jurisdictional barriers to their respective courts.  The next part 
demonstrates that they have employed a similar strategy to divert asylum seekers from 
the courts in the third country hosting the EPC. 
3 Erecting barriers to court access in the third country  
The US Governments has also sought to deny asylum seekers the right to challenge in 
the third country’s courts decision-making by its officials at EPCs by relying on the 
doctrine of state immunity, and by insisting on third countries introducing legislation 
barring judicial review of official acts or decisions in relation to the processing or 
detention at an EPC.   
(a) The state immunity doctrine   
In accordance with the state immunity doctrine, decisions and actions by the 
intercepting state’s officials at an EPC are acts or decisions of a foreign state of a non-
commercial, government nature and therefore presumably immune from court 
proceedings in the host state.993  State or sovereign immunity is a doctrine of 
international law that national courts are not at liberty to ignore.994  As the doctrine 
                                                          
993 P Nygh and M Davies, Conflict of Laws in Australia (Sydney, Butterworths, 2002), 147. 
994 Holland v Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 WLR 1573, 1588 (Lord Millett); Jones v Saudi Arabia [2006] 2 
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goes to the question of jurisdiction, whether in fact the foreign state has breached its 
international obligations does not arise.995   
Moreover, following the approach of the European Court of Human Rights to the 
inherent right of access to the courts under art 6 of the ECHR, the state immunity 
doctrine does not breach a right of access to the courts because the immunity doctrine 
is an inherent limitation on the right of access.996  Thus, the question of whether or not 
the intercepting state has complied with its obligations under the Refugee Convention 
and associated human rights instruments may not even be entertained by a court in the 
host country.   
On the other hand, immunity can be waived.  Yet rather than do so, the US 
Government appears to have exploited the state immunity doctrine as a bar to claims 
against its officials working at EPCs in third countries.  The US-Jamaica agreement, 
for example, expressly stated that the applicable law and jurisdiction was Jamaican 
law subject to ‘general principles of international law, including those relating to 
immunity’, and that ‘persons assigned to the operation by the [US Government] and 
agreed to by the [Jamaican Government] will receive privileges and immunities as are 
applicable under Jamaican law and international law.’997  The Turks and Caicos 
Islands agreement also stated that the Turks and Caicos Islands was required ‘as soon 
as practicable after the coming into effect of this Understanding, to introduce and 
support legislation for the purposes of … granting United States military and civilian 
                                                          
995 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2006] 2 WLR 1424, [64] (Lord Hoffman). 
996 McElhinney v Ireland, App no 31253/96, Judgment [GC], 21 November 2001; Al-Adsani v UK, 
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personnel immunity from any civil action brought against them in the Turks and 
Caicos Islands in respect of acts or omissions arising out of, and in the course of, their 
duties in connection with the operation.’998   
(b) Court ouster clauses   
In addition, the US Government has also relied on third country’s introducing 
legislation expressly ousting their court’s power to hear matters relating to official 
conduct or decisions in connection with an EPC.  The Turks and Caicos Islands 
agreement, for instance, expressly insulates US and host country officials from 
judicial review by requiring that the Turks and Caicos Islands pass and support 
legislation ‘excluding from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Turks and Caicos 
Islands any civil action which may be brought against the Governments of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and the Turks and Caicos Islands arising out of, or in 
connection with, the operation’.999  Presumably, the US de facto sovereignty under the 
1903 lease with Cuba is regarded as safely precluding any access to the courts of the 
host state in that instance.   
No such articles are found in the Australian agreements with Nauru and Papua New 
Guinea.  Presumably this is because the Australian Government relies on the fact that 
refugee determinations made by their officials are sanctioned by a Nauruan special 
purpose visa issued to asylum seekers brought to EPCs on its territory for 
‘humanitarian endeavours.’1000  In such circumstances, where the host country’s laws 
sanction the processing (or detention) of asylum seekers at EPCs, the question is less 
one of the state immunity of officials as who to claim against.   
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This problem is illustrated in the Nauruan Supreme Court case of Abbas, a case 
concerning the challenge to the lawfulness of detention of asylum seekers at one of 
the Australia-Nauru EPCs.  The asylum seekers attempted to claim against the 
Nauru’s Director of Police, IOM, and the Australian Protective Services.  However, 
the Nauru Supreme Court found that Nauru’s Director of Police was the appropriate 
respondent to a petition for habeas corpus brought by asylum seekers, not the IOM or 
the Australian Protective Services.1001  Connell CJ referred to the fact that the asylum 
seekers were restricted to the sites of the EPC facilities by authority of a special 
purpose visa issued by the Nauruan Government.1002  Furthermore, the Australian 
protective personnel responsible for securing the facilities were sworn in as reserve 
officers under the Nauru Police Force Act.1003  The detainees were therefore subject to 
the laws of Nauru and should have brought any action against the relevant Nauruan 
officials.  Bound by the laws of the land, the Supreme Court was unwilling to look 
beyond Nauru’s formal national control over the detainees to the joint control 
exercised by Nauru and Australia as a matter of international law.1004    
Thus, an asylum seeker at an EPC may very well face the immunity doctrine or 
ousting legislation if the court finds that an intercepting state official made the 
adverse determination, or, alternatively, he or she might not be able to proceed against 
an intercepting state official where the decision is traceable to the lawful authority of 
                                                          
1001 Abbas Al Sayed Mahdi and others v Director of Police, Steve Hamilton, Manager, IOM, Officer in 
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1002 Ibid [18]. 
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the third country.  However, rather than take positive steps to remove these barriers to 
the courts, the US and Australian Governments have built them higher. 
4 Proceeding against the third country in the third country’s courts 
A final option open to an asylum seeker transferred to an EPC is to seek to enforce his 
or her rights against the third country in the third country’s courts.  If the intercepting 
state complies with its obligations under safe third country or protection elsewhere 
rules before transfer, it should be satisfied that the third country provides this access.  
However, for a number of reasons, effective access has not generally been available. 
The US de facto sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay precludes any chance that asylum 
seekers might have to enforce any claims that they have against Cuba (putting aside 
the question whether Cuba has any obligations given the US control of the Bay under 
the 1903 lease).  At other US-controlled EPCs, as noted above, the US has sometimes 
insisted that legislation is introduced that ousts the jurisdiction of the courts in the 
host country to hear claims against any officials acting in relation to an EPC.1005   
Where such provisions do not exist, e.g. under the US-Jamaica agreement or the 
Australia-Nauru agreement, this does not mean that asylum seekers are guaranteed an 
effective remedy against the respective third country.  The construction of 
extraterritorial processing so that generally an official from the intercepting state 
makes the determination under the intercepting state’s own administrative procedures 
by itself is enough to create a whirlpool of jurisdictional problems.  The uncertainty 
surrounding who would be the appropriate respondent, as already noted, and what 
laws would govern the legality of the determination under conflict of laws rules1006 
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might explain why no cases have been brought to date in any third country courts 
challenging a negative administrative refugee status determination at an EPC.  
In addition, governments have proven all too willing to exploit the fact of the 
existence of bilateral agreements establishing EPCs to argue for a deferential judicial 
construction of third country laws so as to facilitate their arrangements.  This is 
evident in another challenge to the detention of asylum seekers at the EPCs on Nauru 
commenced in the Nauruan Supreme Court.1007  In that case, asylum seekers alleged a 
breach of their right under article 5(1) of the Nauruan Constitution that ‘no person 
shall be deprived of his personal liberty, except as authorized by law in any of the 
following cases … (h) for the purpose of preventing his unlawful entry into Nauru, or 
for the purpose of effecting his expulsion, extradition or other lawful removal from 
Nauru.’   
The Nauruan Supreme Court denied the claim on the basis that the applicants entered 
and were detained on Nauru in accordance with the conditions contained in the 
special purpose visa issued by the Principal Immigration Officer of Nauru.1008  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court found that the power of the Principal 
Immigration Officer to issue a special purpose visa to a person who arrives in Nauru 
without a passport on ‘such conditions as the Principal Immigration Officer thinks fit’  
extended to the long-term detention of asylum seekers brought to Nauru against their 
will under the Australia-Nauru agreement.1009  Prevalent in the court’s approach is 
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deference to the bilateral arrangements between Nauru and Australia, which were a 
pervasive element in other proceedings as well.1010   
In stretching the legitimizing reach of Nauru’s immigration regulations to encompass 
the bilateral arrangements, where it was clear that the arrangement was clearly not 
contemplated by Nauru’s immigration legislation, the courts deferred to an 
operational reality of extraterritorial processing, namely, that the intercepting state’s 
commitment to detain, process and remove the transferred refugees with minimal 
impact on the host country has to date mandated prolonged, mandatory detention (as 
well as substandard processing).1011  Yet it is clear from the powerful dissenting 
judgment on appeal, that the prolonged detention of asylum seekers (four years at the 
time of the proceedings) amounted to a breach of article 5(1) of the Nauruan 
Constitution when read in light of international human rights instruments.1012 
F Summary - Denying access to effective remedies via an avalanche of jurisdictional 
issues 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the fact that asylum seekers at EPCs are 
processed by officials from the intercepting state in the territory of a third country, 
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deliberately buries any potential litigation in any court under an avalanche of complex 
jurisdictional issues.   Practically, enforcing access to the courts and to an effective 
remedy becomes problematic to say the least.  Hence, contrary to safe third country 
rules requiring that there should be access to the courts as required under article 16 of 
the Refugee Convention, in the case of the US and Australian extraterritorial 
processing schemes there has been little or no access to an effective remedy.   
In sum, these observations illustrate that extraterritorial processing entrenches serious 
jurisdictional and legal obstacles to meaningful and effective remedies, further 
undermining asylum seekers’ right to a fair and effective determination of their claim.  
There is a plain teleological line between denial of access to the courts in the 
intercepting state before and during transfer and the inability to access effective 
remedies in the third country after transfer.  Denial of access to effective remedies in 
the third country is an intentional, not accidental, aspect of extraterritorial processing.  
At base, it derives from the intercepting state’s configuration of an extraterritorial 
processing (and detention) regime that excludes its officials from the reach of any 
court. 
V LESSONS FROM THE DISBANDMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN 
SCHEME 
At a time when extraterritorial processing remains under consideration in the EU as 
part of the Hague Programme adopted by the European Council,1013 it might be 
                                                          
1013 The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union [OJ 
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worthwhile to conclude this paper by considering what lessons can be learnt in light 
of the above analysis from the recent disbandment of Australia’s scheme.   
The new Australian Government’s decision to disband extraterritorial processing in 
third countries can be traced back to 2002 when the Australian Senate Legal and 
Constitutional References Committee recommended against passing legislation 
extending the reach of the then Government’s extraterritorial processing scheme.1014  
Concerns grew as the nature of extraterritorial processing became apparent until a 
Government-dominated Senate committee again recommended against passage of 
similar legislation seeking to extend the scheme in 2006.1015  Specifically, legislators, 
including members of the Government’s own party, rejected the Government’s 
amending bill on the basis that the regime violated key provisions of the Refugee 
Convention by excluding refugees from statutory processes, tribunals, and courts that 
were available to them within Australia.1016  The Committee’s report set the scene for 
the effective disbandment of the Australian policy of transferring onshore asylum 
seekers to third countries for processing by the new Australian Government in 
February 2008.1017     
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Following the Government’s change of policy, there is also cause for repeal of the 
2001 amendments, referred to in section III above, that facilitated the interdiction and 
transfer of asylum seekers to EPCs.  This would, amongst other things, restore the 
statutory right to apply for a protection visa with the associated statutory and judicial 
safeguards under Australian law. 
Legislators’ concerns regarding extraterritorial processing are not restricted to 
Australia.  The UK House of Lords European Union Committee similarly rejected the 
UK proposal to establish transit processing centres outside the EU on the ground that 
‘[t]he new proposals do not provide the safeguards contained in national law’.1018  The 
Committee also did not favour the UNHCR’s proposal at the time to establish joint 
processing centres within the EU because of the lack of adequate legal safeguards and 
uncertainties over state responsibility and processing where the joint processing centre 
was outside the territory of the UK.1019 
The European Union Committee’s concerns were well-founded when taking into the 
similarities between the UK proposal and the US and Australian schemes.  As pointed 
out earlier, the UK proposal was driven by the same prevention and deterrence 
objective as the US and Australian schemes.1020  This can be attributed, in part, to a 
longer and more concrete historical association between the UK and extraterritorial 
processing, as reflected in the Turks and Caicos Islands agreement between the US, 
the UK and the Turks and Caicos Islands government, than was previously 
understood to be the case. 1021 
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The UK proposal therefore shares the same procedural shortcomings that drove the 
disbandment of the Australian scheme.1022  The UK proposal, mooted in 2003, 
specifically foresaw that refugees arriving in the EU would potentially be sent to 
Transit Processing Centres1023 situated outside the EU.  Similar to the Australian 
regime, the IOM would undertake the management of these centres.1024  UNHCR 
would have the role of providing for the protection needs of refugees sent there.1025  A 
UNHCR-approved ‘screening system’ would be put in place.1026  The proposal further 
suggested that the sending EU states would finance the IOM and UNHCR to perform 
these functions.1027  The UK’s suggestions are, however, notable for the absence of 
reference to equivalent national safeguards found in the UK and other EU countries. 
The Danish operational memorandum in 2004, which built on the earlier UK 
proposal, did make some suggested improvements on the US and Australian ‘models’.  
First, it put forward a rapid screening process to assess whether an asylum seeker 
should be sent to a ‘protected area’ outside the EU or should be entitled to apply 
under normal refugee status determination processes within the EU.1028  Second, the 
Danish memorandum also alluded to the possibility of a right to challenge a transfer 
to an EPC in a judicial forum.1029   
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Yet a salutary lesson from the Australian experience is that while the fundamental 
schism between international protection and national safeguards remains a hallmark 
of extraterritorial processing schemes, the isolated application of formal safe third 
country safeguards may not produce any real protection for asylum seekers.  This was 
evident in the tainted Ministerial declaration power, discussed in section III.A.4 
above, which saw the safe third country practice of declaring countries to be ‘safe’ 
according to human rights criteria conscripted to the service of the underlying 
deterrence objective of Australia’s exterritorial processing scheme.1030  Other 
safeguards await a similar fate while exterritorial processing remains an exercise in 
defeating access to meaningful national legal and institutional protections.   
For example, to the extent that the Danish memorandum envisaged an individualized 
assessment of ‘safety’ before transfer to an EPC, it would presumably require that an 
immigration official from an EU country evaluate the effectiveness of the processing 
endorsed by the highest levels of his own government and the EU.  If applied in 
isolation without any alleviation of the underlying defects in extraterritorial 
processing, it would most probably simply serve the preventative and deterrent 
objective of extraterritorial processing without offering any real protection.   
It might, for instance, simply exacerbate what commentators have already observed to 
be the difficulty immigration officers face in making objective decisions where a 
senior minister has declared that a third country is ‘safe’.1031  In addition, it would be 
almost impossible for an asylum seeker facing transfer to an EPC to rebut the general 
presumption of safety of the third country where criteria for determining refugee 
status is obscured by administrative extraterritorial asylum processes, rather than 
                                                          
1030 See, below n 861 - and accompanying text. 
1031 Shacknove and Byrne, above n 855, 196. 
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clearly laid out judicial interpretations.1032  Unlike safe third country cases like 
Adan,1033 a transferee to an EPC generally has no recourse to published judicial 
proceedings or to the record of administrative decision-making (there being no 
detailed reasons given for determinations) that catalogue the criteria adopted at an 
EPC.   
Yet at the end of the day it is difficult to examine the UK and Danish proposals 
because they leave so much unsaid.  As a recent resolution of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe made clear, the proposals to instigate transit 
processing centres whether inside or outside the EU are difficult to analyse in the 
abstract.1034  However, the Parliamentary Assembly did make this much clear: firstly, 
‘centres should not replace national well-established asylum procedures in European 
destination countries’; and secondly, ‘centres should not undermine national policies 
and practices and determination procedures and facilities in the countries where 
centres might be established.’1035  In light of the analysis of the US and Australian 
schemes in this article, it is difficult to envisage a scheme of extraterritorial 
processing in any arena that would not breach these requirements. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The Australian Government’s disbandment of the extraterritorial processing of claims 
in third countries, along with the concerns expressed by other parliamentarians in the 
US and within the EU, is ultimately recognition that exterritorial processing schemes 
                                                          
1032 UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001, 
13. 
1033 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adan [2001] 2 AC 477. 
1034 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Assessment of transit and processing centres as 
a response to mixed flows of migrants and asylum seekers, Resolution 1569 (2007), [11]. 
1035 Ibid [13.1] and [13.2]. 
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are anathema to protection under the Refugee Convention and cognate rights 
instruments while such schemes retain their fundamental objective of preventing and 
deterring direct access to fair and effective processing in-country.   
Rather than employ legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies to protect the 
right to a fair and effective asylum process, extraterritorial processing exploits the 
fault lines between these institutions to deny this right.  The collapse of the Australian 
scheme points to the importance of keeping protection at home amidst the national 
laws and institutions that provide the means for the state’s satisfaction of its 
obligation to provide a full and fair hearing of a person’s claim to protection.
  
 




This chapter examines attempts by states to restrict the access of asylum seekers to the 
courts.  However, rather than focus solely on judicial scrutiny of the asylum process, 
this chapter contends that effective state scrutiny of asylum procedures is dependent 
on the co-ordinated operation of appropriate judicial, legislative and administrative 
scrutiny mechanisms.  This chapter proposes that this is best achieved by states 
engaging a range of scrutiny mechanisms that are guided by a common rights-based 
standard of scrutiny.   
From the discussion of the restrictive trend in asylum procedures in earlier chapters, it 
is apparent that the last decade or more has seen a number of traditional asylum states 
restructure their asylum procedures.1036  In light of this trend, this chapter argues that 
is essential that states engage in continual scrutiny of their asylum procedures to 
ensure that they are devised and implemented in a fair and effective manner.   
 
                                                          
1036 C Harvey, ‘Taking Human Rights Seriously in the Asylum Context?  A Perspective on the 
Development of Law and Policy’ in F Nicholson and P Twomey, Current Issues of UK Asylum Law 
and Policy (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998) 213-233, 214. 
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In making this argument, this chapter takes a broad approach to ‘scrutiny’.  To date, 
the asylum debate has focused on judicial scrutiny of asylum decision-making and 
procedures.  In contrast, there is little work on the scrutiny role of the political 
branches – the executive and parliament – in the asylum context.1037  This is a 
yawning gap in the literature given the prevalence of the political branches in the 
formulation, implementation and scrutiny of asylum policy.  This chapter aims to help 
fill this void.    
This chapter’s premise is that national institutions remain an important mechanism of 
scrutiny in the asylum arena.  This does not exclude the important role of international 
supervision and monitoring by the UNHCR.1038  On the contrary, this chapter 
observes that a key benefit of states employing a range of national institutional 
scrutineers of asylum processes is the potential for greater state engagement with the 
UNHCR and other international organizations, e.g. through interaction between 
parliamentary scrutiny committees and international organizations.1039  This 
interaction is important given the lack of any mandatory international reporting and 
review mechanism under the Refugee Convention such as found in other international 
rights instruments.   
                                                          
1037 Although a few scholars have examined the asylum debates in parliament: see, eg, Steiner’s 
exploration of the arguments made by Swiss, German, and British parliamentarians when debating 
asylum legislation over two decades study (Steiner, above n 444) and Osamu Arakaki’s examination of 
the debate in the Japan Diet on the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Arakaki, above 
n 37, 19-).  
1038 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res 428(v), 
Annex, UN Doc A/1775, (1950), s 8; Refugee Convention, art 35.  See generally, Turk, above n 465. 
1039 For example, through the direct interaction between parliamentary scrutiny committees and the 
UNHCR.  See, eg, UNHCR, above n 584 (UNHCR’s submission to an Australian Senate inquiry into 
Australia’s policy of processing asylum claims offshore); House of Lords, European Union Committee, 
11th Report of Session 2003-2004, Handling EU asylum claims: new approaches examined, Report 
with Evidence, 30 April 2004, [58], [76], [80]-[88] (discussion of UNHCR oral evidence before the 
House of Lords, European Union Committee’s inquiry into the UK proposal to establish transit 
processing centres outside the EU). 
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In making the argument in favour of strengthening national institutional scrutiny of 
asylum processes, this chapter also does not mean to exclude the benefits gained from 
co-operative forms of regional governance.  Regional organisations, such as the 
European Union and the Organization of American States, potentially add another 
level of scrutiny to existing national mechanisms.1040  The importance of fostering the 
scrutiny role of regional institutions is especially important in the EU context, where 
the European Commission has assumed the lead role in the formulation of asylum 
policy.1041  The EU experience, which historically was marked by ‘secretive and 
unaccountable’ policy development1042 and a willingness by national governments ‘to 
adopt and apply concepts developed at the EU level’,1043 highlights the importance of 
identifying and strengthening processes for effective scrutiny that utilise all levels of 
regional governance frameworks – including national parliaments.     
This chapter is set out as follows.  Section II identifies the express and implied 
obligations that require states to engage in the effective scrutiny of asylum 
procedures.  In light of these obligations, sections III-V analyze the current limitations 
and potential benefits of executive, parliamentary, and judicial scrutiny of asylum 
procedures.   
                                                          
1040 See, eg, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, above n 433.   
1041 Harvey, above n 1036, 219. 
1042 D Joly, ‘A new asylum regime in Europe’, in F Nicholson and P Twomey eds., Refugee Rights and 
Realities: Evolving international Concepts and Regimes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
1999) 336-357; B Chimni (2000) ‘Reforming the International Refugee Regime: A Dialogic Model,’ a 
paper given at the workshop Alternative Futures: Developing An Agenda for Legal Research in 
Asylum, 1-3 June 2000, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University, 23, n xii (‘Aware of the lack of 
equity in establishing a restrictive regime in one region, the governments in the region, and 
appreciating the weight of protests by the civil society,  EU States have not adhered to the principles of 
discourse ethics within the region. The regional regime in Europe has essentially been arrived at in 
secrecy and through the denial of a role to the European parliament, non-governmental organizations 
and the UNHCR’); Harvey, above n 1036, 219. 
1043 Harvey, above n 1036, 226. 
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II THE REQUIREMENT TO SCRUTINIZE ASYLUM PROCEDURES 
A Judicial scrutiny as an express requirement 
The Refugee Convention, ICCPR and CAT, as well as regional rights instruments, 
create an obligation upon states to ensure that refugees and persons in need of 
protection obtain access to the courts and an effective remedy.1044  Judicial review 
contributes significantly to lessening the risk of refoulement through independent 
scrutiny of the degree to which a state’s protection process complies with standards of 
due process, the true and autonomous meaning of ‘refugee’, and subsidiary protection 
obligations.   
A good faith application of the right of access to the courts requires that the political 
branches take all possible steps to ensure that the courts retain a role in the asylum 
process.  As a practical matter, this requires that the political branches adopt 
administrative and legislative measures that foster access to the courts, rather than 
erect barriers to effective judicial scrutiny of asylum decision-making.  This would 
mean, for example, that an overly onerous leave mechanism which unreasonably 
prevented asylum seekers from accessing the courts would infringe this right.1045   
B Political scrutiny as an implied requirement of the good faith obligation  
The need for the political branches of the state to engage in diligent scrutiny of 
asylum procedures is a logical application of the general duty upon states to interpret 
and apply the Refugee Convention and related rights instruments in good faith.1046  
While the good faith obligation cannot give rise to obligations that do not exist under 
                                                          
1044 See above n 399 – and accompanying text.   
1045 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, above n 433, 30-33. 
1046 See above n 349 – and accompanying text. 
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a treaty,1047 it does obligate states to ensure that those duties that are set out in treaties 
are implemented to the greatest extent possible.   
When applied in good faith, the non-refoulement obligation requires that states 
diligently ensure that their asylum procedures are compliant with evolving standards 
of protection.  In other words, it is integral that states parties should not adopt a 
process that is manifestly unsuited to the task of identifying persons requiring 
protection, but should diligently and rigorously assess and scrutinize the development 
and implementation of new or existing asylum procedures.  In short, fair and effective 
asylum procedures require reflective and responsive scrutiny practices. 
Arguably, given the numbers and complexity of asylum decision-making today, this 
requires the engagement of both executive and parliamentary scrutiny.  Where states 
utilize their administrative and legislative organs to ensure asylum policies and bills 
comply with international standards, they are simply fulfilling the general good faith 
obligation to ensure compliance with their international obligations to the greatest 
extent possible.  This is a logical consequence of the fact that the duty to ensure the 
effectiveness of rights requires that states adopt positive administrative, judicial and 
legislative measures to ensure that rights are applied to the greatest extent possible 
within their jurisdictions.  
C Scrutiny as a component of the obligation to facilitate international supervision 
The need for states to scrutinize and assess their asylum procedures for compliance 
with international standards is also a practical component of states engagement with 
the UNHCR.  States should actively seek UNHCR comment on the development of 
                                                          
1047 In re Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v Honduras) [1988] ICJ Rep 69 [94]; In 
re Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria) [1998] ICJ 
Rep 275 [39]. 
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national or regional laws and policies.  Pursuant to its Statute and the Refugee 
Convention, the UNHCR has competence to supervise the application of the Refugee 
Convention.1048  This jurisdiction expressly extends to fostering the development of 
laws and policies concerning refugees that are consistent with international law.  
Article 35 of the Refugee Convention obligates states parties to cooperate with the 
UNHCR in the performance of its role.  Engagement with the UNHCR should thus 
form part of, and engender, diligent scrutiny by states of their asylum procedures. 
States’ scrutiny of their asylum procedures is also demanded by collective 
international protection standards that states themselves have laid down as part of the 
activities of EXCOM.  EXCOM consists of states parties to the Refugee Convention 
and its Protocol.  The annual EXCOM Conclusions are arrived at through a 
consensual process requiring the agreement of states.  The EXCOM Conclusions are a 
source of basic asylum processing standards that states should refer to when 
developing and implementing their own determination process.1049  At the time of 
writing, the UNHCR is also considering the development of a more comprehensive 
EXCOM Conclusion on Asylum Procedures. 
States may also be required to scrutinize and assess their asylum procedures as part of 
the periodic reporting requirements under the ICCPR and CAT or when responding to 
individual complaints made to the Human Rights Committee and the Committee 
against Torture respectively.1050  As noted by the Committee against Torture, States 
Parties to the CAT ‘have the obligation continually to keep under review and improve 
                                                          
1048 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res 428(V), 
Annex, UN Doc A/1775, (1950) s 8.  UNHCR’s supervisory responsibility under its Statute is mirrored 
in art 35 of the Refugee Convention and art II of the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 
1049 EXCOM Conclusions No 8 (XXVIII)-1977, (d) and (e), No 28 (XXXIII)-1982, (c), and No 85 
(XLIX)-1998, (r). 
1050 ICCPR, art 40; Optional Protocol to the ICCPR; CAT, art 19.  
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their national laws and performance’ under the CAT ‘in accordance with the 
Committee’s concluding observations and views adopted on individual on individual 
communications …’1051   These mechanisms are assuming growing significance in the 
asylum adjudication context as the ICCPR and CAT deal with a growing number of 
allegations of violations of the non-refoulement principle.1052  
D Scrutiny as a component of regional governance frameworks 
State scrutiny is also a necessary component of regional governance frameworks.  The 
increasing role of EU institutions in the development of asylum procedures does not 
absolve states from their responsibility to ensure that such processes comply with 
international standards, 1053 obligating states to diligently and rigorously scrutinize the 
development of asylum procedures at the national and confederational levels.  In 
addition, OAS member states must also respond to the monitoring function of the 
                                                          
1051 Committee against Torture, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, General Comment No 2 (Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties), 
CAT/C/GC2/CRP.1/Rev.4, [4]. 
1052 CAT: Pelit v Azerbaijan, Communication No 281/2005, CAT/C/38/D/281/2005, 5 June 2007 
(CAT finding that Azerbaijan’s extradition of Pelit to Turkey violated art 3 of the CAT despite 
diplomatic assurances from Turkish authorities that Pelit would receive humane treatment); Agiza v 
Sweden, Communication No 233/2003, UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005) (CAT of the view that 
Sweden in breach of art 3 of the CAT when failed to provide independent review of the expulsion 
decision);  Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under 
Article 19: United States of America, Conclusions and Recommendations, CAT/C/USA/CO/2, July 25, 
2006, 5 [21] (CAT expressing concern regarding the US’s use of diplomatic assurances that a person 
will not be tortured if expelled). See generally, S Joesph, ‘Committee against Torture: Recent 
Jurisprudence’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review, 571-577, 574 (observing that ‘[t]he Committee’s 
jurisprudence in individual complaints has been dominated by matters arising under Article 3 of CAT 
…’).  ICCPR: Mohammed Alzery v Sweden, Communication No 1416/2005, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (2006) (HRC of the view that Sweden breached arts 2 and 7 of the ICCPR 
when state expelled author to Egypt where state acknowledged a risk of ill-treatment in Egypt and 
failed to provide an avenue for the review of the expulsion decision); Mr C v Australia, 
Communication No 900/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 (2002), [8.5] (HRC of the view that 
deportation in circumstances where the State party has recognized a protection obligation towards the 
author, and where it was unlikely the author would receive necessary medical treatment for a condition 
caused by the State party’s violation of the author’s rights amounted to a violation of art 7 of the 
ICCPR). 
1053 Goodwin-Gill, above n 344, 146.   
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Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.1054  In performing its mandate, the 
Commission has undertaken important inquiries into the treatment of asylum seekers, 
including the operation of refugee determination procedures.1055 
The next three sections explore in more detail the role of judicial, executive, and 
legislative scrutiny of asylum procedures. 
III JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF ASYLUM DECISION-MAKING  
A Attempts to restrict the judiciary’s role in the asylum process 
The benefits of judicial scrutiny of asylum adjudication, noted in chapter 4 of this 
thesis,1056 have been seriously undermined in recent times by attempts to restrict 
asylum claimants accessing the courts in developed states.  Most blatantly, states have 
sought to introduce ouster clauses or similar legislative provisions designed to 
exclude or limit the grounds of judicial review of asylum decisions.1057  In addition, 
                                                          
1054 Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires 
(1967), Protocol of Cartagena de Indias (1985), Protocol of Washington (1992), and Protocol of 
Managua (1993), art 53 (defining the status of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
within the OAS) and art 106 (establishing the mandate of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights). 
1055 See, eg, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, above n 433.   
1056 See above n 536 - and accompanying text. 
1057 UK: D Stevens, ‘The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002: Secure Borders, Safe 
Haven?’ (2004) 67(4) Modern Law Review 616-631; D Stevens, ‘The Asylum and Immigration Act 
1996: Erosion of the Right to Seek Asylum’ (1998) 61(2) Modern Law Review 207-222; D Stevens, 
‘The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999: A Missed Opportunity’ (2001) 64(3) Modern Law Review 
413-438; R Thomas, ‘Asylum Appeals Overhauled Again’ (2003) Public Law 260-271; A Le Sueur, 
‘Three strikes and it’s out? The UK government’s strategy to oust judicial review from immigration 
and asylum decision-making’ [2004] Public Law 225-233.  In Australia, the Migration Reform Act 
1992 (Cth) introduced a new part into the Migration Act excluding the Federal Court’s jurisdiction to 
review migration decisions under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and 
the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): s 485(1) Migration Act 1958 (Cth).  Instead, judicial review before the 
Federal Court was only available on limited grounds set out in the then s 166LB (s 476) of the 
Migration Act.  See generally, P Mathew, ‘Sovereignty and the Right to Seek Asylum: The Case of 
Cambodian Asylum-Seekers in Australia’ (1994) 15 The Australian Yearbook of International Law, 35, 
80-82.  The Migration Reform Act amendments also restricted the Federal Court’s jurisdiction to hear a 
migration matter on remitter from the Australian High Court under s 44 of the Judiciary Act 1903 
(Cth): s 485(3); Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510.  See generally, R Beech-Jones, 
‘Part 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the Decisions in Abebe and Eshetu’ 24 AIAL Forum 35.  
The government subsequently resorted to a privative clause or ‘ouster clause’ when the earlier 
amendments directed cases to the High Court in its original jurisdiction under s 75(v) of the Australian 
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states have introduced laws defining and limiting the scope of the refugee definition, 
thereby depriving the courts of the capacity to foster an inclusive interpretation of the 
refugee definition in line with international jurisprudence.   
Another measure that restricts access of asylum seekers to an effective judicial 
remedy is decision-making processes prescribed by statute that are exclusive of 
judicial or common law notions of fairness – effectively depriving the courts of any 
role in ensuring the asylum process is fair.1058  As observed in chapters 5 and 6 of this 
thesis, judicial involvement is also effectively stymied by statutory or administrative 
schemes that seek to entrench unfettered administrative discretion or privatized 
immigration control at the ‘exported border’.   Lastly, states have sought to deny 
access to judicial review in cases where border officials classify an asylum claim as 
‘manifestly unfounded’.1059  
B Unsustainable reasons for limiting judicial involvement 
The policy reasons put forward in support of limited access to the courts for asylum 
seekers are unsustainable as a matter of international law.  Commonly, it is argued 
that the courts are an unwarranted check on the state’s capacity to control its 
immigration programme.  Excluding the courts from the asylum arena, it is said, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Constitution: Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth); Plaintiff S157/2002 
v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 (upholding the constitutional validity of the ouster or ‘privative’ 
clause while limiting its operation to decisions that did not involve jurisdictional error).  See generally, 
C Dauvergne, ‘Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times’ (2004) 67(4) Modern 
Law Review 588-615; D Kerr and G Williams, ‘Review of executive action and the rule of law under 
the Australian Constitution’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 219-233. 
1058 See, eg, Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 (Cth).  According to 
the Second Reading speech to the Bill, the purpose of this legislation is ‘to make it expressly clear that 
particular codes in the Migration Act do exhaustively state the requirements of the natural justice or 
procedural fairness ‘hearing rule’’: (Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Official 
Hansard, No. 6 2002, Thursday, 27 June 2002, Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Bill, 
Second Reading, Senator Ian Campbell, 2790). 
1059 Byrne draws a link between the adverse effect of the practice of ‘manifestly unfounded’ claims 
upon appeal rights and the ‘classification approach’ taken in EXCOM Conclusion No 30 (XXXIV) – 
1983, ‘The Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum,’ 
UN Doc A/AC.96/631: Byrne, above n 594, 75. 
  
267
guarantees that government – perhaps with the assistance of a subservient legislature 
– can efficiently and effectively safeguard the state’s sovereign right to control 
immigration.1060  This argument is clearly fallacious.  A state’s international 
protection obligations are an exception to the immigration control norm.  To the 
extent that the courts ensure the effective recognition of that exception within the 
domestic milieu, they do no more - and no less - than guarantee the enforceability of 
self-imposed limitations on state sovereignty. 
Second, it is argued that greater access to the courts equates to greater social and 
economic costs associated with prolonged asylum adjudication.1061  Rosemary Byrne 
observes that in the EU asylum ‘appeals were seen as an often costly and lengthy 
component of procedures in need of enhanced efficiency and became the prime target 
of streamlining reforms.’1062  Governments may point to the recent drop in asylum 
claims as evidence of the success of restrictive asylum measures.1063  Yet assessing 
the ‘effectiveness’ of asylum policies against how well they deny access to asylum is 
                                                          
1060 Introducing the Border Protection Bill in Parliament in 2001 (the Border Protection Bill sought to 
grant Commonwealth officers the power to seize any vessel and take it outside Australia’s territorial 
waters.  Moreover, no civil or criminal judicial proceedings could be taken against the Commonwealth 
or its officers for events occurring during those operations), Australia’s then Prime Minister, John 
Howard, stated: ‘This Bill will confirm our ability to remove to the high seas those vessels and persons 
on board that have entered the territorial waters under Australian sovereignty contrary to our wishes.  It 
is essential to the maintenance of Australian sovereignty, including our sovereign right to determine 
who will enter and reside in Australia.’ Significantly, the Prime Minister also stated that it was 
essential that the removal process ‘not be able to be challenged in any court’ because ‘the protection of 
our sovereignty … is a matter for the Australian government and this parliament’: Hansard, House of 
Representatives, 29 August 2001, 30569-70.  
1061 See, eg, Senator Ian Campbell, above n 1058, 2791 (stating that ‘[t]he Migration Legislation 
Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 sets out a new judicial review scheme to address concerns 
about the growing cost and incidence of migration litigation and the associated delays in removal of 
non-citizens with no right to remain in Australia.’) 
1062 Byrne, above n 594, 72. 
1063 T Hatton, ‘The Rise and Fall of Asylum: What Happened and Why?’, Discussion Paper No 577, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, The Australian National University, March 2008, 27 
(concluding that ‘[t]here is evidence that asylum policies have become tougher and that this has 
reduced the volume of asylum applications. This effect appears to be stronger than some previous 
studies have suggested and it accounts for all of the fall in applications since 1997.  But policy explains 
only about a third of the steep decline between 2001 and 2006—a distinctly smaller effect than some 
politicians have claimed.’) 
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simply wrong as a matter of international law.  Asylum policies should be judged 
according to how well they protect access to a fair and effective asylum process, not 
by how well they prevent access to protection.   
C Facilitating judicial involvement in the asylum process 
The courts in the UK and Australia have had some success in contesting direct 
challenges to their jurisdiction in the asylum arena.1064  In other instances, the courts 
appear content to perpetuate the executive’s traditional unfettered authority in relation 
to the exclusion or expulsion of foreigners.1065  While these cases may be in 
conformity with the judiciary’s strict constitutional function, it ignores or undermines 
the application of fundamental limitations placed on governments by their protection 
obligations.   
In balance, despite judicial activism in certain instances, there remains a very real risk 
that asylum adjudication is heading back towards arbitrary, non-transparent, and non-
reviewable executive decision-making that was the lot of refugees for centuries.  To 
arrest this process the onus is on the political branches to ensure that asylum seekers 
retain access to the courts by putting in place a conducive statutory and administrative 
framework.  This brings the discussion to the nature and potential benefits of scrutiny 
by the politicial branches of asylum procedures. 
IV EXECUTIVE SCRUTINY OF ASYLUM PROCEDURES 
Governments take on the task of devising and implementing asylum processes in most 
jurisdictions.  Governments should not seek to abdicate their responsibilities to devise 
                                                          
1064 UK: Rawlings, above n 41, 391.  Australia: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 
476.  




and implement a fair and effective asylum process to private institutions or to an 
international organization.  As a matter of international law, state responsibility 
attaches to the conduct of processing where individuals fall with the state’s 
jurisdiction.  
States that involve private contractors in the asylum process, for example through a 
requirement that carriers ‘screen’ unauthorised arrivals, cannot avoid responsibility 
for ensuring that asylum seekers have access to fair and effective determination 
procedures.  Equally, state responsibility remains engaged where the UNHCR 
conducts asylum processing at a state’s request.  States who seek to engage private 
contractors or international organisations in this way are not absolved from 
scrutinizing those procedures to determine whether they are, in practice, fair and 
effective. 
A Administrative scrutiny mechanisms  
A number of administrative institutions and mechanisms have emerged across 
jurisdictions in recent years that can usefully be employed in the scrutiny of asylum 
policy and procedures.  They include: independent merits review tribunals; internal 
department review processes that scrutinize individual decision-making as part of new 
performance management and managerial techniques of good administration;1066 
Ombudsman;1067 independent human rights agencies;1068 government auditors;1069 and 
                                                          
1066 Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, Parliament of Australia, Report (2002) 
149–51, 158–60. 
1067 The Commonwealth Ombudsman in Australia is performing an increasingly important evaluation 
function in the immigration area generally: See Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) s 4(4), inserted by 
Migration and Ombudsman Legislation Amendment Act 2005 (Cth) s 8.   The Ombudsman has a duty 
to investigate and make recommendations on the appropriateness of detention arrangements for long-
term detainees: Migration Act s 486O, inserted by Migration Amendment (Detention Arrangements) 
Act 2005 (Cth) s 3, sch 1(19). 
1068 Australia’s Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) undertook a number of 
illuminating investigations into the operation of Australia’s immigration laws and policies: see, eg, 
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budgetary review processes that ensure that administrative agencies remain 
accountable to Parliament for the expenditure of public funds. 
B Self-assessment and evaluation by government 
The successful application of these administrative scrutiny mechanisms in the asylum 
context depends on the extent to which they prioritise rights above competing policy 
objectives.  Without a clear and binding set of rights-based scrutiny standards, such 
mechanisms can too easily be co-opted to the achievement of implicit government 
policy objectives that themselves reflect a deficient understanding and appreciation of 
the scope of a state’s protection obligations.   
This is particularly apparent in the case of Australia’s offshore processing of asylum 
claims, which fell through the gaps of administrative scrutiny mechanisms.  
Beginning with the department responsible for devising the scheme, Australia’s 
offshore processing of asylum claims was subject to a much lesser standard of internal 
monitoring and review by Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
(DIAC).   There was very little in terms of quality assurance checks in the way files 
and personal information was managed nor in the standard of reasons provided.   
There was also no access to the usual independent review and scrutiny mechanisms. 
First, there was no individual external tribunal review of the merits of a claim before 
the Refugee Review Tribunal (as well as no avenues for judicial review).1070  
                                                                                                                                                                      
HREOC, Those Who’ve Come Across the Seas: Detention of Unauthorised Arrivals (1998); HREOC, A 
Last Resort? The National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention (2004). 
1069 Auditor-General Act 1997 (Cth) s 8.  
1070 As noted in chapter 6, Australia's offshore processing of asylum claims was governed by an 
interim policy document issued by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs: Onshore Protection Branch, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs, Refugee Status Assessment Procedures for Unauthorised Arrivals Seeking Asylum on Excised 
Offshore Places and Persons Taken to Declared Countries (Onshore Protection Interim Procedure 
Advice No 16, 2002). Under the procedures, asylum seekers processed on third countries had no right 
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Furthermore, the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission was 
unable to access asylum seekers at offshore processing centres for the purposes of 
evaluating the conditions of their detention, processing etc.1071  The Australian 
Commonwealth Ombudsman was similarly excluded from reviewing the detention of 
long-term detainees despite the power of the Ombudsman to review the detention of 
unlawful non-citizens in Australia.1072 
Where the offshore processing scheme was subject to administrative scrutiny, the 
scrutiny standards that were employed reflected underlying policy preferences that 
prioritised immigration control over the delivery of fair and effective asylum 
processing.   Internal department reviews of individual cases, for instance, took place 
according to much lower benchmarks of good decision-making – requiring the 
reviewing officer to assess the merits of another officer’s decision without recourse to 
any reasons provided by the original officer. 
C Administrative scrutiny of asylum procedures through the budget reporting process 
The triumph of competing policy objectives was also obvious in the administrative 
scrutiny of the scheme that took place according to mandatory budgeting reporting.  
By way of background, DIAC – like most administrative agencies in the developed 
world - participates in a form of post-enactment review through the gathering of 
‘performance information’ with measures presented to Parliament in DIAC’s portfolio 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of appeal to the Refugee Review Tribunal or to the courts:  Senate Designated Unauthorised Arrivals 
Bill Report, above n 883, [3.16]-[3.23], [3.202]. 
1071 Senate Designated Unauthorised Arrivals Bill Report, above n 883, [3.62] – [3.64].  The Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission was renamed the Australian Human Rights Commission in 
September 2008. 
1072 Ibid [3.61]. 
  
272
budget statements and annual report.1073 The collection of performance information is 
designed to ensure that the executive is accountable to Parliament, and through it the 
people, for the spending of public money. In Australia, as elsewhere in the OECD, 
‘[i]n the past twenty years in particular there have been significant changes in the way 
that the executive government presents its budget to the parliament for approval and 
in the way in which it accounts for past expenditure.’1074 Government departments are 
the provider of ‘outputs’ to their Minister, who is the ‘purchaser’.1075  Departments 
are required to assess their programmes against how efficiently and effectively they 
achieve identified policy aims expressed in terms of outcomes and outputs and 
measured by quantitative and qualitative performance measures.1076 
In Australia, the Minister for Immigration presents his or her portfolio’s outcomes and 
outputs to Parliament for approval in portfolio budget statements each year, 
acknowledging in the transmittal letter that he or she does so ‘by virtue of my 
responsibility for accountability to the Parliament and, through it, the public.’1077 
DIAC’s annual report is presented to Parliament as a ‘report on performance’,1078 
                                                          
1073 See Australian National Audit Office, Management of the Detention Centre Contracts — Part B: 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Audit Report No 1 of 2005–06 
(2005) 68. 
1074 Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, Parliament of Australia, 
Transparency and Accountability of Commonwealth Public Funding and Expenditure (2007) 69. 
1075 R Gregory and M Painter, ‘Parliamentary Select Committees and Public Management Reform in 
Australasia: New Games or Variations on an Old Theme?’ (2003) 106 Canberra Bulletin of Public 
Administration 63, 63. 
1076 See Finance Minister’s Orders for Finance Reporting (Incorporating Policy and Guidance) 2007 
(Cth) O 121. This is issued under Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) s 63. See 
also Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494, 523 (Gleeson CJ). 
1077 Commonwealth, Portfolio Budget Statements 2006–07: Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
Portfolio, Budget Related Paper No 1.12 (2006) iii. See also Commonwealth, Portfolio Budget 
Statements 2007–08: Immigration and Citizenship Portfolio, Budget Related Paper No 1.13 (2007) iii 
where words to the same effect were used. On portfolio budget statements, see generally Appropriation 
Act [No 1] 2005–06 (Cth) ss 3, 4; Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494, 525 (Gleeson CJ). 
1078 Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 2004–05 Annual Report 
(2005) pt 2. 
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which evaluates DIAC’s performance against the outcomes and outputs set out in the 
portfolio budget statements and portfolio additional estimates statements.1079 
Parliament then has the opportunity, through Senate estimates hearings, to question 
the Minister and Department officers concerning the realisation of outcomes and 
outputs developed by DIAC to benchmark their performance.1080 
Although formally concerned with the expenditure and appropriation of public funds, 
the outcomes/outputs framework is a centrepiece of post-enactment scrutiny in 
Australia.1081 First, it allows a department such as DIAC, and senators during 
estimates hearings, to get a systems-level analysis, or a ‘snapshot’, of decision-
making and implementation of laws and policies which otherwise would be lost in the 
mass of decision-making in a portfolio that annually delivers a migration programme 
of more than 140 000 people.1082 Second, estimates hearings provide parliamentarians 
with an important opportunity to question department officers and ministers 
concerning the administration and operation of the relevant regulatory framework.1083 
Yet the outcomes/outputs framework is not simply a value free process that reports to 
Parliament whether public funds have been, or are to be, spent in the ‘efficient’ and 
‘effective’ achievement of stated policy aims. In reality, the setting of outcomes and 
outputs, and the determination of what performance reporting measures should assess 
the efficient and effective meeting of those goals, necessarily involves significant, 
                                                          
1079 See, eg, DIAC, Annual Report: 2006–07 (2007). 
1080 See, eg, Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Estimates 
(Budget Estimates), Official Committee Hansard, 23 May 2006. 
1081 H Evans, ‘Senate Estimates Hearings and the Government Majority in the Senate’ (Address 
delivered at the National Press Club, Canberra, 11 April 2006) 1. 
1082 A Metcalf, Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, DIMA Plan Launch, 
18 July 2006. 
1083 H Evans, above n 1081, 1. 
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value laden decisions that can lie obscured beneath general and vaguely expressed 
outcomes and outputs.1084 
The influence of policy on the outcome/output framework is reflected in DIAC’s use 
of outcomes and outputs to report on its performance in relation to Australia’s 
offshore processing of refugee claims. Outcome 1 of the immigration portfolio is 
framed in terms of ‘contributing to Australia’s society and its economic advancement 
through the lawful and orderly entry and stay of people.’1085 To provide further 
guidance, this outcome is divided into supporting outputs.1086 
Output 1.6 (offshore asylum seeker management)1087 covered Australia’s offshore 
processing regime — the so-called ‘Pacific Solution’.  As noted in chapter 6 of this 
thesis, Australia’s Pacific Solution refers to the Howard Government’s policy of 
processing claims for onshore refugee arrivals in the territory of other states.1088 The 
policy was designed to deter future boat arrivals of asylum seekers by ensuring that 
they did not get direct access to Australia’s onshore refugee status determination 
process.1089  Processing took place according to what the government claimed were 
                                                          
1084 See Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494, 523, 525–6 (Gleeson CJ). 
1085 See Commonwealth, Portfolio Budget Statements 2007–08, above n 1077, 19 (emphasis in 
original). 
1086 The output structure of DIAC has been revised in the latest Portfolio Budget Statements: see 
Commonwealth, Portfolio Budget Statements 2007–08, above n 1077, 21–2.  
1087 Output 1.6 was previously classified as Output 1.5: ibid. 
1088 This policy was introduced by a package of legislation in 2001: see Border Protection (Validation 
and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (Cth); Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 
2001 (Cth); Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 
2001 (Cth). For an overview of the Pacific Solution see Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional 
References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Migration Legislation Amendment 
(Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002, 26 July 2002, Submission No 26 (Angus Francis); 
Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry 
into the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006, 22 May 2006, 
Submission No 60 (Angus Francis). 
1089 See Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001 
(Cth) 2; Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 
2006 (Cth) 5. 
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the UNHCR processing standards — a lower standard of processing than that 
available onshore.1090  As early as 2002, the UNHCR expressed the view that 
applying a lower processing standard offshore was ‘discriminatory’ and not in 
accordance with Australia’s ‘international protection obligations.’1091 
The way DIAC developed output 1.6 as a new output for Australia’s offshore 
processing centres downplayed these concerns. Specifically, output 1.6 effectively 
obscured any problems with the programme by subjecting it to performance measures 
qualitatively ‘lower’ than those used to assess the efficient and effective achievement 
of the outputs set for Australia’s onshore regime.  The relevant performance measure 
under this output was: ‘Persons in offshore processing centres … given the 
opportunity to have any claims for refugee asylum considered against Refugee 
Convention standards.’1092  Not surprisingly, DIAC’s Annual Report declared in 
positive terms to Parliament that the offshore processing centres ‘in Nauru and [Papua 
New Guinea] have been effective in delivering offshore asylum seeker 
processing.’1093  Yet this failed to indicate that the UNHCR contested the ‘standard’ 
applied to offshore processing. While from the perspective of identifying expenditure 
it was justifiable to set a new set of outcomes, outputs and performance measures for 
                                                          
1090 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Migration Zone 
Excision: An Examination of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection 
Measures) Bill 2002 and Related Matters (2002) 31.  See also Explanatory Memorandum, Migration 
Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth) 15–16. 
1091 Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Inquiry into the Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002, 
July 2002, Submission No 30, 4 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). See also 
Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry 
into the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006, 22 May 2006, 
Submission No 75, 6 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 
1092 Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, above n 1078, 139.  DIAC 
was then known as this Department. 
1093 Ibid.  
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the offshore scheme, the way this was done obscured the ‘inefficiencies’ in the 
scheme. 
Hence, a major risk of the outcomes/outputs framework is that it can lead to the 
downplaying of the importance of rights in the evaluation process.  Procedural 
qualities like efficiency and effectiveness are introduced as values that ‘overwhelm 
more substantive principles’.1094  The efficient achievement of performance measures 
becomes the benchmark for how government and Parliament should evaluate 
programmes — a form of ‘actuarial justice’.1095  In short, the budget reporting of 
Australia’s offshore processing programme subsumed the rights of refugees under 
disingenuous scrutiny criteria. 
This approach infected that of other executive agencies, including the Auditor-
General.  The Auditor-General assists Parliament in maintaining accountability for 
government spending.  Section 8(1) of the Auditor-General Act 1997 (Cth) appoints 
the Auditor-General as an officer of the Parliament.1096  The Auditor-General, with 
the assistance of the ANAO, performs this function through a programme of 
‘performance audits’ of the self-monitoring and evaluation conducted by 
                                                          
1094 S Armstrong, ‘Bureaucracy, Private Prisons, and the Future of Penal Reform’ (2003) 7 Buffalo 
Criminal Law Review 275, 277. 
1095 For a discussion of actuarial justice, or the ‘new penology’, see generally J Simon, ‘The 
Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 771; J Simon and M 
Feeley, ‘True Crime: The New Penology and Public Discourse on Crime’ in T Blomberg and S Cohen 
(eds), Punishment and Social Control: Essays in Honor of Sheldon L Messinger (1995) 147; R Grattet 
and V Jenness, ‘The Reconstitution of Law in Local Settings: Agency, Discretion, Ambiguity, and a 
Surplus of Law in the Policing of Hate Crime’ (2005) 39 Law and Society Review 893, 905. 
1096 L English and J Guthrie, ‘Mandate, Independence and Funding: Resolution of a Protracted 
Struggle between Parliament and the Executive over the Powers of the Australian Auditor-General’ 
(2000) 59(1) Australian Journal of Public Administration 98, 110. 
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departments.1097  In this capacity, the ANAO has performed a number of audits of 
DIAC programmes.1098 
While an independent agency, the ANAO’s performance audits of DIAC sometimes 
follow the outcomes and outputs framework established by DIAC.1099 When this 
occurs, the underlying policy agenda imbedded in performance reporting measures 
can undermine the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of ANAO auditing as an 
independent scrutiny mechanism. This becomes apparent upon examination of 
ANAO’s approach to auditing Australia’s onshore refugee determination process. At 
the height of the Pacific Solution, the ANAO reported that Australia’s onshore 
processing regime met the quality measures used to assess output 1.2 ‘refugee 
humanitarian entry and stay’.1100  This may have been true.  Yet this finding ignored 
output 1.6 (offshore asylum seeker management), discussed above.1101  No-one 
reading the audit report would know that the Pacific Solution had replaced the 
onshore protection determination process for nearly all unlawful boat arrivals, leading 
to substantially lower standards of procedural fairness. This blinkered approach, while 
perhaps methodically correct from an auditing point of view, failed to acknowledge 
the reality of Australia’s onshore/offshore processing regime. 
                                                          
1097 K Mackay, ‘Two Generations of Performance Evaluation and Management System in Australia’ 
(2003) 10 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 9, 15. 
1098 See, eg, ANAO, The Management of Boat People: Department of Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs; Australian Protective Service; Australian Customs Service — Coastwatch, Audit Report No 32 
of 1997–98 (1998); ANAO, Management Framework for Preventing Unlawful Entry into Australian 
Territory: Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Audit Report No 57 
of 2001–02 (2002); ANAO, Management of the Processing of Asylum Seekers: Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Audit Report No 56 of 2003–04 (2004). 
1099 See ANAO, Management Framework for Preventing Unlawful Entry into Australian Territory, 
above n 1098; ANAO, Management of the Processing of Asylum Seekers, above n 1098. 
1100 See generally, ANAO, Management of the Processing of Asylum Seekers, above n 1098. 
1101 See above n 1092 - and accompanying text. 
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Thus, it becomes clear that administrative scrutiny mechanisms will not cure systemic 
defects in asylum processing where they simply apply non-rights based policy 
objectives as the criteria for the evaluation of those processes.   This finding points to 
need for a greater co-ordinating role of parliament in what administrative agencies 
scrutinize, the timing of the review, and the criteria employed.  National and regional 
parliaments should seek out input from UNHCR and local and regional human rights 
bodies in order to devise appropriate criteria. 
V PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF ASYLUM PROCEDURES 
A The immediate benefits of parliamentary scrutiny of asylum procedures 
Parliamentary scrutiny of asylum processes has important potential benefits.  First, in 
terms of pre-legislative scrutiny, the introduction of new or amending legislation 
provides legislators with an opportunity to scrutinize the asylum process contained in 
those provisions against human rights criteria.  Second, as a matter of post-enactment 
scrutiny, parliament can investigate whether the asylum process established under law 
or policy is operating in accordance with human rights.  
These potential benefits are not out of reach.  Scholars acknowledge the increasing 
benefits of greater parliamentary involvement in the scrutiny of legislation,1102 
through the work of parliamentary committees such as the United Kingdom’s Joint 
                                                          
1102 See S Evans and C Evans, ‘Australian Parliaments and the Protection of Human Rights’ (Papers 
on Parliament No 47, Department of the Senate, Parliament House, Canberra, 2007) 24–5 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/pubs/pops/index.htm>; B Horrigan, ‘Improving Legislative Scrutiny 
of Proposed Laws to Enhance Basic Rights, Parliamentary Democracy, and the Quality of Law-
Making’ in T Campbell, J Goldsworthy and A Stone (eds), Protecting Rights without a Bill of Rights: 
Institutional Performance and Reform in Australia (2006) 60; D Feldman, ‘The Impact of Human 
Rights on the UK Legislative Process’ (2004) 25 Statute Law Review 91; D Feldman, ‘Parliamentary 
Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ [2002] Public Law 323; D Kinley, ‘Human Rights Scrutiny 
in Parliament: Westminster Set to Leap Ahead’ (1999) 10 Public Law Review 252; J Hiebert, ‘A 
Hybrid-Approach to Protect Rights? An Argument in Favour of Supplementing Canadian Judicial 
Review with Australia’s Model of Parliamentary Scrutiny’ (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 115. 
  
279
Committee on Human Rights and Australia’s Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee.1103 
The use of legislative scrutiny as a tool for rights protection has figured significantly 
in these studies.1104  There is also growing awareness of the potential for greater 
involvement of parliamentarians in the scrutiny of the impact and operation of 
legislation after enactment (‘post-legislative scrutiny’).1105 Various UK parliamentary 
reports, for instance, have recommended that legislators both set the criteria for post-
legislative scrutiny by the executive1106 and provide oversight of that evaluation 
process through the existing parliamentary committee structure.1107  
Without distinguishing between pre- and post-legislative scrutiny, David Feldman 
defines scrutiny of legislation as ‘a matter of testing legislation by reference to certain 
standards, and seeking to ensure that it meets those standards, whether or not one 
approves of what the legislation is trying to achieve.’1108 In this sense, scrutiny is a 
‘principled activity’ that tests legislative measures against standards or criteria that 
are independent of the measures themselves.1109  The use of independent scrutiny 
criteria represents an example of what Jeffrey Goldsworthy refers to in a more general 
                                                          
1103 See Kinley, above n 1102, 252–3; Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human 
Rights’, above n 1102, 323–4, 345; Horrigan, above n 1102, 72. 
1104 See Horrigan, above n 1102, 67–9; Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human 
Rights’, above n 1102, 323–4, 347; Kinley, above n 1102; Feldman, ‘The Impact of Human Rights on 
the UK Legislative Process’, above n 1102, 92–3. 
1105 See Select Committee on Procedure, The Working of the Select Committee System, House of 
Commons Paper No 19-I, Session 1989–90 (1989) lxviii–ix; Hansard Society, Making the Law, The 
Report of the Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process (1992) 95 [393]; Select 
Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons, The Legislative Process, House of Commons 
Paper No 190, Session 1997–98 (1997); Select Committee on the Constitution, Parliament and the 
Legislative Process, House of Lords Paper 173-I, Session 2003–04 (2004). 
1106 Select Committee on the Constitution, above n 1105, 46. 
1107 Ibid. See also Commission to Strengthen Parliament, Strengthening Parliament (2000) 44; Liaison 
Committee, Annual Report for 2003, House of Commons Paper No 446, Session 2003–04 (2004) 27. 
1108 Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’, above n 1102, 329. 
1109 D Oliver, ‘Constitutional Scrutiny of Executive Bills’ (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 33, 36 
(emphasis in original). See Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’, above 
n 1102, 328. 
  
280
sense as the ‘structuring’ of the law-making function through the law-making 
procedures of Parliament.1110  Bringing these wider developments to bear on asylum 
procedures stands to contribute to more fairer and effective identification of persons 
in need of protection. 
A third benefit of parliamentary scrutiny is that it can provide the impetus for rights-
focused scrutiny standards that guide not only parliaments, but also governments and 
the courts.  Thus, parliament can be instrumental in inserting international standards 
into the construction, implementation and scrutiny of asylum processes.  Fourth, 
parliamentary scrutiny committees can perform an important role in co-ordinating the 
various mechanisms of oversight that are available through the political branches.  
This may include co-ordinating the roles of Ombudsman and independent human 
rights agencies to ensure greater and more systematic scrutiny of asylum processes.  It 
may also include setting independent rights-based scrutiny standards in the nature of a 
checklist.1111   This would also ensure that parliaments have a greater important role 
in setting the standards for the scrutiny of government expenditure through annual 
budget processes.   
B The long-term creation of a human rights culture 
Perhaps the greatest potential benefit of parliamentary oversight of asylum processes 
is the creation of a human rights culture.   Parliament’s endorsement of rights-criteria 
as the overriding standard for scrutinizing asylum processes can work to infect the 
                                                          
1110 J Goldsworthy, ‘Introduction’ in T Campbell, J Goldsworthy and A Stone (eds), Protecting Rights 
without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and Reform in Australia (2006) 1, 5. On the concept 
of ‘structuring’, see generally K Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969) chs 
3–5. 
1111 See House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Parliament and the Legislative Process: 
The Government’s Response, House of Lords Paper No 114, Session 2004–05 (2005) 7; D Oliver, 
‘Improving the Scrutiny of Bills: The Case for Standards and Checklists’ [2006] Public Law 219, 224–
7; S Evans, ‘Improving Human Rights Analysis in the Legislative and Policy Processes’ (2005) 29 
Melbourne University Law Review 665, 686. 
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executive’s development, implementation, and evaluation of such procedures.  In 
addition, if Parliament clearly and authoritatively lays down binding international 
standards governing asylum processes, the courts have an added incentive and 
justification for insisting on fair and effective asylum procedures.     
These arguments recognize that in the asylum arena (or any other area of human 
rights) parliament need not be simply a conduit for electoral demands as interpreted 
from time to time by the executive.  Use of human rights criteria during pre- and post-
legislative scrutiny is consistent with a rationale for democratic government that 
enables the ‘detection and correction’ of abuses of political power.1112  Parliament’s 
adherence to rights in the scrutiny process fosters states’ engagement with 
international law and their compliance with international obligations.1113   
In this regard, it must be remembered that ‘Parliament’ is a diverse institution.1114  
Parliament consists of not just the political executive, but also a majority of non-
executive members who serve in either the House of Representatives or the Senate, 
‘each with its own power to organize itself as a remarkably autonomous constitutional 
entity.’1115  This underlying institutional dynamic is allowing parliamentary scrutiny 
committees to play an increasingly important role in facilitating the discussion and 
application of international human rights generally.  There is no reason that this 
should not occur with greater frequency in the asylum context. 
                                                          
1112 T Campbell, ‘Human Rights Strategies: An Australian Alternative’ in T Campbell, J Goldsworthy 
and A Stone (eds), Protecting Rights without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and Reform in 
Australia (2006) 319, 323. 
1113 H Charlesworth et al, No Country Is an Island: Australia and International Law (2006) 156–60. 
1114 J Uhr, ‘The Performance of Australian Legislatures in Protecting Rights,’ in T Campbell, J 
Goldsworthy and Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights (2006), 46; Oliver, above n 
1109, 39. 
1115 Uhr, above n 1114, 46. 
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Advocating a greater role for Parliament as a protector of the rights of a minority or a 
marginalised group, such as refugees, has traditionally raised the vexed issue of the 
place and role of the demos in relation to asylum policy.   Matthew Gibney’s work 
provides probably the most sophisticated analysis of this issue.  Central to Gibney’s 
work is his notion of the ‘democratisation of asylum’.  Gibney argues that the trend 
toward restrictive asylum policies since the 1980s is the result of the 
‘democratisation’ of asylum policy.1116  By this Gibney claims that after the end of the 
Cold War asylum policy shifted from ‘high politics’, involving geopolitical security 
issues centred on the Cold War, to ‘low politics’ (‘matters of day to day electoral 
politics, including employment, national identity and the welfare state.’)1117   
Gibney further asserts that the asylum crisis ‘exposes the tense and conflictual 
relationship between the values that constitutional democracies are supposed to 
uphold.’1118  According to Gibney, ‘[e]mbodying the principle of democratic rule, 
electoral politics pushes policies towards closure and restriction; embodying 
constitutional principles, the law inches unevenly towards greater respect for the 
human rights of those seeking asylum.’1119  Gibney argues that a principal solution to 
restrictive asylum policies is to neuter the push of electoral politics by ‘a more 
inclusive politics of asylum, one that goes beyond the law to elicit from the public of 
western states greater identification with and respect for the claims of refugees and 
asylum seekers.’1120  Gibney presciently observes that ‘a new and positive political 
                                                          
1116 M Gibney, ‘The State of Asylum: Democratisation, Judicialisation and Evolution of Refugee 
Policy’ in S Kneebone (ed), The Refugees Convention: 50 years on (2003) at 28. 
1117 Ibid. 
1118 Id at 43. 
1119 Ibid. 
1120 Id at 45. 
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bipartisanship within western states on refugee questions would be needed.’1121  
Gibney’s thesis has been borne out to a certain extent by subsequent developments in 
states like Australia.  There is no doubt that important sectors of public support, co-
ordinated by civil society and aided by a certain level of bipartisanship, fuelled 
backbench revolts against Australia’s mandatory detention and offshore processing 
policies in 2005 and 2006.   
However, too greater a focus on public opinion risks endorsing a crude majoritarian 
conception of democracy.  As Tom Campbell observes, ‘[d]emocratic governments 
have a built-in bias towards the abuse of the power that they are designed to 
control.’1122  Campbell therefore argues that there is ‘a perpetual imperative to 
reassert human rights values and to work out how they may be better protected.’1123  
‘The articulation and promotion of human rights’, says Campbell, ‘is an important 
part of the endeavour to make democracies more democratic and protect both 
majorities and minorities against ever-present internal and external threats to their 
wellbeing.’1124  In agreement with this understanding of democratic government, 
strengthening the institutions of rights-scrutiny within Parliament is a demonstratively 
and normatively preferable solution to reliance on the vagaries of public opinion (as 
interpreted from time to time by the political executive).  This is particularly essential 
in refugee law and policy where the persons subject to the policies are non-members 
and rarely popular - the classic ‘other’ according to Costas Douzinas.1125 
                                                          
1121 Ibid. 
1122 T Campbell, ‘Human Rights Strategies: An Australian Perspective’, in T Campbell, J Goldsworthy 
and A Stone (eds) Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights (2006) 319, 324. 
1123 Ibid. 
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Secondly, at the same time as it raises the issue of Parliament’s role in upholding the 
rights of marginalised groups, asserting a role for Parliament with respect to the rights 
of refugees and human rights challenges assertions of ‘state sovereignty’ as a ‘shield’ 
against international legal rules.1126  Parliament’s capacity to engage independently 
with international human rights law in a way that internally restricts state sovereignty 
requires a rethink of the rhetoric behind such bald assertions of ‘sovereignty’.  Thus, 
the engagement of legislators with the executive in matters of refugee rights also has 
implications for the nature of sovereignty and state’s relationship with international 
law and their international protection obligations.   
In No Country is an Island: Australia and International Law,1127 the authors make the 
important point that the concept of sovereignty is ‘infinitely fluid.’1128  As the authors 
remark, ‘[s]overeignty can be understood as the capacity of a country to cooperate 
with the international community to prevent arbitrary action and the abuse of power in 
all spheres’ (citing Philip Allot’s Health of Nations) as well as a ‘“conceptual 
barricade” against what is assumed to be a meddling or hostile international 
society.’1129   
Philip Allot bases his account of sovereignty – an account that recognizes the role of 
international law in preventing the ‘abuse of power in all spheres’ - on a 
transcendental, Kantian vision of the international legal order.1130  Other scholars, in 
the meantime, have derived the same principle as Allot but from a more positivist 
framework – one that recognizes the role of states in making international law, but 
                                                          
1126 H Charlesworth, M Chiam, D Hovell and G Williams, No Country is an Island: Australia and 
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1128 Id 144. 
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which also entertains the interdependence of national, regional and international legal 
institutions and laws.1131   Erika de Wet has argued, for example, that there exists an 
‘international community with an international value system’ that ‘leads to the 
replacement of the traditional, dualist system with a more integrated system.’1132  She 
observes that in this system ‘individuals and State organs simultaneously function 
both within the national and post-national communities and legal orders.’1133  This 
analysis rings true if we consider Parliament’s direct engagement with international 
law through the scrutiny process, e.g. its ability to request, assess, and question 
submissions from international rights agencies such as the UNHCR.   
It is important to recall, in addition, that the human rights legislators employ during 
the scrutiny process have both an international and national dimension.  While human 
rights may derive from international law, they fundamentally reconfigure the 
relationship between the state and its citizens (and non-citizens).  The substantive 
norms underlying human rights traverse the international and national, binding the 
exercise of public power at different levels of the international legal order.    
Once accepted in principle as a binding set of normative criteria, state organs (the 
courts, parliament, and the executive) inevitably confront the limitations rights place 
on the exercise of public power within the state.  The increasing evidence of the 
application of independent human rights scrutiny criteria by parliaments signals that 
the conceptual force of rights as a normative constraint on the exercise of public 
power has its own momentum irrespective of formal acts of incorporation.  
Traditional conceptions of states’ relationship with international law, which maintain 
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the dualist division between international and domestic law, struggle to accommodate 
this fluidity and interdependence. 
The tendency to overlook the true significance of states’ relationship with 
international human rights law has gone hand in hand with ignoring the importance of 
the divisibility of sovereign power within the state when debating the relationship 
between the state and the international legal order.  State ‘sovereignty’ is often 
invoked as a ‘shield against international legal rules’1134 without any true 
understanding or analysis of how that ‘sovereignty’, commonly understood as an 
expression of sovereignty at the international level, divides within the domestic 
political system.   
VI CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a more nuanced understanding is required of the engagement of the 
different arms of government in the scrutiny and strengthening of asylum procedures.  
This especially requires the acknowledgment of the potentially fruitful engagement of 
legislators with asylum policy as an avenue to cement the role of Parliament in 
interpreting the extent to which a state’s international protection obligations impinge 
on the state’s sovereignty.
                                                          




8  CONCLUSION:  TOWARDS A CONTINUUM OF LEGALITY 
 
This thesis has broader significance for our understanding of human rights generally.  
International human rights are intended to supplement, rather than supplant, national 
institutions.  They depend on a framework of national judicial, administrative, and 
legislative institutions and mechanisms for their successful implementation.  The 
international human rights movement therefore presupposes and demands an 
integrated and rights-based international legal order in which the realization of rights 
is achieved through checks and balances on the exercise of public power within the 
state.   
Expressed in terms of the sovereignty doctrine, in order for human rights to limit the 
external sovereignty of the state in international law, states must implement rights 
within the state as a limitation on the internal authority or sovereignty of government.  
Thus, appeals to the traditional sovereign right of states to exclude or expel aliens in 
order to justify the maintenance of blunt immigration tools that block access to in-
country asylum procedures, or to support the unfettered authority of government to 
devise, implement and scrutinize the asylum process, is fundamentally misconceived.  
States should not avoid the restrictions that rights place on their traditional 
sovereignty by the creation of zones of unfettered administrative power at the national 
level that deprive persons of meaningful protection.   
Checks and balances on the exercise of public power or internal authority within the 
state require the input of parliaments, courts and different administrative agencies.  In 
relation to parliament, this requires more than seeing parliament’s role as simply the 
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rubber stamp of government-sponsored restrictive asylum policies.  While the 
political executive has no doubt used the legislature as a means of entrenching 
executive power in the asylum context since at least the eighteenth century, the 
important point that emerges from this thesis is that this historical dominance did not 
go unchallenged.  Nor should it go unchallenged today.   
Parliament’s potential contribution to a fair and effective asylum process is far too 
important to discard.   Statutory provisions that safeguard the right to apply for 
protection; sections that implant procedural rights, including to merits review and 
judicial review of an administrative decision denying an application for protection; 
and the benefits to be derived from a thorough and systematic rights-based process of 
pre-legislative and post-legislative scrutiny of asylum bills – all these emerge in this 
thesis as important institutional safeguards of a fair and effective asylum process. 
The comparative neglect of parliament’s role in ensuring a fair and effective asylum 
process may also be caused by underlying assumptions about the role of parliament in 
a liberal democracy.  In the asylum area, governments – and some commentators – all 
too often portray parliament’s proper role as no more than facilitating the political 
executive’s interpretation of the wishes of the electorate.  As the electorate favours a 
tough asylum policy, it is the role of parliament to ensure that the political executive 
can delivery it.  This thesis queries this one-dimensional view of parliament’s 
contribution to asylum policy.   
Instead, this thesis raises the prospect of parliament’s role and responsibility to act as 
an agent of rights.  The reform focus should shift from how governments have no 
doubt exploited parliament to devise restrictive asylum policies, to an examination of 
how parliament’s law making and scrutiny processes can act as a mechanism for 
entrenching the rights of refugees within the national legal and political landscape.  
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The extent to which this vision can be entertained for national parliaments within the 
EU, not only only in the asylum area but with respect to rights generally, is emerging 
as a major challenge of this century. 
None of this is to discount the important role and responsibility of the courts in 
ensuring a full and fair hearing of an asylum claim.  However, this thesis does suggest 
that even an activist and liberal judiciary can only go so far in the incorporation and 
protection of human rights.  Eventually, the courts are dependent on the political 
branches to maintain and strengthen the rights-centredness of the constitutional, 
statutory and policy framework within which they operate.  Parliament, the executive, 
and the courts must work together to ensure a fair and effective asylum process. 
This analysis suggests that domestic reform of restrictive asylum policies is most 
likely to occur through the efforts of parliamentary and judicial institutions with the 
co-operation of international agencies and the support and encouragement of civil 
society.  It is clear that parliament and the courts are increasingly taking part in an 
international rights dialogue with international agencies.  There are signs that this 
dialogue may be beginning to pay dividends in terms of forcing the political executive 
to adopt fairer and more effective asylum procedures.  Reform efforts in the asylum 
context should be directed in part at strengthening the means by which this dialogue 
can take place, eg legislative scrutiny procedures that allow legislators direct 
engagement with the UNHCR.  
This thesis runs counter to a powerful force toward tighter immigration control that 
has gripped the imagination of policy-makers in many developed states.  Yet contrary 
to the propaganda that drives the ‘denationalization’ trend, we are not in a new ‘age’ 
of global migration that somehow requires a different (read more restrictive) approach 
to asylum.  Immigration control is as old as the state itself.   The challenge that 
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asylum poses for immigration control is also nothing new.  Yet immigration control 
did not prevent the creation of international protection instruments over 50 years ago; 
it should not prevent their effective application today.   
The argument in this thesis also has broader implications for the realization of fair and 
effective asylum procedures globally.  The argument in this thesis, while directed at 
the policies of developed states, goes beyond them.  The restrictive asylum policies of 
developed states are redirecting refugees to states that are least likely to provide fair 
and effective asylum procedures.  Consequently, developing states are increasingly 
asking the UNHCR to undertake asylum processing.  The UNHCR, which reluctantly 
takes on this role, continually reiterates that its own processes are not a substitute for 
state protection.  The result is a steady decline in the standard of asylum processing in 
developed and developing states.   
It is in the interests of all states to address this decline.  Poor processing standards in 
developing states are an important factor that contributes to secondary movement of 
asylum seekers from developing to developed states.  This creates tension between 
developed and developing states.  Developing states justifiably claim that they are 
shouldering the burden of refugee flows, while developed states resent the secondary 
movement of asylum seekers.  An important response is to increase the capacity of 
developing states to provide a fair and effective asylum process.   
However, developing states are more likely to devote resources to increase their 
processing capacity and safeguards when developed states ensure access to a fair and 
effective asylum process within their own territory.  A principled approach by 
developed states to the asylum process, such as advocated in this thesis, is essential to 
fostering or maintaining the commitment of developing states to their own asylum 
procedures.     
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Thus, the realization of fair and effective asylum processes within individual states (or 
bodies of states) has significance for the worldwide protection of refugees.  The 
achievement of this goal will require a commitment to ensuring greater protection to 
asylum seekers through incremental, practical and hard-won improvements in national 
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